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2Abstract
Achieving Higher Capacity Factors in Nuclear Power Plants
Through Longer Operating Cycles
By
Gabriel Dalporto
Submitted to the Department of Nuclear Engineering in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, January 27, 1995.
Research into designing nuclear power plants for higher capacity factors through longer
operating cycles was initiated. Over 40 representatives from industry were interviewed to
solicit their insights into the capabilities and limitations of current nuclear power plant
designs. The results of these interviews serve as a basis from which to proceed in a formal
effort to redesign power plants for longer operating cycles and higher capacity factors.
Strategies for redesigning power plant systems were developed. These included designing
plants to allow monitoring, inspection, calibration, maintenance and repair (MICMR) closer
to full power than previously possible (at higher modes of operation); decreasing the time
required to perform MICMR, and increasing the times between required MICMR. The
results of the interviews regarding the steam generators were then used in conjunction with
the strategies to illustrate how innovative design solutions can be synthesized from the
strategies.
Probabilistic methods for predicting performance of complex systems were reviewed.
Monte carlo simulation was chosen as the prefered tool for future research because of its
flexibilities in handling complex, time dependent problems with interdependencies, and
external perturbations. The basis of any redesign of power plant systems should be
economics. Therefore, deterministic and statistical cost benefit analysis methods were
reviewed.
A simplified simulation model of a pressurized water reactor was constructed, with the
feedwater system modelled in greater detail. The model's logic was simplified slightly to
facilitate comparison with an analytical solution to validate the model's structure.
Perturbation calculations were performed on the original model to determine the value of
adding redundancy, increasing reliability, and decreasing repair time. It was concluded that
adding redundancy in the feedwater heat exchangers, increased mean time to failure of
feedwater components, and decreased mean time to repair of feedwater components
improved capacity factor significantly. This analysis was intended to show how simulation
techniques can be used to evaluate modifications before costly implementation.
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Chapter 1- Background. motivation and problem statement
Utilities have long recognized that enhanced economic performance through achievement of
improved capacity factor provides an incentive to minimize the duration of refueling
outages. However, because perceived needs for plant shutdown to perform maintenance
and repairs dovetailed with economic optimums for core cycle life, little incentive has
existed to run LWRs to cycle lengths longer than 12 to 18 months. Recently however,
some US utilities have extended their operating cycles to 24 months. Nevertheless, this is
not a widely accepted strategy nor is it obvious that this length is ambitious enough.
The goal of this project is to examine the strategy of improving capacity factor by
increasing cycle length beyond 24 months. Such an examination entails two facets. First,
the identification of engineering activities necessary to insure reliable operation throughout
the duration of the extended operating cycle. Second, the design and economic assessment
of cores which can achieve lifetimes consistent with extended cycle length. This project
addresses only the first facet. A parallel activity is underway to address the second facet.
This project is applicable to both operating and advanced reactor designs. In light of the
large amount of activity already expended on core and safety system design of advanced
systems, it is likely that the next round of advances in reactor safety and economic
performance will be achieved by engineering focus on achieving improved operational
reliability. In this regard, examination of gains to be achieved through enhanced
monitoring, inspection, calibration, maintenance and repair (MICMR) activities is strongly
warranted. This project is focused on the development of strategies to improve capacity
factor by achieving reliable, longer operating cycles by enhanced MICMR activities.
This project is also intended to support the work of Hejzlar, Tang, and Mattingly. [Refs. 1,
2 and 3]
The rest of this chapter is intended to provide a background of the current economic
environment in the electric utility industry, and the economic driving factors for nuclear
power in particular.
1.1 Competition
1.1.1 Domestic environment
Historically, US utilities operated as a cost-plus industry. A cost plus environment meant
that the investors were assured of a "fair rate of return." All costs incurred by the utility in
operations were covered in the rate base. The investors , however, received an additional
return on their capital investments, which was also covered in the rate base. If electrical
production costs increased, the utilities appealed to the Public Utility Commission (PUC)
for a rate increase. Under this system, there was little incentive for producing power
cheaply, as long as utilities could justify costs to the PUC. [Ref. 4]
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With the passage of the 1992 Energy Policy Act, the United Sates electric utility industry
started down the road to competition. Thus, only recently has widespread competition
emerged. Under the new system, utilities are beginning to be required to purchase
independent power producers' (IPPs) electricity if it is cheaper than can be produced
through the utility. This allows small, non-utility producers to construct cheap, natural gas
combined cycle power plants, and undercut the utilities. Fortunately for the utilities, the
capacity of the IPPs is still relatively small. Unfortunately, it is growing. Therefore, there
is now significant impetus in the United States to make utility produced power cost
competitive.
This is especially true for nuclear power plants. Many of these plants have enormous
capital debt, which increases the overall costs associated with nuclear generation.
Compounding that is the historically poor operating performance achieved by these plants
and the high operating and maintenance costs. These components of cost will be discussed
later, but nuclear generating costs are, in general, slightly higher than coal and significantly
higher than natural gas powered electrical generation. The advantage of nuclear power is its
relatively cheap fuel.
1.1.2 International environment
Internationally, nuclear utilities are facing the same pressures. Where available, natural gas
fired power plants can produce electricity cheaply and efficiently. Where natural gas is not
plentiful, coal, oil and hydro powered generators are becoming more competitive with
nuclear generation. Compounding the economics is the issue of waste disposal. The
United Kingdom has deregulated its utility industry and Japan is proceeding towards
deregulation. Although regulatory structures differ from country to country, in the long
run, cheaper, simpler electric production sources have the potential to overtake the market.
Therefore, the problem of nuclear power economics is a global issue, not just a localized
political issue.
1.1.3 Summary
Electric power production is becoming a competitive industry. Worldwide, nuclear utilities
will soon face pressures to become cost competitive. There are several ways to reduce
production costs - each of which will be discussed subsequently. However, if large
generating stations fail to become competitive, they may eventually be forced out of
business.
1.2 The economics of nuclear electricity generation [Ref. 5]
This section is intended to provide an overview of the elements of cost associated with
nuclear power electricity generation. This section will make explicit in a somewhat
simplified fashion the factors that affect nuclear power costs, and will suggest strategies for
improving nuclear power economics.
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For any business, net profits are related to revenues and expenses by the following
equation:
NP [$] = R- E (1.1)
Where NP [$] = Net Profits
R [$] = Revenues
E [$] = Expenses
To understand the importance of this simple equation, consider how it affects the overall
costs to consumers. In a competitive industry, the maximum price that utility generated
electricity can be sold at is set by the price (P) of competitor's power expressed in
[$/MWh-e]. If the plant cannot sell power at least as cheaply as its competitor, it cannot
sell power. The revenues generated over a given time period are:
R [$] = P * C * Tgen (1.2)
Where P [$/MWe-h] = Price
C [MWe] = Nominal electric generating capacity
Tgen[h] = Generating Time
For a given amount of power produced over a given production time, revenues are fixed.
If expenses are greater than revenues, then the plant loses money. This does not mean
that it should be shut down, but it certainly means that the expected return to investors is
insufficient. Let us look more deeply into the components of revenues and costs.
1.2.1 Revenues
As mentioned before, revenues are a function of the rate of power production multiplied
by the time this rate of production is maintained multiplied by the mean price received for
the power sold. To further decompose it:
R = P * C * (r1 / ) * CF * T (1.3)
where CF = Mean capacity factor
(fl/Tlo) = Thermal efficiency / nominal thermal efficiency
T [h] = Total period of time under consideration
What is seen is that there are a number of ways to increase revenues. The first is to
increase the electric power capacity rating of the plant, C. This usually requires
modifications such as revisiting technical specifications, re-doing safety calculations with
better analysis tools, and when necessary, modifying plant safety systems to accommodate
the power uprating. Therefore, the first assumption made is that this option has been fully
exploited.
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The second way to increase revenues is to increase the ratio of the average plant thermal
efficiency over the period in question to the nominal thermal efficiency over all time
(rl/tl). The reason it fluctuates is that the temperature of the ultimate heat sink varies
from day to day and from season to season. So rq = rl(t), and is out of control of the
operator. It is further assumed that the nominal thermal efficiency has been fully
maximized.
The third way to increase revenues is to increase average capacity factor. The capacity
factor is defined as:
CF = Actual energy produced over a period of time (1.4)
Maximum energy that could be produced over that period.
So if a plant ran for 200 effective full power days in the period of 1 year, CF = 200 / 365 =
0.55, or 55%. If the plant were available for 300 EFPDs, the capacity factor would be
82%, and revenues would increase by 50%. Increasing capacity factor will be one of the
main focuses of this thesis.
Finally, for practical purposes, T is merely an accounting tool that sets the period of time
over which revenues are to be computed. However, in the long run, T can be used to
represent the design life of the plant. As such, life extension will affect Tma,, - the
maximum operating life of the plant. However, that is beyond the scope of this project.
1.2.2 Expenses
Like revenues, expenses can be further decomposed. Let us look at the various cost
components associated with nuclear power, which for present purposes may be
disaggregated as follows:
E [$] = (O&M) + S + F + CP + RC + FF + SR (1.5)
Where O&M [$] = Operations and maintenance costs
S [$] = Salaries
F [$] = Fuel costs
CP [$] = Capital costs
RC [$] = Electrical replacement energy costs
FF [$] = Future expense funds
SR [$] = Safety regulation costs
Now, let's look at each component individually.
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1.2.2.1 Operations and maintenance costs
Operations and maintenance costs (O&M) are those costs associated with maintaining the
plant material condition and providing operations services.
O&M costs = (M + O) (1.6)
Where M [$] = material condition costs
O [$] = operations services costs
1.2.2.2 Salaries
Salaries (S) are associated with the payment of the workforce necessary to produce and
distribute power to the consumer. They are not explicitly included in O&M costs here,
because they are such a dominant cost that they deserve to be considered separately. (In
general, however, discussions of operations and maintenance costs typically include
personnel expenses.) The total salary paid is the product of the mean workforce size
(which can vary in time due to significant augmentation during refueling outages), the
average wage (including overhead and benefits), and the time period in consideration.
S = (CW) * H * T (1.7)
Where (ME) [person] = Mean workforce
H [$/person-h] = Hourly wage
1.2.2.3 Fuel costs
Fuel costs (F) are those costs associated with maintaining the heat source to produce
electricity. In standard light water reactors, the fuel costs are a function of unit energy
costs (Fc), electrical power capacity (C), thermal efficiency (E), capacity factor (CF) and
cycle time (T). In an online refueling scheme, the unit energy costs are constant because
enrichment does not need to increase for longer cycles. This is a significant advantage over
batch refueling schemes, because in going to longer operating periods in batch schemes,
the enrichment and reactivity control costs can increase significantly.
F = Fc * (C/E) * CF * T (1.8)
Where F, [$/MWth h] = unit energy costs
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1.2.2.4 Capital costs
Capital costs (CP) are associated with paying back the investors for their initial capital
outlay with a fair rate of return included. It is a function of the plant value (V) and the
fraction of the power plant value which is charged as an expense (L) during the time
interval, (T). Here we assume all such costs are levelized over the life of the plant (i.e.
charged at an equivalent constant rate).
CP = (V) * L * T (1.9)
Where V [$]
L [$/$h]
= Plant value
= Rate of capitalization
1.2.2.5 Replacement power costs
Replacement electrical energy is the cost (RC) of buying more expensive electricity from
external sources to replace the power deficit experienced when one of the utility's operating
plants is off-line or at reduced power. It is a function of the average power deficit, the unit
replacement power cost, and the time.
RC = DP) * C * T (1.10)
Where DP [MWe]
Cr [$/MWe]
- average power deficit
= power rating * capacity loss
= unit replacement power cost
1.2.2.6 Future expense funds
Future expenses funds (FF) are associated with the costs of plant decommissioning and
spent fuel and waste disposal, and time.
FF=(D+W)*T (1.11)
Where D [$/h]
W [$/h]
= rate of savings for decommissioning
= rate of savings for waste disposal
1.2.2.7 Safety regulation costs
Safety regulation is the cost (SR) associated with normal licensing fees and with punitive
actions by the safety regulatory authority. This is a difficult quantity to define or quantify.
Nevertheless, it is real and should be included in any discussion of nuclear related costs. It
is a function of fines and backfit hardware.
SR =[P, + B] * T (1.12)
Where Pr [$/h]
B [$/h]
= Average cost of regulatory fees and fines per unit time
= Cost of backfit hardware per unit time
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This concludes the summary of the factors associated with plant expenditures:
Expenses [$] = { (M+S) + C*Fc(CF/ ) + WF*H + V*L + DP*Cr + (1.13)
(D+W) + [Pr+ B]} * T
1.2.3 Net profits, revisited
Combining the results of the previous discussions yields a formula that summarizes the
factors comprising nuclear power economics.
Net Profits [$] = [C * CF * (rl/rlo) * P}- { (M+S) + C*Fc(CF/n) + WF*H + (1.14)
V*L + DP*Cr + (D+W) + [Pr + B]}] * T
This research is intended to increase net profits by improving capacity factor. Clearly,
capacity factor affects many aspects in the above equation, the most important of which is
revenues. The more subtle effects on net profits are increased fuel costs, decreased
replacement power costs, and decreased regulatory costs.
For a continuous refueling scheme, the fuel costs are only a linear function of capacity
factor (Revenues Fuel Costs = Constant). In this scheme, going to a longer cycle or a
higher capacity factor does not increase the ratio of revenues to fuel costs. Therefore, the
factors that we will consider in this thesis are (1) increased revenues, (2) decreased
replacement power costs, and to a lesser extent (3) decreased regulatory-associated
availability losses.
For a batch refueling cycle, capacity factor does not greatly affect fuel cycle costs. In
reality, current US LWR owners typically plan to run at a high capacity factor between
refuelings. If they run very well, they use up all the excess reactivity in the core. If they
do not run well, then they may be forced to "throw out" part of the excess reactivity (i.e.
off-load a batch fraction of the core that is not fully utilized). So for a batch cycle, the fuel
costs for a given cycle length are not dramatically affected by an improved capacity factor.
However, increasing the cycle length can significantly increase the unit fuel costs, by
increasing uranium ore and enrichment requirements.
1.3 The state of current plants
US PWRs and BWRs had a three year median capacity factor of about 72% for the 1991-
1993 period. [Ref.6] In Canada - where refueling outages are not a limitation because of
the online refueling capabilities of the CANDU reactors - the three year average capacity
factor is around 69%.[Ref. 7] These levels of performance are typical for most operating
reactors around the world - with a few notable exceptions that are discussed later. There
are two reasons for this mediocre record. First, when these plants run, they often run
poorly. Maintenance or safety problems force plants to reduce power or shut down
frequently. Second, LWRs have to shut down periodically for refueling or major
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surveillances, calibrations, maintenance, and repairs. The duration of these outages vary
significantly betwen BWRs and PWRs of various standard designs and between plants of
the same standard design operated by different utilities. In the US, they are on the order of
65 days every 18 to 24 months, but range from about 30 days to over 100 days depending
on the specific plant.
The two areas of capacity loss suggest three ways to increase capacity. First, decrease
major outage durations. Second, increase the period between major outages. Third,
improve operational period availability (i.e. reduce forced outages). Figure 1.1 illustrates
how shorter outages and less frequent outages affect capacity factors, given perfect
reliability during normal operations (i.e. no forced outages).
Maximum theoretical capacity factor
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Figure 1.1
Two facts emerge from Figure 1.1. First, if outages can be completed very quickly (say 15
days), there is very little gain from increasing cycle length beyond 12 to 18 months.
Second, if outages cannot be performed very quickly, then significant improvement in
capacity factor can be achieved by extending the cycle length.
1.3.1 Short outage / short cycle strategy
The short outage / short cycle strategy is an approach that Finland has perfected. Finnish
outages average 15 days (they actually have alternating 10 and 20 day outages), and they
operate very reliably during the cycle. From the Figure 1.1 we predict that their capacity
factor should approach 96%. In fact, it is around 93%, which is outstanding compared to
world performance. [Ref. 8] There are underlying conditions allowing the Finns to achieve
such short outages. First, they have a highly skilled labor force which returns around 90%
of its outage force annually. This assures that outage personnel are familiar with the plant
and require minimal or no training annually. Second, their plants were designed for ease of
maintenance. For example, they have extra laydown space, which is at a premium in US
plants. Third, they fully utilize specialized tools to speed up the outages. Finally, they
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have outstanding planning. All of these factors allow them to achieve very short, but
highly effective outages. [From interview with Finnish utility representative, coded U27.]
As a counter example to the effectiveness of the short outage, short cycle approach,
consider Japanese outages. Like the Finns, the Japanese are on an annual cycle and run
extremely reliably between planned outages. However, the Japanese have very long
outages relative to the Finns - around 80 days. This is partially due to regulatory
requirements that force them to do more maintenance than may be necessary on an annual
basis. But clearly significant gains in capacity factor could be realized in Japan by
extending cycle length, and keeping the outage duration at 80 days.
1.3.2 Long cycle strategy
For typical major outage times on the order of 55 days or longer, it makes very much
sense to increase the period between major outages to greater than one year, and possibly
up to five years. Note, however, that there is a saturation effect. The gain is very flat past
about three year outage periods. A note of caution about this figure. It is drawn to
illustrate how capacity factor changes vs. cycle length for a GIVEN outage duration. In
reality, the outage duration may increase (or decrease) as cycle length increases.
Consider the example of Pickering 7 - a CANDU plant owned by Ontario Hydro.
Pickering 7 recently ran for 894 days straight - a new world record.[Ref. 9] This is nearly
two and a half years, and is in line with the cycle lengths that should be considered in
future designs. The ultimate goal of this line of research is to design a plant capable of
doubling Pickering 7's performance.
1.3.3 Effects of running better during the cycle
Up to this point, the maximum hypothetical capacity factor (MHCF) was considered.
MHCF is the capacity factor the plant would achieve if it ran perfectly during the cycle,
and the only down time was due to the planned outage. Let us look at the effect of
improving operating capacity factor (OCF). The operating capacity factor is the capacity
factor achieved by the plant during the cycle. It is defined as the electricity produced
during the operating cycle divided by the electricity that could have been produced if the
plant ran at rated capacity 100% of the time during the operating cycle. Figure 2 plots the
affect of OCF on overall capacity factor for a 55 day outage, as a function of different
cycle lengths.
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What Figure 1.2 shows is that it does not matter how long the cycle length is if the plant
does not run well during the operational period. A 55 day outage is certainly achievable,
even for 2 year cycles. But what is seen in Figure 1.2 is that when the operational
availability hovers around 80%, the capacity factor is constrained to 70-75% even for
increasing cycle lengths. This confirms the previous hypothesis that improving operational
availability can significantly improve capacity factor and nuclear power economics.
As previously mentioned, reducing outage duration is beyond the scope of this research.
Outage management is already being addressed by many experts. However, it is worth
noting that the methods utilized for improving operational availability and increased cycle
length may decrease outage duration. Take the specific example of the Pilgrim nuclear
power plant. Pilgrim's critical path item is their ECCS. [Utility representative, coded
U19]. Pilgrim has only 2 independent trains, both of which must be maintained during the
refueling outage. The ECCS maintenance requirements dictate the length of the outage and
the cycle length. By designing for extended cycle length, the capability to surveil, test, and
maintain this system online would have to be addressed. As such, this critical path item
will be removed from the outage scope, and the outage is free to decrease to the next most
limiting challenge. In essence, two difficulties, extended cycle lengths and a critical path
outage item, are dealt with by one strategy - online surveillance, testing, and maintenance.
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1.4 Research directions
The problems limiting capacity factors have been delineated. The next task is to identify the
areas where research needs to be performed to achieve a higher capacity factor through an
extended operating cycle. As shown in Figure 3, the natural division is between fuel cycle
physics and plant engineering:
IPTLWR - online|
eling I
:ycle with Pu
fR cycle 
Minimize
planned outages
IMinimize
forced outages
Figure 1.3 - Research directions
This report is concerned with designing the plant to accommodate whichever fuel cycle /
reactor combination is chosen. In the subsequent chapters, a strategy is developed to
/suggest advantageous system alignments and modifications, and analysis techniques will
be identified and utilized to predict the effects of modifications on plant performance. For
now, focus is in the plant engineering direction. It is desired to design power and support
systems capable of operating reliably for extended periods of time. Although the specifics
of the fuel cycle and reactor type will affect the design and requirements of certain of plant
systems, initial focus will be on those systems common to the different reactor types;
specifically, the power production systems such as feedwater, steam supply, condenser,
turbine, reactor coolant pumps, service water, and other continuously operating systems.
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Chapter 2 - Strategy for improving capacity factor
Several areas were identified in Chapter 1 of having potential to increase capacity factor.
Those areas were shorter outage duration, longer cycle length, and improved operating
cycle performance. From these broad areas for improvement, several potential strategies
emerge which will be discussed in this section.
One of the goals of the plant operator and plant designer is to find ways to minimize
unavailability. A general approach to accomplishing this goal is to be able to perform
required critical activities (monitoring, inspection, calibration, maintenance, and repair)
* at higher modes of operation (closer to full power)
· quicker
· less frequently.
Modes of operation are generally defined as follows. Mode 1 is defined as power
operation. The plant is typically producing greater than 15% power. Mode 2 is defined as
startup/low power operation. The plant is operating at less than 15% power. Mode 3 is
defined as hot standby. The plant is at less than 3% power, but is close to critical. Mode 4
is defined as hot shutdown. The plant is still in hot conditions (between approximately
260 °C and 290 °C for a PWR), but all rods are inserted into the core, and the reactor is
subcritical. Mode 5 is defined as cold shutdown. The plant primary temperature is below
approximately 93 °C. Mode 6 is defined as refueling shutdown. The plant primary
temperature is below approximately 65 °C, and the primary system is open.
2.1 Moving monitoring, inspection, calibration, maintenance,
and repair to higher modes of operation
The first strategy for improving capacity factor is shortening the amount of time spent out
of power production modes. While in lower modes of operation, less or no electrical
energy is produced. This reduces revenues and profits, as discussed in Section 1.2. It
takes increasing amounts of time to go to and return from progressively lower modes of
operation, resulting in additional profit losses.
2.1.1 Power maneuvering
Nuclear power plants can typically change power at a rate of 5% per minute without
exceeding technical specification limits. Therefore, the time loss associated with
maneuvering between power states is small compared to the time required to maintain the
lower power level for monitoring, inspection, calibration, maintenance and/or repair.
2.1.2 Maneuvering between full power and hot shutdown
Although a nuclear power plant can go from full power to hot shutdown in a matter of
seconds as a result of a reactor trip, the subsequent transient may cause safety setpoints to
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be exceeded, resulting in a safety system actuation. Therefore, it is desirable to approach
shutdown in a controlled manner. As stated, power can be increased or decreased at a rate
of 5% per minute - the plant can go from hot standby to full power in a matter of minutes.
In practice, maneuvering plant power is rarely this simple, but as a first approximation,
assume that the time required to get between full power and hot shutdown is short.
Therefore, most of the lost electrical generation comes from the time to restore (repair) the
plant to its functional state.
2.1.3 Moving from hot shutdown to cold shutdown
The time required to bring the plant from hot shutdown to cold shutdown is not negligible.
The maximum primary system heatup and cooldown rates are 100 degrees Fahrenheit per
hour. This is set by the thermal stresses put on the reactor vessel. Therefore, it takes a
combined minimum of a half a day to cooldown and heat up, ignoring time spent in cold
shutdown. In actuality, heatup and cooldown are performed slower than this. Intermediate
states and steps slow the rate at which the reactor approaches power operation. Therefore,
it is assumed that a combined period of at least two days is required to cool the plant down
from power to cold shutdown conditions and then to heat the plant up to return to power
operation.
2.1.4 Moving between cold shutdown and refueling shutdown
In the refueling shutdown condition, the primary system has to be opened. The reactor
must be cooled further (typically under 150 °F) and the plant must be put in the refueling
shutdown condition. Opening the primary system requires breaking the pressure boundary
and requires laborious effort to insure proper controls are observed from a safety and
radiological perspective. It is assumed that the additional controls contribute to add a
combined week in going into and out of refueling shutdown conditions, starting from cold
shutdown.
2.1.5 At power monitoring, inspection, calibration, maintenance, and/or
repair
It should be obvious that the value of avoiding lower modes of operation is real and
significant. It was indicated in the industry interviews that if all critical activities could be
performed at power without degrading safety, then capacity factor would be increased
substantially. Major outages would be reduced to refueling outages only - a maximum of
about 20 days. This may be unrealistic, but the value of online maintenance becomes
apparent.
However, industry interviews also expressed some reservations about performing all or
most critical activities at power. Representatives from all backgrounds expressed
reservations over the impacts on safety of performing more activities at full power. For
example, when a system is taken out of service for repair, it is unavailable for safety
applications until it is returned to service. If careful consideration is not given, this can
increase the overall risk associated with the operation of the plant.
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2.1.6 Strategy matrix for monitoring, inspection, calibration, maintenance,
and repair at higher modes of operation.
Thus, Figure 2.1 suggests strategies for approaching standby safety system maintenance.
The location of the item in the grid shows the typical conditions under which the given
operations are currently performed. The arrows signify where it is desirable to perform the
given operations. For the specific example of the standby safety system that is inspected at
cold shutdown conditions to verify its operability, two strategies are suggested. First, it is
desirable to perform the inspections closer to full power. Second, it would also be
advantageous if monitoring could be used to verify the operability in place of inspection,
and at higher modes of operation. The matrix also suggests performing maintenance and
repair for these systems at higher modes of operation.
Performance of these activities at full power could result in savings in two areas. First, if
safety system inspection, maintenance and repair are critical path outage items, then
performing these activities at power could decrease outage duration. Second, if the standby
safety system limits cycle length, performing these functions at power allow extended
operating cycles without requiring additional costly outages.
Monitor Inspect Calibrate Maintain Repair
Full Power Desired Desired Desired Desired
Reduced Power _____
Hot Standby _
Hot Shutdown
Cold Shutdown Present Present
Primary
System Opened
Figure 2.1 - Monitor, inspect, calibrate, maintain and repair in higher
modes of operation - standby safety system as an example
2.2 Shortening repair time (MTTR)
The second strategy involves decreasing the mean time to repair. This applies to
operations, unplanned outages, and major planned outages. The mean time to repair can
also be thought of as the mean time to perform required monitoring, inspections,
calibration, maintenance, and repairs. In short, it is the average amount of time required to
return the entity to the desired state or to verify that the entity is already in the desired state.
The time required to repair a component or system directly affects capacity factor. When a
component important to safety fails, the plant is put in a limiting condition for operation. If
that component is not repaired within a specified period of time, the plant will be required
to go to a lower power or a lower mode of operation, resulting in economic losses for the
utility. In other cases, a failure may result in an immediate loss of power. In both cases, it
is economically advantageous to repair the component or system as fast as possible.
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Figure 2.2 illustrates the value of performing required activities quicker. The location of the
item on the grid indicates the approximate duration of time required to return the item to its
functional state. The arrows indicate the direction for improvement.
The example given illustrates that major turbine-generator inspection and repair can take
months. Figure 2.2 suggests that online monitoring may take the place of some
inspections. It shows that investing in better inspection techniques may provide savings.
Figure 2.2 also suggests that measures taken to reduce repair times (such as keeping a
spare rotor or spare parts in stock) can be advantageous.
This strategy does not only apply to turbine-generators nor only to monitoring, inspection
and repair. Decreasing the time required to calibrate and maintain components can increase
availability and/or reduce manpower requirements.
Monitor Inspect Calibrate Maintain Repair
Online Desired
Hours i
Days Desired Desired A
Weeks \ _ _
Months Present Present
Figure 2.2 - Shorten time to return item to functional state -
turbine/generator as an example
2.3 Extending the periodicity of activities - increasing the mean
time to failure (MTTF)
The final method available to improve plant performance is extending the required
periodicities of monitoring, inspection, calibration, maintenance and/or repair. Mean time
to failure is a parameter used to capture all of these activities. Perhaps a better word would
be mean time to unavailability or mean time until attention is required. Regardless, if
entities can go longer periods before they require attention, then the plant capacity factor
will be increased, and cycle lengths can be increased. Therefore, increasing the mean time
to repair of components within plant systems can affect economics.
Figure 2.3 suggests increasing the mean time to required attention as a strategy to improve
overall reliability. The arrows show the current relation between periodicities of required
activities of a given item. The arrow suggest increasing the periodicities. In this example,
strategies for increasing the mean time to inspection and maintenance of the low pressure
turbine is examined. Current low pressure turbines require major inspections and
maintenance approximately every five years. The scope of low pressure turbine inspection
and maintenance is enormous, and the time required to perform this is large. Many people
believe that on a five year major outage cycle, if all three low pressure turbines have to be
inspected and maintained, turbine maintenance will dictate the length of the outage.
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Therefore, reduction of required low pressure turbine inspections and maintenance is key
to longer cycles.
Monitor Inspect Calibrate Maintain Repair
Five years Present I Present
Ten years Desired D' esired _
Figure 2.3 - Increase time between shutdowns - turbine/generator as an example
2.4 Example - Implementation of the strategy to steam generators
The purpose of the following section is to demonstrate by example how the strategies
implied by the previous section can be used to help synthesize engineering solutions to real
problems. As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, interviews were conducted with industry
representatives to identify issues regarding achieving higher capacity factors through
longer operating cycles. One of the sections describing a problematic component identified
during the interviews, which fits equally well in Chapter 3, is presented in this section to
illustrate the strategies of Sections 2.1 - 2.3. (Al, A2...; C1, C2...; N1, N2...; P1, P2...;
U1, U2...; V1, V2... are codes used to shield the identity of the commentor. Additional
codes are used to protect the identity of plants, when disclosure could identify commentor.
See Chapter 3 for the key regarding the generic origin of the comment.) Section 2.4
includes the following:
* results of interviews identifying the steam generator as a problem component
· discussion of the strategies to be applied to the steam generator
· matrix of proposed design changes based on the strategies.
2.4.1 Interview results regarding steam generators
When asked about the most limiting factors in going to longer cycles or running more
reliably, the most popular response - by far - was the steam generators; therefore, steam
generator design is an issue worth examining in detail. The most prevalent steam generator
design is the U-tube. For a more detailed description of this device, see [Ref. 10] and [Ref.
11].
The following is a summary of the comments made concerning steam generators during
interviews with representatives from the nuclear industry.
2.4.1.1 Issues/new problems concerning steam generators
2.4.1.1.1 Steam generator tube ruptures
The probability of having a steam generator tube rupture in a PWR is about 0.02 / yr. If
the tubes are not inspected or repaired periodically, however, the frequency of tube
ruptures may increase. Tube ruptures are currently low contributors to the expected core
damage frequency because the plant can usually repressurize, isolate, and shut down
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safely, following a steam generator tube rupture. Nevertheless, tube ruptures are not
insignificant from a safety perspective, and are a serious economic risk. (U20) (U4)
The safety and economic risks from an increased probability of steam generator tube
rupture from longer operation and decreased inspections should be analyzed.
2.4.1.1.2 Multiple tube ruptures
There was recently concern that a main steam line break could cause multiple steam
generator tube ruptures due to the degraded states of the tubes and the resultant high
pressure drop across them. However, NRC has found that in this event, the pressure drop
across the tubes is insufficient to cause multiple ruptures of degraded tubes. (N1)
An analysis by Maine Yankee supports the conclusion that a main steamline break would
not cause multiple tube ruptures. [Ref. 29]
Consequently, multiple degraded tube ruptures due to a main steam line break are not
currently limiting, but should be considered for longer cycles.
2.4.1.1.3 Utility perspective
Tube integrity and support plate problems are key to running longer and improving capacity
factor. The advanced reactors have improved materials and chemistry; have reduced hot leg
temperature; and have incorporated past experience. The performance of replacement steam
generators should give some indication of how redesigned steam generators may perform
in the future. (P4)
Steam generator tube leaks are also a big concern to utilities, and may be the limiting factor
in going to longer cycles. If tubes are not inspected periodically, there may be a tube
rupture, and this can have serious impacts on capacity factor and operations. (C2) (Ul 11)
(C4) (U4)
2.4.1.1.4 Regulatory perspective
Steam generator tubes are a limiting problem in extending cycle lengths. NRC would be
skeptical of running a plant five years without inspections, even if all of the problems were
believed fixed. The NRCs position is that the utilities might as well plan on having
problems with the steam generators. (V2) (N2)
If a plant has a problem steam generator or if there are indications of degradation, then there
may be a regulatory requirement to inspect and plug or sleeve tubes on a specific schedule
that is less than the cycle length. If there is a history of leakage, NRC isn't going to permit
longer operating cycles without inspections. (V2)
2.4.1.1.5 New problems
There are new tube degradation mechanisms being discovered all the time (every 5 years or
so). PWR_#6 and another plant recently had tube ruptures between the support plate,
which is a new problem. (C4) (N2)
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2.4.1.1.6 Aging
Steam generator degradation is a function of the age of the generator. There has to be
sleeving and plugging done to maintain the primary system's integrity. (U20)
2.4.1.1.7 Planning for problems
Significant savings could be achieved by planning to replace the steam generators in the
design phase. Maintenance capabilities should be considered when designing the steam
generator. (N1) (V1)
2.4.1.2 Steam generator redundancy and loop isolation valves
2.4.1.2.1 Redundant loops for online work
Redundancy can be designed into the steam generators. Loop stop valves can be used to
isolate one loop of the reactor coolant system to allow inspections, maintenance and
repairs while the rest of the plant is at power. The design would be for N-1 loop
operation - four 33% capacity loops, five 25% capacity loops, etc. This is advantageous
because it is not necessary to shut down the plant and open the primary system when a
tube leaks or to do required inspections and maintenance. The Russians have 6 loops, and
may have done this. It probably wouldn't make sense to have a design where power would
have to be reduced to do the inspections and maintenance, because the economic incentive
is lost. (Ul 1) (C4) (V2) (C2)
The downside to designing to isolate and drain one loop during operation is that
complexity and maintenance burden are increased. There are now more tubes, pumps, and
valves to fail and maintain. Further, the additional complexity translates into additional
costs. It is expensive to add an extra loop or extra capacity. (P3) (C2) (U11)
2.4.1.2.2 Safety issues associated with online work
The capability to use valves to isolate a reactor coolant system loop is not out of the
question. The Navy has loop stop valves, and the NRC staff has accepted them. They can
be made reliable enough to prevent an accidental LOCA. (N2)
However, if it is desired to do online loop maintenance, multiple valves become necessary
to prevent a large LOCA and for safety of personnel. If there are two valves is series, they
can be tested for leakage by measuring the pressure between them.
From a maintenance perspective, personnel are in containment with the potential for an
accident, so it may not be safe for the workers, and it also raises containment isolation
questions. (U20)
2.4.1.2.3 Shutdown maintenance
Having isolation valves is also a good way to isolate the steam generators after shutdown.
Isolation valves eliminate the need to construct nozzle dams to keep water out of the
steam generators. Nozzle dams tend to leak and they are not designed to withstand much
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pressure. If there is any sort of pressure transient, the dam will leak or fail. With isolation
valves the steam generators can be accessed earlier in an outage, with less probability of
leakage. (V2) (U13)
Loop stop valves are desirable for steam generator maintenance because the plant does not
have to go to mid-loop as often as in other plants. Mid-loop operation is a very risky
condition because there is so little water inventory. (U13)
2.4.1.2.4 Stop valves under tube rupture conditions
PWR_#2 has loop stop valves, but in the event of a tube rupture, the plant has to equalize
the pressure between the primary and the secondary before it can be ensured that the valves
will close. PWR_#2's stop valves do not work well under high differential pressures. The
stop valves are not in any of the emergency operating procedures or any accident
sequences. (U20)
2.4.1.3 Materials and specifications
2.4.1.3.1 Material selection
Better alloys need to be chosen for the steam generator tubes. The new steam generators
use Inconel 690, which has been shown to be a lot better than the old steam generator
tubes, but NRC will not allow five years of operation without inspecting the tubes. Surrey
and Turkey Point should have good data on Inconel 690 performance. Inconel 690 is
probably the best material available, but materials selection is still somewhat of an art-form.
It may be advantageous to look at exotic materials for the tubes. Exotic materials may be
much more expensive initially, but these materials would pay off in the long run.(U12)
(U24) (C4) (V2)
2.4.1.3.2 Materials specifications I fabrication
In addition to material types, the specifications for the tubes are important. Excellent
quality control (QC) over the fabrication of materials is absolutely necessary. Good
construction techniques are also important. Full length tube expansion and the use of
explosive expansion of the tubes in the tubesheet is superior to rolling the tubes and older
techniques. The tubes should not be rolled because rolling leaves residual stresses and
makes stress corrosion cracking a possibility. An important specification is the acceptable
level of residual stresses. (U24) (V1) (U12)
2.4.1.3.3 Secondary side factors
Key elements to steam generator performance include not only good steam generator
materials selection, but also secondary materials selection. The secondary system
chemistry dictates the performance of the steam generators. A condenser with no in-
leakage of brackish water is important so titanium condenser tubes should be used to avoid
tube failures. Feedtrain materials selection is important, and copper and catalysts should be
avoided. Finally, things like resin beads must be prevented from getting to the condenser.
(V1)
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2.4.1.4 Chemistry
2.4.1.4.1 Water chemistry
The most important factor in extending steam generator life is water chemistry. Nuclear
plants have to gain control over the water chemistry - the industry has to be religious about
it. With the new steam generator materials, and excellent chemistry, the steam generators
can probably last over 35 years. The problem is very much quality control over the steam
generator environment during repair and operation. (U24) (U21) (C2) (Ul 11)
2.4.1.4.2 Sludge and sludge removal
The sludge pile sitting on top of the tube sheet is a disaster for the tubes. The high
concentration of chemicals in the sludge eats away at the interface between the tubes and the
support plate. The capability to sludge lance is important. The steam generator should have
a good blowdown system with a procedure that will regularly get rid of the sludge pile.
There should be a continuous online blowdown capability of up to 1% of full rated steam
flow, and a high capacity blowdown rate of up to 10% full rated steam flow. (V1) (U21)
PWR_#1I does sludge lancing every outage. If the period between lancings is to be
increased, the plant needs better steam generator and secondary side chemistry. (U21)
There needs to be pressure pulse cleaning capabilities. (V2)
2.4.1.5 Leak monitoring
There needs to be a better way to measure leakage to get more tolerance in leakage rate
limits. The concern is that a tube will break before the plant can shut down, and that there
will be a safety system actuation. If leakage can be monitored better, tube rupture becomes
less of a risk. Online tube leak detection via main steamline radiation detectors (N- 16) is
possible, but it is very difficult to predict the magnitude of the leak. (V2) (C4)
When the plant passes the administrative leakage limit, it has to be shut down, and the
tubes have to be inspected and repaired. (V2)
2.4.1.6 Inspections/repairs
2.4.1.6.1 Predicting tube conditions
Steam generator tube condition can be predicted based on prior inspection results. If better
predictive capabilities were available, then the potential for extending inspections exists. An
understanding of crack growth rates would be useful. (U21)
2.4.1.6.2 Industry experience with inspection
PWR#_3 takes three days just to inspect a steam generator (one steam generator per
outage), not including cooldown or startup. A mid-cycle shutdown to inspect steam
generators and maintain hard to reach components and satisfy surveillance requirements
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could be performed in about three weeks for a large plant. The plant could go up to three
years between inspections. (U24)
PWR_#2 inspects 100% of all four steam generators' tubes every outage. It takes
PWR_#2 30 days to inspect and repair a steam generator. Steam generator inspection is a
critical path item for PWR_#2. (U13)
PWR_#1 tries to have refueling be the critical path item, but steam generator work
borders the critical path. Technical specifications require 6% tube inspection via eddy
current testing. PWR_#1 does 100% inspection of two steam generators every outage
because of the plant's own concerns, not NRC's concerns. Some other plants are having
mid-cycle inspections. On a 5 year cycle, 100% of the tubes would have to be inspected
every outage, which would significantly increase the outage scope and probably its
duration. (U21)
2.4.1.6.3 Inspection
There is a need for non-destructive evaluation (NDE) of steam generators to be done
periodically to verify the integrity of the tubes. If there is not a refueling outage every two
years, the steam generators can not be inspected on a regular basis. Eddy current testing
isn't as good as plants would like; there is a need for better methods for tube inspection.
There is nothing available yet for on-line testing of tubes. The reactor has to be in cold
shutdown for inspection to occur. Ultrasonic techniques may yield better results than eddy
current testing, but there may be drawbacks associated with them. (N1) (P3)
2.4.1.6.4 Repair
There are automatic machines that can do the repair, but they are susceptible to human
errors also, because there is a human telling it what tube to fix. (U 13)
2.4.1.7 Safety
From a risk perspective, a couple steam generators should be available during refueling
until the head is removed (at which point natural circulation capabilities are lost). But
from a maintenance perspective, this is not possible for PWR_#2 because the steam
generators are on the critical path. (U13)
2.4.1.8 Summary
Section 2.4.1 outlines many of the issues associated with operating steam generators
under extended operating cycles. Steam generator tube condition is a major economic and
significant safety concern. The tubes must be inspected and repaired periodically to
minimize the risk of tube rupture. Plant experience with steam generator tubes has been
poor, and extending the period between inspections could increase the risk of tube
rupture.
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2.4.1.8.1 Traditional approach to improved steam generator reliability
Better materials, chemistry and workmanship may be a partial solution to increasing
inspection periodicities without significantly increasing the risk of tube rupture. Inconel
690 is superior to current tube materials. Secondary chemistry is extremely important to
steam generator condition. Sludge lancing and continuous blowdown can be used to
improve steam generator chemistry and tube reliability. Tube expansion techniques and
workmanship are important to reduce stress corrosion cracking. However, even with these
precautions, the performance will still be unproven, and extended operating cycles may still
not be accepted by NRC or the utilities.
2.4.1.8.2 Innovative approaches to improved steam generator reliability
An alternate approach is to design for online monitoring, inspection, maintenance and/or
repair. This satisfies the first strategy for improving capacity factor listed in Chapter 2.
Online leak monitoring can be used to predict incipient tube failures, which can potentially
alleviate tube rupture safety concerns, but will not improve tube reliability. Other online
monitoring techniques may be developed to monitor tube condition.
Loop stop valves can be used to isolate a steam generator during operation. With a steam
generator isolated and extra capacity in the remaining operational loops, inspection and
repair of steam generator tubes could be performed while the plant is at power. This
approach will permit longer cycles by reducing tube rupture concerns. Safety issues
include containment isolation limitations and isolation valve reliability.
2.4.2 Strategy for redesign of steam generators
2.4.2.1 Current state of steam generators
The current state of steam generators has just been outlined. Steam generators have
become high maintenance items, requiring long periods of time in cold shutdown
conditions for inspections, maintenance, and repair. The frequency of required
inspections, maintenance, and repair depends on the history of the steam generator, but is
typically once every 3 or 4 years per generator. Finally, 100% inspection and repair of a
single steam generator takes approximately 30 days.
2.4.2.2 Strategies for steam generator activities at higher modes
Figure 2.4 shows the current state of steam generator operation. The figure shows that
currently, steam generators are inspected, maintained, and repaired with the primary system
cold and open. Also shown is that it would be advantageous to perform inspections,
maintenance and repairs at higher modes of operation. Further, it would be advantageous
if tube conditions (such as crevice chemistry or leak rates) could be continuously monitored
online to predict when more detailed inspections, maintenance or repairs are necessary.
38
Monitor Inspect Calibrate Maintain Repair
Full Power Desired Des ed Desired Desired
Reduced Power \i
Hot Standby i =__
Hot Shutdown
Cold Shutdown
Primary Present Present Present
System Opened
Figure 2.4 - Steam generator inspection, maintenance and repair at higher modes
Figure 2.5 shows that steam generator tube inspection, maintenance and repair take on the
order of months to perform. If inspection, maintenance and repair could be performed
quicker, they would no longer be critical path, could be done all in the same outage, and
the operating cycle could be extended.
Monitor Inspect Calibrate Maintain Repair
Minutes Desired , Desired
Hours
Days
Weeks
Months Present Present
Figure 2.5 - Shortening steam generator tube inspection, maintenance and repair
Figure 2.6 shows that steam generators are inspected every three to four years. If the
period between inspection, maintenance and repair could be extended, then for a longer
cycle, the steam generator inspections, maintenance and repair could still be staggered.
Under a staggered strategy, only half of the steam generators undergo inspection,
maintenance and repair every outage.
periodicity Monitor Inspect Calibrate Maintain Repair
3 years Present Present Present
4 years
5 years
6 Years
7 years Desired Desired ' Desired Desired
Figure 2.6 - Periodicity of steam generator tube inspection, maintenance and repair
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2.4.3 Addressing the steam generator problem
The previous strategies were used to synthesize proposed design solutions which could
help solve the listed problems to various extents. The hypothesized options for steam
generator redesign are included in Table 2.7. The perceived advantages and drawbacks are
listed along with each option. An explanation of each option follows.
2.4.3.1 Option 1
Option 1 is the reference design. It can be considered a typical steam generator in and
operating plant. It has Alloy 600 tubing, which is particularly susceptible to stress
corrosion cracking. Industry experience indicates that long term tube performance is
poor, and steam generator replacement is likely.
2.4.3.2 Option 2
Option 2 includes many of the current proposed solutions to the steam generator problem.
These steam generators are expected to achieve better performance in terms of reduced
corrosion and reduced inspection, maintenance, and repairs. However, there is no
guarantee that all contingencies will have been accounted for. As such, there is a chance
that the steam generators will not be able to run for extended cycles without inspection,
maintenance or repair. Further, without operating experience, NRC will not accept longer
periods between inspections. Therefore, the economic risk of designing the rest of the
plant for longer cycles with the uncertainty associated with steam generator tube
degradation is too great.
2.4.3.3 Option 3
Option 3 uses the same features as option 2, but includes the capability to monitor tubes
online. This is a relatively cheap method that could be used to satisfy NRC inspection
concerns. If the monitoring system is exceptionally good, then steam generator inspection
requirements may be reduced significantly possibly reducing outage durations. However, if
NRCs concerns were founded, the steam generator will still require frequent maintenance
and repairs.
2.4.3.4 Option 4
Option 4 also incorporates the features of option 2 to improve steam generator
performance. In addition, loop isolation valves are incorporated in the design of the
reactor coolant system. Each of the loops (typically 4 for a large PWR) is equipped with
additional capacity such that if one loop is isolated, the reactor will be able to run at
100%. Further, while the loop is isolated, inspections, maintenance and repairs could be
performed on a steam generator. This capability can completely remove steam generator
(and reactor coolant pump) maintenance from the outage scope. This has the potential to
significantly reduce outage duration and manpower.
Two problems are apparent with this strategy. First, the additional capital cost may be
overwhelming. Second, if workers are required to perform inspections, maintenance, and
repairs inside containment while the plant is running, their safety and public safety could
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be jeopardized. If an accident occurred with workers in containment, containment
isolation may be jeopardized and workers may be injured.
Two additional strategies can be used to minimize previous risk. First, if the online
monitoring system of option 2 is also incorporated into the design, time consuming
inspections may be reduced, and the frequency that the steam generators are isolated could
be reduced. Second, if a remote robotic system for inspections, maintenance and repairs is
incorporated into the design, human time in containment would be reduced.
2.4.3.5 Option 5
Option 5 is similar to option 4, but the reactor coolant pumps and steam generators are
located outside containment. There are several benefits to this design. First, the size of the
containment could be reduced, with a significant capital savings to the utility. Second, the
personnel safety and containment isolation questions are eliminated by design. Third,
there is much more room to perform maintenance, and fewer contamination concerns.
This can decrease inspection, maintenance and repair times (strategy 2). Fourth, by
making the isolations valves very reliable and capable of closing under high differential
pressures, pump seal LOCA and multiple steam generator tube break concerns could be
eliminated. Finally, the steam generators would be much more accessible for replacement.
Drawbacks include radiological concerns outside of containment, although this is a
common concern in BWRs. Also, there may be additional capital expenses associated
with housing the steam generators and making isolation capabilities sufficiently reliable.
2.4.4 Summary
Section 2.4.4 is devoted to illustrating how the strategies developed in Sections 2.1 - 2.3
can be used in conjunction with industry experience to generate targets for improvement.
Steam generators were used in this example because they represent a chronic component,
potentially limiting cycle lengths and capacity factor. Industry experience garnered from
interviews is outlined. Strategies for less frequent and online monitoring, inspection, and
repaired suggest innovative methods to decreasing the impact of tube degradations.
Strategies for reduced steam generator repair and replacement time are also examined.
The various methods are analyzed based on their expected benefits and drawbacks.
As a result of this effort, three innovative solutions are developed. The first uses online
monitoring to replace inspection requirements. The second includes the capability to
isolate a steam generator for online maintenance and repair, but raises safety issues. The
third locates steam generators and reactor coolant pumps outside containment for ease of
maintenance and replacement.
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Strategy description benefits drawbacks
(1) Base design - standard design 1. Extended outages
no modification 2. Possible mid-cycle
outage/limit cycle length
3. difficult/expensive to
replace steam generators
(2) Standard 1. Alloy 690 tube material 1. increase in steam 1. Would require
design solutions 2. modified tube supports to generator performance experience before
[Ref. 12] reduce fretting 2. potential increase in time accepted by NRC for
3. explosive tube expansion between inspections, longer cycles.
4. periodic chemical cleaning maintenance and repairs 2. no guarantee of
5. high pH chemistry eliminating al problems
6. redesigned support plate 3. still may require
7. design for easier expensive steam
replacement generator replacements
8. higher blowdown capacity to
remove sludge
(3) Online Same as (2) except online 1. moderates or eliminates 1. If concerns were
monitoring monitoring of tube condition by NRC inspection concerns founded, then still have
monitoring tube crevice 2. reduce inspection to shut down to repair
chemistry and/or crack requirements 2. expensive and
development 3. relatively cheap difficult to replace steam
generators
(4) Online 1. valves to isolate steam 1. online inspection / repair 1. expensive to construct
inspection & generators and pumps 2. shorter outage times 2. expensive and
repair 2. n loops, with 1/(n-1)*100% 3. longer operating cycles difficult to replace steam
capacity per loop 4. may eliminate pump seal generators
3. possibly robotic inspection / LOCA considerations
repair
4. characteristics listed under
(2) and possibly (3)
(5) Online, easier Same as (4) except Same as (4) except 1. expensive to construct
inspection & 2. containment isolation
repair, easier 5. steam generators and pumps 6. easier and cheaper steam concerns
replacement outside containment [Ref.13] generator & pump
6. ability for human inspection replacement and repair.
/ repair 7. roomier or smaller
containment
Figure 2.7 - Alternative steam generator design improvement strategies
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2.5 Summary
In this chapter, three strategies were identified to guide in the redesign of problematic
systems or components. They were
* design for monitoring, inspection, calibration, maintenance, and repairs at
higher modes of operation;
* design for shorter down times associated with monitoring, inspection,
calibration, maintenance and repair; and
* design for extending periodicities of required monitoring, inspection,
calibration, maintenance, and repair.
Next, the results concerning steam generators from interviews conducted with a range of
organizations associated with nuclear power generation were summarized. These results
were then used in conjunction with the strategies to synthesize proposed design
modifications that would remediate - to different extents - the concerns about steam
generators vocalized during the interviews.
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Chapter 3 - Interviews with industry representatives
The first step in designing power plant systems is a review of current operating experience
to learn of shortcomings and/or strengths of existing designs. This ensures that the pitfalls
of past mistakes are avoided while current operational experience is exploited.
With this in mind, a diverse group of knowledgeable individuals were interviewed to
identify factors that may inhibit extending the operating cycle to up to five years and/or
running more reliably. Interviews were conducted with 55 individuals from utilities -
PWR, BWR and CANDU; vendors - General Electric, Westinghouse, and
ABB/Combustion Engineering (ABB-CE); consulting firms; academia; the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC); and industry organizations - the Institute of Nuclear
Power Operations (INPO), the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), and the Nuclear
Management Resources Council (NUMARC). Their comments encompassed a myriad of
technical, regulatory, institutional and regulatory obstacles. In addition to suggesting
areas where difficulties may arise, they also offered many helpful and innovative solutions.
The purpose of this chapter to classify and outline important comments made during the
interviews with industry representatives. Important generic issues associated with longer,
more reliable plant operation are listed. This chapter delineates several general categories
of concerns, and cites important concerns in each category. Information gathered
regarding steam generators was transferred to Chapter 2, Section 2.4. Information cited
represents only opinions of those individuals interviewed, but provides a valuable
knowledge base.
Categories identified were:
1. Technical / Hardware Concerns
2. Regulatory / Institutional Framework
3. PRA in Design
4. Design Principles
5. Economic Pressures
6. Operation and Maintenance Practices
7. Material Condition
8. Cycle Length Pressures
9. Advanced Concepts
10. Safety
11. Plant Size
To maintain anonymity while preserving information about the generic source and
perspective of the commentor, each interviewee was given a code. Further, if it was
thought that mention of a plant or utility name could be damaging or would jeopardize
anonymity of the commentor, a code was assigned to the utility. The following key lists
the codes
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A_x -Academia representative
C_x -Consultant representative
N_x -Nuclear Regulatory Commission representative
P_x -Professional industry organization (INPO, EPRI and NUMARC)
representative
U_x -Utility representative
V_x -Vendor representative
PWR_x -PWR plant code number x
BWR_x -BWR plant code number x
Utility_x -Utility
3.1 Technical / hardware concerns
Virtually everyone interviewed commented on at least one plant system. These comments
varied from observations, to complaints, to suggestions for future designs. This category
of comments is of immense importance, as it addresses many of the fundamental design
issues. Few systems are immune to complaints or suggestions. In the following
discussion, important examples will be examined in detail.
3.1.1 Feedwater system
This system was chosen as the example case for analysis in Chapter 5. The suggestions
made in this section will be utilized in Chapter 5 in conjunction with the strategies of
Chapter 2 to address the redesign of the feedwater system.
According to one reactor designer, "the feedwater system is key to running at high
capacity factors." (V3) The feedwater system has historically been a major cause of plant
unavailability. It is not a safety grade system. As such, it was not given the detailed
design consideration that it deserved. The following is a list of concerns expressed in the
interviews regarding the feedwater system.
3.1.1.1 Typical system configurations
Experience with redundancy is mixed. Utility l's practice is to have three 50% capacity
feedwater pumps - 2 turbine and 1 mechanical. They still have had problems. BWR_#3
has three, 50% feedwater trains, and they haven't had many problems with their feedwater
system. BWR_#3 has only had one loss of feedwater trip. (U12) (U2)
ABB-CE System 80+ was designed with redundant feedwater trains, which was not a
significant cost compared to the cost of many of the other components. Current ABB-CE
plants have two oversized feedtrains (two 70% capacity feedtrains), with both operating
continuously. If one trips, the other goes to full speed and the reactor cutback system
reduces power. (V1)
General Electric BWRs usually have three or four condensate pumps that boost the
pressure to 150 psi, three to four condensate boost pumps that boost the pressure to 500 -
600 psi, and three to four main feedwater pumps that boost the pressure to reactor
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pressure (-1000 psi). The feedwater system should be designed so that it can provide
100% of rated flow with one pump out of service. The obvious configurations are three
50% capacity pumps or four 33% capacity pumps. (V3)
The feedwater system should be designed with redundant feedpumps for reliability and
safety. (C2) (U 11)
3.1.1.2 Feedwater control systems
The feedwater system has feedwater heaters which have their own control systems to
control water level. The control systems deserve particular attention. (V3)
Typically, the feedwater pumps are not the weakness, the feedwater control system is the
design weakness. (U12)
Feedwater regulation is a problem. If there are valve stem leaks, and regulation problems,
the feedwater system requires manual control. Eventually, the reactor trips. Trips due to
improper feedwater regulation are fairly frequent. There is a fair amount of work that
goes into maintaining those valves. (U20)
Feedwater heating is key to effective steam generator water level control at low power
(less than 15%). (A2)
3.1.1.3 Feedwater pumps
(See also Section 3.4.4 on auxiliary feedwater pump diversity)
Turbine driven feedwater pumps and electrical powered auxiliary feedwater pumps should
be used. Turbine driven pumps will run reliably for a very long time. The problem comes
when they are started fast in an emergency situation. They aren't fast start, quick
response machines. The pumps need to be "tweaked" slowly to get them running just
right. Therefore, electrical powered auxiliary feedwater pumps for fast start actions are
more appropriate for fast start safety applications. (U12)
For BWRs, shielding should be provided so that maintenance can be done on turbine
driven feedwater pumps without excessive radiation exposure. (U12)
The feedwater pumps in BWRs should be powered by electrical motors because turbine
driven pumps use radioactive steam, and they tend to be located near the main steam lines.
This is a tough environment to do maintenance in. Electrically powered motors are less
efficient than turbine driven pumps, so a little efficiency is lost to gain maintainability. (V3)
Note the contrast with the first statement made above.
Magnetic bearing feedwater pumps: two magnetic bearing feedwater pumps have two
years operating experience. That kind of technological evolvement can be very significant.
Magnetic bearings theoretically have no wear. (U14)
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Feedwater pumps haven't been a problem for PWR_#10 as far as running them longer is
concerned. (U15)
3.1.2 Turbine-generator
3.1.2.1 Maintenance requirements
Typically, the turbine generator consists of one high pressure turbine and two or three low
pressure turbines located on a common shaft with the generator. Major inspections and
overhauls are currently required approximately every 5 years. Turbine maintenance may be
staggered between outages to reduce work scope and time. If all turbine maintenance is
performed at the same time, the outage length will probably be dictated by turbine
inspection and maintenance (on the order of 100 days). Further, the utilities will have to
convince themselves that the turbine and excitor can be run that long continuously without
risk. Utilities and vendors are hesitant to extend the periodicity because the consequences
of turbine blade failure or generator failure are high (witness Pilgrim, 1994 and Fermi,
1993). Utilities would have to convince insurance companies of the feasibility of running
the turbines longer. Therefore, turbine inspection and maintenance requirements are
thought to be a major limitation in going to longer cycles, and 5 years is thought to be
pushing the limits between turbine inspections and maintenance. (U14) (U 15) (V1) (V3)
(U16) (U21) (N5) (P3)
However, recent developments have been made in turbine design. BWR_#4 purchased
two low pressure turbines that are warranteed for 10 years - meaning they only have to do
major inspections and maintenance on a 10 year schedule. The cost to replace the two
low pressure turbine was $28M. The high pressure turbines can run for 5 years already,
and do not take nearly as much time to inspect as the low pressure turbines, so they should
not be limiting. Minor inspections may be able to be performed in hot standby. (U19)
(U24)
3.1.2.1.1 Degradation mechanisms
Turbine blade erosion is a concern, especially for low pressure turbine blading. The
primary thing to watch for is erosion. (U21) (U20)
3.1.2.2 Diagnostics/non-destructive evaluation (NDE)
There are now offline NDE techniques and online diagnostics that are currently being
implemented that generate data and precursor information to mitigate failure
consequences and almost predict when it is really necessary to inspect specific components
(e.g. a bearing, a rotor, the generator, stator windings, etc.) (U 14)
There are usually vibrations prior to failure. Monitoring systems for detecting vibrations
are in place. Some units are designed to trip on high vibration of the turbine. But there
may be spurious trips based on this alarm. (U21)
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NDE techniques can be used to monitor fracture toughness and fatigue. The primary thing
to watch for is erosion. Effectively monitoring turbine condition should not be a very
difficult task. (U24)
3.1.2.3 Design solutions
3.1.2.3.1 Redundancy
The turbine generator will be a problem. One solution is to use twin turbine generators.
They do this in the Swiss plants (Gosgen is the exception). With redundant turbines, the
plant may be less susceptible to loss of load conditions. And the plants are much better off
from a maintenance perspective. (C2) (U11) (V3)
3.1.2.3.2 Better design
If the utilities made it a requirement that the turbine run for over five years continuously,
the design people would put in some extra design margin in the bearings and other
components to achieve better durability and higher reliability to allow them to write a
warranty for five years. There aren't any technological reasons why a turbine couldn't run
for that long. (V3) (C4)
3.1.2.4 Turbine generator auxiliaries
The turbine generator auxiliaries are worth redesigning. There are simple, cheap
components in the turbine generator auxiliaries that can cause a large loss of capacity - for
example the hydrogen subsystem, the steam seals, stop valves, hydraulic control valves,
the lube oil system, moisture separators / reheaters and the electro hydraulic control system.
A little money spent on improving these systems can significantly improve availability.
(C4) (V3)
3.1.2.4.1 Electro-hydraulic control system
The turbine could in principal have two redundant electro-hydraulic control systems with a
bumpless transfer. At BWR_#3, the control system is electrical on startup and hydraulic for
steady state operations. Switching from electrical to hydraulic control has caused many
trips. If the hydraulic control systems on the turbine generator fails, the turbine generator
will trip. So the hydraulic control system and the supporting systems have to be robust.
(V3) (C4) (U2)
3.1.3 Condenser
3.1.3.1 Turbine steam bypass capabilities
The turbine steam bypass system re-routes main steamline steam from the turbine inlet to
the condenser. This allows a main steam flow- turbine flow mismatch without plant trip.
The bypass capability varies between plants. This system is useful in reducing plant trips
on loss of load generator. High condenser bypass capabilities reduce the chance of a trip
following a complete or partial loss of load on the turbine.
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System 80+ has a 50% capacity turbine steam bypass flow capability. With the reactor
power cutback system, power can go down to 50% within seconds and not trip in the event
of loss of load. (V1)
3.1.3.2 Chemistry
If the condenser leaks seawater, it corrupts the BWR primary (or the PWR secondary)
system because of inter-granular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC), and other problems
with stainless steel. (V3)
3.1.3.3 Condenser retubing
Several utilities have had to retube condensers. When the tubes degrade, they start leaking.
Sometimes the plant can be down powered to plug the tubes (depending on condenser
design), other times the plant has to be shut down. As the tubes degrade the plant begins to
experience chemistry problems on the secondary side, especially for a seawater plant.
During a refueling outage, plants with degraded condensers do a lot of plugging and
retubing. (U20)
BWR_#3 just had its condenser retubed. Until the condenser retubing, there had been a lot
of saltwater leaks. The plant would constantly downpower to fix tubes. Sawdust was
frequently added into the pump suction of the circulating water pumps every day to plug the
holes in the condenser tubes. The new condenser tubes are titanium, which are expected to
be much more reliable. (U2)
BWR_#4 has an titanium tube condenser, and has very few problems with saltwater in-
leakage. BWR_#4 is one of the few saltwater sites without an intermediate loop to prevent
saltwater in-leakage into the primary. The intermediate loop, which other BWRs have, is
intended to provide a barrier between the saltwater coolant and the condenser, and,
consequently, the primary system. At BWR_#4, one of the water boxes can be taken out of
service for online maintenance. It involves de-rating the plant for maintenance. (U19)
(V3)
3.1.4 Reactor coolant pumps (RCPs)
Current industry experience with reactor coolant pumps is mixed. PWR_#9 had a major
outage recently because of loose reactor coolant pump bolts. Conversely, PWR_#10 has
never had any problems with reactor coolant pumps. (U 11) (U 15)
ABB-CE uses a more forgiving reactor coolant pump design. They have better seals and
seal cooling; a flexible coupling between the motor and the pump which eliminates some of
the vibration that causes pump wear, and better bearing arrangements. Their pumps are
purchased from KSB (German). Byron Jackson pumps are not as reliable. (V1)
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3.1.4.1 Pumps seals
3.1.4.1.1 Opinions on the state of seals in the industry
In the early 1980s, plants were losing about 10 days of production capability a year due to
poor reactor coolant pump seal performance or poor recirculating pump seal performance.
A new set of specifications were put together by several utilities and a consulting company
to improve the seal design, but the main improvements were in other areas. There was
poor training, inadequate tools, insufficient spare parts, and inadequate procedures at the
plants. Now reactor coolant pumps and recirculating pumps are running for five or six
years without problems. The average lost time due to these seals is now under two days
per year, and is much lower for the plants that do their maintenance correctly. The problem
is not as significant. The lessons learned about seals can be applied to other pumps critical
to operation. (C3) (U21)
Main coolant pump seals are elaborate multi-stage, controlled leakage devices, and they do
wear. The solution is canned rotor pumps, but they cost more and are less efficient. (C4)
The limiting factor with RCPs is the mechanical seals. Depending on size, they run from 2
to 4 years. (V1)
3.1.4.1.2 Monitoring
PWR_#1 is now using trending of the leakage rate, and they typically rebuild or replace
one reactor coolant pump seal per cycle based on the trending. (U21)
3.1.4.1.3 Seal cooling
There are two seal cooling systems: component cooling water system, and charging. If
service water is lost, both of these systems become inoperable, and there is a risk of a seal
LOCA. Therefore, in this design, the probability of a seal LOCA is the probability of
losing service water. (U13)
3.1.4.1.4 Pump seal LOCA following loss of seal cooling and initiating event
One vendor analysis showed that their reactor coolant pump seals can operate post initiating
event (transient) without seal cooling for the duration of the event, with a probability of a
seal LOCA of 1 in 1000 (0.1%). But different vendor analysis could not support a similar
conclusion, and it has to be assumed that the probability of a seal LOCA is unity, if seal
cooling is lost during a transient. As a result, a large contributor to the expected core melt
frequency in the second vendor's plant is a seal LOCA. Therefore, seal cooling is an issue
worth investigating in more detail. (U13)
3.1.4.2 RCP motor maintenance
3.1.4.2.1 RCP motor maintenance frequencies
Typically, motor overhauls are done around every 5 years. Westinghouse RCP motors,
called "smart motor," are self monitoring. They monitor vibrations and temperatures for
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indications of degradation. The pump is shut down when one of the key parameters is out
of tolerance, rather than at fixed intervals. (V2) (U 11)
At PWR_#1, there is a preventive maintenance order to change out and rebuild the RCP
motors every 10 years. PWR_#1 is questioning whether that is too frequent. They
changed out one motor after seven years, and there were no indications of degradation. So
the plant is not changing out the second one until 10 years. The last one will wait 14 years
at the earliest. (U21)
3.1.4.2.2 Spare motors
Utility 3 is ordering a new RCP motor (at a cost of $2M) which is being built in
Switzerland. Utility 3 decided to buy a separate RCP motor because the analysis showed
that it's better to have a spare RCP motor than to be forced down without a spare. (C6)
PWR_#9 currently pulls one RCP motor every outage for maintenance and puts in a spare,
which saves time. (U 11)
3.1.5 Recirculating pumps (BWR)
The ABWR has 10 canned rotor recirculating pumps, but it only needs nine to run. There is
significant maintenance required on the pumps every five years. It is possible to do two out
of the 10 pumps every year, or four out of 10 every 18 to 24 months. For a 5 year cycle,
all of the recirculating pumps would have to undergo maintenance at once, or they would
have to be made more robust so that they could run for 10 years. The solution to the
recirculating pump problem is to go to a natural recirculation design. (V3)
3.1.6 Safety systems
3.1.6.1 Emergency core cooling system (ECCS)
3.1.6.1.1 Online maintenance
To go to longer cycles, there must be the capability to do maintenance on safety systems
online. The plant must be designed for N-2 safety train operation (have two extra
redundant trains of ECCS to satisfy the single failure criterion) or the operator must be
willing to enter limiting conditions for operation (LCOs) to maintain these systems online.
As an example of N-2 redundancy, Gosgen (Sweden) has four trains of ECCS, and they
only need two to provide 100% core cooling functions. Therefore, they can do
maintenance on one system without significantly degrading safety. For LCO maintenance,
the utility itself and then the NRC has to be convinced that LCO maintenance is safe. If a
careful review is performed, LCO maintenance of safety systems can be performed safely.
(U15) (C2) (Ull)
System 80+ has 4 trains of ECCS. The fourth train is not an installed spare, but the
Technical Specifications may allow online inspections and maintenance. The ABWR has a
three division ECCS. The plant can write Technical Specifications that allow it to take one
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division down for maintenance for a certain period of time. These systems can already be
maintained, as designed, so they are not a serious problem in going to longer cycles. (V1)
(V3)
3.1.6.1.2 Online testing
System 80+ has online testing of all safeguards pump, which traditionally had to be tested
while shut down. ABB-CE has extended testing to full flow testing because previous tests
were done at partial flow and then full flow predictions were extrapolated. The error and
uncertainty due to extrapolation was sometimes very large. (V1)
3.1.6.1.3 Functional ties
System 80+ has the ability to functionally exchange the shutdown cooling and containment
spray pumps. This adds 2 additional pumps to the function of shutdown cooling or
containment spray. It can be helpful to have pumps available from other systems as
backups. (V 1) (C2/U 11)
In past BWR designs, ECCS and RHR (residual heat removal system) have been mixed
together. The RHR has a heat removal function and the same pumps are used for the core
flooding function. (V3)
3.1.6.1.4 Safety limitations
PWR_#2 is the only PWR in the country that does not have accumulators. This makes it
almost impossible to go to 24 month cycles because of peaking factors prior to
LOCA.(U13)
3.1.6.1.5 ECCS designs with limited flexibility
BWR_#4 has an ECCS design that is highly inflexible for maintenance. There are two
100% capacity ECCS trains. Maintenance on either train of ECCS cannot be performed
until the reactor cavity has been flooded during a refueling outage. To take one train out,
non-safety systems have to be aligned to provide some form of redundancy. BWR_#4's
ECCS drives their outage lengths. From this experience, it should clear that some form of
alternate shutdown cooling capability must be designed into the reactor. The same principle
applies to emergency diesel generators. (U19)
(See also Section 3.8.3.2.1)
3.1.6.2 Emergency diesel generators (EDGs)
3.1.6.2.1 Maintenance unavailability
Maintenance unavailability of the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) significantly
increases the expected core damage frequency (CDF). An additional gas turbine can be
added to supplement the diesels. (N1)
However, some industry representatives think it is sometimes best to fix EDGs online
because they may be needed most when the plant is shut down. They argue that the
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probability that the EDGs will be called upon while being maintained is small enough to
justify online maintenance. (U24)
BWR_#4 can currently have one of their diesels out for three days for repairs before they
are required to shut down. They don't do major diesel overhauls online. This takes a
couple of weeks, which would be too long from a risk perspective. (U9)
3.1.6.2.2 Maintenance strategies
System 80+ has two diesels and one gas turbine, so it can have a diesel out for 2 weeks if
necessary (in the Technical Specifications). CE plants used to be limited to 3 days. The
PRA justified going to 2 weeks, and voluntary entry of LCOs was accepted by NRC. (V1)
PWR_#9 overhauls one diesel every other outage (every 3 years). It's often the critical
path item. There is a requirement to do a 24 hour run after the overhaul. If there is a
problem, they have to fix it, and that will push the critical path. Sometimes maintenance
causes problems in the diesel generators, so PWR_9 may be doing maintenance too
frequently. (U1 1)
BWR_#4 has only two EDGs. Work on an EDG cannot begin until the refueling cavity is
flooded. An extra EDG could help shorten their outages, and give more flexibility. (U19)
3.1.6.2.3 Fast start requirements
Diesel generators are big machines suitable for continuous operation, that have been
required to start in 10 seconds, and be tested that way. Too frequent fast start testing of
the generators wears them out. They don't need to start in 10 seconds. Starting a 4.5
MWe diesel in 10 seconds puts enormous stresses on it. If the plants could take a little
more time in starting them, they could be made a lot more reliable and longer lasting.
(U12) (U9)
3.1.6.3 PWR control rods / control rod drives (CRDs)
PWR_#10 has recently had problems with control rod drop times. Control rod drop time
tests are required by NRC, but they could either be done online or at hot shutdown, so
that capacity factor would not be significantly affected. The rods don't get exercised
enough if the plant does not shut down periodically. Then crud builds up in a couple of
orifices that affect the scram time. B&W has changed the design to cure the crud buildup.
This is the type of problem that is hard to anticipate when going to long cycles. (U 15)
(N2)
3.1.6.4 BWR control rod drives
3.1.6.4.1 Maintenance
BWR control rod drives have to be rebuilt and refurbished periodically. A certain fraction
are refurbished each year. In a longer cycle, a larger fraction would have to be refurbished
each outage.(V3)
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BWR_#4's control rod drives are never critical path. The control rod drives can be
inspected very quickly. The outage staff tries to pick the worse 10% every outage and fix
them, rather than fixing them arbitrarily. They monitor the temperatures and pressures to
get an idea of their condition. (U19)
3.1.6.4.2 Control rod drive purge system
The control rod drive purge system keeps CRDs ready for scram. It keeps the
accumulators charged, keeps the drives themselves filled with clean water, and keeps
recirculating pumps filled with clean water. Its design is already sufficient - two 100%
capacity pumps. (V3)
3.1.6.4.3 Control rod drive seals
Control rod drives have seals that require periodic maintenance. But GE is working on an
advanced drive that does not have seals, but uses magnetic force across the pressure
boundary as a coupling. "The current drive shaft with a seal is split, and a strong
permanent magnet is attached to the portion within the pressure boundary. There is a mated
permanent magnet coupling outside the pressure boundary but close enough to provide a
holding torque higher than the stall torque of the drive motor (which is also located outside
the pressure boundary). The design is expected to fit within the current geometric
envelope. Commercial availability is a few years away, but feasibility has been proven."
(personal correspondence with V3)
3.1.6.4.4 Conclusion
There should not be any trouble with the BWR control rod drives when going to longer
cycles. There is a need for maintenance, but the track record is pretty good. (V3)
3.1.6.5 Containment
3.1.6.5.1 Containment leak rate tests
Containment leak rate requirements are 0.1% pressure drop per day, as specified in
Appendix J. Utilities are continuously finding that some valve isn't quite as tight as
thought, and they spend a great deal of time finding those valves and fixing them, but it's
really not necessary. Plus, the mandated time scale for actuation of these valves is
unrealistic. They are large, fast acting valves that have to be very reliable. But if the time
scale was made more rational, the valves could be made much more reliable. (the time scale
is currently under revision). (C8) (U12)
Check OCFR50 Appendix J for containment leak test requirements. The regulations are
being changed to make it a more reasonable test, but the requirement is not being done
away with. NRC will begin giving plants relief on testing if they can show a history of
successfully satisfying Appendix J requirements. (N2)
The law currently requires physical leak rate checks of the containment isolation valves
every two years. At BWR_#4, some of the valves must be tested in shutdown conditions.
The whole testing takes about two weeks if all the valves pass. However, if a valve
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exceeds allowable leakage limits, it has to be repaired. This could result in additional
weeks added to the outage for a single valve. Some valves can be tested online, but if they
fail, the plant still has to shut down to perform maintenance. Online testing of valves
should be addressed in the design phase. (U5)
The utilities would like to see overall containment performance criteria rather than
individual valve leak requirements. It's easier to test the whole containment rather than
the whole containment AND each valve. This is a performance approach. (U9)
3.1.6.5.2 PWR containment
3.1.6.5.2.1 Containment environment
The containment atmosphere during operations is about 120 degrees F. Some of the
equipment operates better at this temperature, too. It is very difficult for people to go into
containment for extended periods of time. This places limitations on what equipment can
be maintained online. (C2) (U 11)
It is possible for people to enter containment while the reactor is running, but it is not
pleasant. It is a harsh environment. (U20)
3.1.6.5.2.2 Containment spray systems
In a PWR, it may be better to make the containment spray systems manual start. If there
is a fan cooler (in the heating, ventilation & air conditioning [HVAC] system), there is no
reason for the containment spray to be fast start. Fast start of the containment spray uses
up the stored water quickly. The containment spray may not need to be actuated in the
first two minutes of an accident. It makes a big difference in the maintenance program and
the reliability of components. If it is a fast start, automatic system, the equipment is
continuously being beaten to death. Plus, there are a lot of things that have to happen
coincident: pumps start, valves open, valves close. Therefore, there is a lot of logic
circuitry to maintain. (U12).
The comment (U12) made above about using a manual start containment spray seems
contrary to what I would think. It seems like manual start lends itself to operator error.
A slow, phased, automatic start process may be the compromise.
3.1.6.5.2 BWR containments
3.1.6.5.2.1 Drywell cooling system
The drywell cooling system, starting with the ABWR, is designed with nothing in
containment except the chiller heat exchangers and fans. The pumps are outside. There is
a need to have redundancy for the fans in the containment. (V3)
3.1.6.5.2.2 Containment atmosphere
In BWR Mark I & II containments, personnel can not go into containment because it is
inerted. The containment can not be de-inerted for safety reasons. To go into
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containment, the plant has to be shut down. The Germans designed a BWR for online
maintenance of the recirculation pumps, but scrapped it because of the inert requirement.
(V3)
3.1.7 Residual heat removal system (RHR) - BWR and PWR
3.1.7.1 Online maintenance
It is important to be able to do maintenance online for the RHR system because it becomes
critical during plant shutdown.(U11)
3.1.7.2 Combining safety and non-safety heat removal:
The RHR system is a safety heat removal system, but the plant generates heat in the non-
safety portions also. The question is whether to combine the RHR system and the non-
safety heat removal systems. Combining the two saves capital expenses, but reduces
maintenance flexibility. If they are combined, the sea water system needs to be running all
the time - during operation and shutdown - because the containment air conditioning has
to be running continuously. That makes it difficult to do maintenance. The alternative is
to: (1) have a non-safety grade closed cooling water loop for the non-safety grade heat
removal, or (2) provide more redundancy in the safety grade loops. (V3)
The RHR pumps can be doubled up or taken out for maintenance. But the heat
exchangers cannot be spared. (V3)
3.1.8 Heating ventilation & air conditioning (HVAC)
3.1.8.1 Inattention
The HVAC system always takes low priority in the design process; however, it is critical
to short term reliability. It has an enormous impact on the reliability of solid state
electronics and other key equipment. (U12).
3.1.8.2 Heating
For winter climates, if heating water goes out, it can shut the plant down. If the plant has
a heating water system, the heating water system will create a significant maintenance
program. (U12)
The secondary should be at least moderately protected from the elements and heated. (N6)
3.1.8.3 Fans
Belt-driven fans should not be used in the containment. The belts wear out and they are
inaccessible. This can shut the plant down. (U15)
3.1.8.4 Ventilation of safety systems
PWR_#2 has no ventilation problems because all the ECCS safety systems are housed in
one very big room. But PWR_#5 had to put everything in different rooms to meet
separation, fire and flood requirements. There is not a lot of information on heatup of
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those rooms during post-initiating events. This is one of the big gray areas. So reliance
on external cooling systems should be minimized, but this is very difficult to accomplish.
(U13)
There is a plant that has a very risk significant ventilation system because it had a two
pump system that supplied ventilation to almost everything in the plant. That came up as
the most risk significant system in the plant. PWR_#5 has multiple systems to supply
ventilation to the whole plant. (U13)
3.1.9 Instrumentation & control (I&C)
3.1.9.1 Control system capabilities
Plants should have control systems that are much more instrumented and more advanced.
They should have at least 50% runback capabilities so that the plant does not have to
depend so much on trips. (C2) (U 11)
3.1.9.2 Calibration periodicities:
Utility 4 knows that they don't have to calibrate control systems or protective systems
every refueling. They have 20 years of data that says to go to 2 year periods on the
calibrations. It saves money and potentially reduces the risk of introducing problems.
(U14)
If instrument readings don't drift apart, they're probably OK, but we test them anyway.
(U4)
3.1.9.3 Online maintenance of control and protective systems
A utility is trying to push as much of the maintenance on control and protective systems
online as possible, and is approaching this from a risk based perspective. In many cases,
the best and safest time to do maintenance is online.(U14)
From an electronics perspective, online testing and calibration has already been done.
Most (if not all) I&C has online testing done automatically in the System 80+, or has
simple, built in testing which does not require opening cabinets and putting jumpers on to
test them. So the System 80+ has eliminated those types of testings that often tripped the
plant off-line or required it to be shut down. (V 1)
There is a tremendous benefit to doing I&C surveillance online. (C6)
3.1.9.4 New instrumentation and control equipment
New I&C equipment is a lot less sensitive to problems. The digital equipment does not
drift, and better monitoring and diagnostic techniques are available for this equipment.
Some of the new I&C has not been specified yet in the new reactor designs because it
changes so much. (C6)
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The control systems are tremendously better and more reliable than they were 10-15 years
ago. They are easier to test, have more online test capabilities than older systems. Control
systems is the area to be least worried about when designing for longer cycles. (U20)
Controls are constantly getting better. The problems are the mechanical components they
regulate. If they fail, the system fails. (U20)
3.1.9.5 Digital control
(See Section 3.9.3)
3.1.9.6 Instrumentation and monitoring
There are not any major problems with running any of the primary monitors longer. This
includes thermocouples, differential level, differential pressure cells, pressure transmitters,
neutron detectors (which are good for 10 years). The utilities have enough experience to
know how to monitor them. (C6)
3.1.9.7 Cables
High voltage cables start to break down after 20 years. Regular surveillance tests do not
indicate the overall condition of the cable, only if the cable is functional at that instant in
time. The solution is to go to diagnostics that monitor the circuitry's electronic signature.
(C6)
3.1.9.8 Designing against operator error
In the design stage, it has to be assumed that the operator will do the wrong thing.
Controls should be designed such that the reactor is protected from the operators. (V4)
3.1.10 Valves
3.1.10.1 General concerns
3.1.10.1.1 Valve maintenance and testing
In general, valve maintenance and testing may be a limiting factor in going to longer
cycles. Valves that operate frequently require more maintenance than those that operate
infrequently. Redesigned valves may alleviate concerns over expanded maintenance.
Valves experience hardening of grease which affects the torque that must be applied to the
valve to shut it. (V 1) (U 16) (V2) (U21) (U24)
Motor operated valves are required to undergo force measuring to verify operability. The
valves have to be out of service for force measuring. [Ref.30]
When valves remain shut for long periods of time, they can form chemical bonds and seal
shut. (U9)
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3.1.10.1.2 MOV testing under high flow conditions
A BWR has had problems showing that MOVs will close against high flow. It's hard to
test the valves because there more or less needs to be a line break to generate that kind of
flow resistance. (U2)
3.1.10.2 Safety valves
3.1.10.2.1 Safety valve testing
After two years safety valve settings drift and they need to be refurbished and reset off-
line. (N1)
Safety valves are passive, and there is no particular reason to think that the valves would
deteriorate and not tolerate a five year operating period. A safety relief valve
manufacturer should be consulted to make sure this is correct. (V3)
Safety valves can not be tested online because that might initiate a LOCA. (V3)
3.1.10.2.2 ASME testing requirements
To meet ASME codes, a certain fraction of the safety valves are taken apart and run
through an ASME test periodically. If they pass, there is no problem. If not, more testing
has to be done. ASME rules will show whether it is currently acceptable to work on safety
relief valves every five years. (V3)
3.1.10.3 Solenoid valves
The rubber / elastomer diaphragms in solenoid valve air and water systems are a problem.
(C4)
3.1.10.4 Flow control valves
Flow control valves are a generic class of valves. Flow control valve performance is one of
the biggest issues to address. (U12)
3.1.10.5 BWR main steam isolation valves (MSIVs)
BWR main steam isolation valves often don't pass their tests and have to be fixed every
refueling outage. MSIVs can be tested online (late at night) by going to lower power and
shutting one. But they may only be able to test their ability to close, not how much they
leak. (C4) (V3)
BWR_#4's MSIVs can show up on critical path if they fail their leak rate tests. MSIVs are
huge, and it costs about $150,000 to fix one of them. All containment isolation valves
have to be tested every two years. NRC is about to give some relaxation on that
requirement. If a plant has a good history with passing the tests (at least two passes in a
row), NRC will start considering letting them go longer between tests. Maybe up to five
years or more. (U19)
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3.1.11 Circulating water system
The circulating water system removes heat from the Condenser. This system has had
tremendous problems in the past. This system can be designed for longer cycles through
redundancy. (V3)
Swedish plants have a spare circulating water pump for quick change-outs during outages.
BWR_#4 has to rebuild their circulating pumps during the outage, which consumes
valuable time and workers. The analogy applies to other pumps and other components.
(U19)
BWR_#4 has had plant shutdowns due to rough ocean conditions. Debris accumulates at
the intake screens, the circulating water pumps tripped and the plant tripped. (U23)
3.1.11.1 Seawater sites
At seawater sites, the circulating water system is more trouble because it brings algae,
muscles, and bacteria into the system, causing additional corrosion and erosion. These
problems have to be dealt with using better materials (titanium tubes for the condenser), or
by putting in enough parallel piping for online repair i.e. instead of two pipes, use three -
one inlet, one outlet, and one redundant for repair. (V3)
BWR_#3 had a problem with seaweed in inlet screens, which caused a loss of circulating
water pumps, which caused a trip. (U2)
Circulating water pumps suck in whatever is out in the environment. By going to a cooling
tower, chemistry can be controlled better. (C4)
3.1.11.2 Future heat sinks in the US
Rivers and lakes are out as far as heat sinks for future plants because of EPA regulations.
In the US, future plants will be limited to cooling towers, with which it is easier to control
chemistry; therefore, chemistry and biological factors shouldn't be as much of a problem as
for seawater sites. (V3)
3.1.12 Service water system (BWRs only)
The service water system in a BWR provides cooling water from the environment to the
closed cooling water system, which in turn provides cooling water to the condenser. The
service water system is the interface with ultimate heat sink.
One of the problems, like the circulating water system in PWRs, is that it pumps in
whatever is out in the river, ocean, or whatever the ultimate heat sink is. The solution to
the chemistry problem is a cooling tower. (C4)
3.1.12.1 Service water system maintenance
In some plants it may be OK to reduce power to 50% to where only one train is needed,
and then to do maintenance on the other train. (U8)
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A BWR has a lot of systems with less redundancy than modem plants have. The service
water system was very poorly designed. The staff can not work on anything in this system
at power, and it's extremely difficult to work on it while the plant is offline. (U2)
It is better to maintain the emergency service water system at power, because it is needed
when the plant comes down. (U24)
3.1.13 Reactor pressure vessels
3.1.13.1 Reactor vessel fluence
Reactor vessel embrittlement has become an issue for some plants. Embrittlement due to
high neutron fluence can be solved for future plants by better materials selection, better
quality control, and better vessel shielding. This will not be a limiting factor for future
reactors. It has been a problem for current plants. (C4) (U 14)
Utility 4 is still on 12 month cycles because of pressure vessel fluence issues. They run a
low leakage core to achieve planned plant life. Longer fuel cycles are more difficult to
design for low leakage. (U14) (U15)
3.1.13.2 BWR reactor vessel internals
BWR internals may be a problem for future plants. Even if they're built out of new
materials, they are still going to be required to be monitored periodically. Internals are
required to be tested on a 10 year interval. (C4) (U9)
* Jet beams crack. (C4)
· Core shrouds crack. (C4)
· Use ultrasonic techniques to test the instrumentation tubes. (U 13)
According to GE, depending on the scope of failures of the vessel internals, utilities may
be faced with up to $600M per unit in repair costs. (U23)
Hydrogen chemistry can be used to keep crack growth rates within acceptable limits. But
it costs in exposure to the workers. (U23)
3.1.13.2.1 Thermal gradients
Near the end of the fuel cycle, the core reactivity becomes depleted. In order to continue
operating, the power level must be dropped or inlet feedwater temperature must be
dropped to add reactivity. Dropping the inlet temperature for the reactor puts thermal
stresses on the reactor pressure vessel and the nozzles. (U5)
3.1.13.2.2 Nozzles and vessel penetrations
With aging, nozzles and vessel penetrations may exhibit cracking due to severe thermal
stresses or poor water chemistry. As the plant ages, inspections are required to show that
these components are still functional. Access to the control rod drive penetrations is very
restrictive, and inspections will be difficult. (U5)
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3.1.13.2.3 Core shroud
The core shroud is essentially a steel cylinder. It is susceptible to intergrannular stress
corrosion cracking (IGSCC). BWRs are beginning to show signs of cracking in the core
shroud. This is a significant safety issue. The concern is that in an accident, if the shroud
was cracked and there was an upsurge of pressure, the shroud would lift up, move a little
sideways, and prevent the control rods from being inserted. (U5) (U9)
BWR_#4 is going to be required to inspect their shroud for cracks in the next outage.
They have assumed that they will have cracking, and are planning to implement a fix.
Inspecting the shroud involves exotic inspection tools and significant time. BWR_#4
decided to just implement the fix, and assume that the cracking is there. (U5) (U9)
The fix that BWR_#4 is using is essentially a clamp between the upper shroud and the
lower shroud. There are rods connecting the upper and lower shroud, and they are put in
tension. This will hold the shroud together and eliminate concerns of a circumferential
failure. (U9)
3.1.13.2.4 Vessel welds
BWRs are required to perform a full inspection of all the reactor vessel welds every 10
years. The law was changed from partial to full inspections. When BWR_#4's vessel was
built, the welds were X-rayed. There were signs of flaws, which was normal. But they
couldn't measure the size. There are now methods of determining the size of weld flaws,
and plants are required to measure them, and will probably be required to measure them
again in two years to see if the cracks have grown. This is a critical path item, because the
reactor has to be empty of fuel for 10 days to inspect the penetrations. It adds 10 days to
the outage. (U5)
3.1.14 Electrical system
3.1.14.1 DC breakers
BWR_#4 has two trains of DC power, and both are required for operation. It's very
difficult to take any of the DC breakers offline. When a DC breaker is taken out, a whole
distribution panel is taken out with it, because the testing can not be done live. So
BWR_#4 has to use temporary modifications to provide DC power to critical equipment
just to be able to take the breakers out for testing. During the next outage, these breakers
will be tested for the first time since the plant was built (20 years). If they are in good
condition, this may be evidence that the DC breakers don't need to be tested frequently.
(U3)
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3.2. Regulatory / institutional framework
The institutional environment is a generic class of concerns encompassing interactions
with such bodies as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME), the Vendors, EPRI, and INPO. However, the main
constituent of this category is the NRC. The following is an outline listing observations
and opinions regarding the interactions of the various institutional organizations with plant
design and operations.
3.2.1 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
3.2.1.1 Regulatory requirements
3.2.1.1.1 Over regulation
The staff of a PWR has become too concerned about regulatory requirements. The staff
does not think in terms of reliability, it only thinks in terms of satisfying regulations. The
industry has been driven rather than led by regulatory requirements. (U 11)
About 50% of the regulatory requirements don't produce any value in safety or
economics. After a certain point, additional regulations begin to adversely affect safety.
Initially, adding good regulations increases safety, but after a point, adding additional
regulations begin to overwhelm the utility, and safety begins to be compromised. Thus,
there is a hump shape to the safety vs. regulatory curve. NRC has gone over the hump
(too much regulation) on Appendix K requirements. They have made equipment
inaccessible to the point where safety and economics are lost. (U14)
PWR_#5 was forced by NRC to spend a couple million dollars last year on a leak
detection system that the PRA found insignificant. Hopefully, the maintenance rule will
limit inappropriate items like this. (U 13)
All BWRs with Mark I and II containments had to install a hardened wetwell vent for a
specific severe accident. The cost was several million dollars, and it was just to satisfy a
certain Generic Letter. The probability of that accident was about 10-8 per reactor year.
Hopefully, in the future, things like the maintenance rule will alleviate these problems.
(U10)
NRC became too prescriptive in the post TMI era. Within the past three years, NRC has
been turning that around. It is difficult for NRC inspectors and people at the plants to
look past the old prescriptive environment into one in which they have to begin thinking
for themselves again. NRC is becoming more helpful and less paternal.(U9)
3.2.1.1.2 Rationalizing design requirements
The first and most important step to designing better plants is to rationalize the design
requirements. The industry needs to go back to fundamentals, and question all of the
requirements. Then the plants will have more time for response during accidents, and they
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can design more rational and reliable systems. For example, the requirement on fast acting
containment isolation valves and fast start diesel generators are too restrictive and may
actually be contrary to safety because fast acting machines tend to be less reliable. The
reason behind the fast start requirements on diesel generators is the Appendix K
assumptions of a large break LOCA coincident with a loss of offsite power (LOOP), and
the conservative assumption that all of the equipment needs to be online instantly. But
designing for this short of a time scale puts enormous stresses on machinery, can reduce
reliability and safety, and may have no physical justification. (U 12)
3.2.1.1.3 Surveillance requirements
BWR_#4 spends an inordinate amount of time on load shedding tests. In the event of a
coincident LOCA and LOOP, the plant has to shed a lot of its electrical loads, and then
sequence certain ones back on after the EDGs start up. It is required to test that the load
shedding works properly every outage. Its interpretation of "works properly" has been
almost a full logic system functional test for every circuit in that load shedding. It takes 36
hours, and it is one critical path. For this case, the staff at BWR_#4 knows that they were
doing more than was required, and they are going back and rewriting the procedure.
(U23)
At BWR_#4, there is a class of tests that overlap. The logic system functional tests and
the simulated automatic actuation tests both test much of the same logic circuitry. They
were doing most of the testing twice. They are going back and revising these
requirements. (U23)
3.2.1.1.3.1 Self imposed surveillance requirements
Plants have not sufficiently evaluated the effects of generic policy changes based on
LOCA failures. When a particular relay fails, and is tested on a five year basis, the
corrective action might be to test it on a two year basis. However, it might be decided to
test all relays of that type on a two year basis. The impact of this is usually not
appreciated. Now, all relays of that type are tested on a two year basis. But if none of
them fail the test on a two year basis, the basis stays at two years, instead of being
extended back to five years. This is very common in the industry. After sufficient time,
these requirements build up and become overwhelming. (U23)
3.2.1.1.3.2 Surveillance and maintenance extensions
(See Section 3.6.1)
3.2.1.1.4 Online maintenance
If the utilities get into arguments with NRC over whether it is safe to do maintenance
online, the public will never trust them. NRC is concerned about how plants can optimize
their refueling outage durations, and at the same time not raise concerns over working on
standby safety systems at power. Many stations are adopting an online maintenance
strategy - they are taking safety systems out to do maintenance - but the position at NRC
is that they do not want the utilities to be doing online maintenance of safety systems
64
solely to reduce refueling outage duration. This can be overcome in a couple of ways. (1)
ALWR approach - eliminate active systems, and (2) European approach - have many
redundant systems. (P3) (N2)
NRC's view on operational maintenance is changing. It was previously very negative, but
NRC is beginning to ask "when do plants really need this component to work?" If the
answer is at shutdown, then plants should do the maintenance online. (P2)
3.2.1.1.5 Innovative techniques
NRC's attitude will evolve into letting plants use innovative techniques. The industry is at
the stage where it can learn how to use advanced technologies by risking relay, circuit, or
valve failures without jeopardizing public safety. The incentive is reliable operation of the
plant. However, plants have to differentiate between failure modes in which there is and is
not a significant safety risk. Plants can not afford a pump seal LOCA, or a problem with
the primary pressure boundary, the containment, or the fuel.(P2)
The regulatory climate is good for new technology. There is a new receptiveness to
looking at things from a risk perspective (in the last 2 years). NRC is beginning to use risk
concepts to make rational decisions, but not as the sole basis for decisions. (N5) (V 1)
3.2.1.1.6 Containment leak rate tests
There are containment leak rate tests (Appendix J) that need to be done every 24 months.
Regulations are much more difficult to change than Technical Specifications. (U20)
3.2.1.1.7 Regulatory emphasis
In the design stages, NRC should be consulted to see what their explicit concerns are (i.e.
LCO maintenance) and then designers can understand and address these concerns. (U8)
From a regulatory point of view, it is clearly the surveillance of safety systems, steam
generator tube inspections, and containment leak rate tests that are important. NRC is
going to be very restrictive with respect to running steam generators for longer cycles
without inspections, even with new tube materials. (N2) (C4)
Generic Issue 23: NRC is trying to make the plants have an independent method of seal
cooling that can be lined up within 10 minutes following loss of seal cooling. (U13)
3.2.1.1.8 Diversity requirements
There has been regulatory insistence on diverse equipment drivers (i.e. electrical powered
motors, steam driven turbine motors, diesel powered motors) in key systems such as
auxiliary feedwater. But experience shows that this has not improved safety. (U 12)
3.2.1.1.9 Separation requirements
Equipment separation requirements are an enormous contributor to down time. It makes
sense electrically because of the effects of fires or floods. But a fire or flood won't affect
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a pipe. Reduction of the separation requirements will make maintenance significantly
easier.(U 12)
Plants barricade equipment to meet the requirements for flood, fire, and separation, but
this increases the reliance on external cooling and support systems. (U13)
3.2.1.2 NRC assistance
3.2.1.2.1 Surveillance extensions
See Section 3.6. 1.1
3.2.1.2.2 Inspection and surveillance criteria
A review of current inspection and surveillance criteria would supplement the information
and insights that would be gained by a focused examination of equipment failure data.
(N1)
3.2.1.2.3 Modular I&C specifications
Design assistance criteria are used in the instrumentation and control (I&C) area.
Basically, the plant is designed for certification without the detailed I&C design. This
allows customers to specify the design with state of the art I&C so that it does not become
obsolete. (N3)
3.2.1.2.4 Cost beneficial licensing actions (CBLAs)
The Cost Beneficial Licensing Action program is new at NRC. Historically, if plants had a
cost saving proposal, NRC was reluctant to provide the resources to evaluate the
proposal. But now NRC will let operators fill out a form, and the NRC gives it to a special
reviewer who comes back in a prioritized fashion. If the plant satisfies the safety
concerns, NRC gives the plant a fast track to approval. (C6)
3.2.1.2.5 Analysis of operating data
AEOD deals with trends and patterns. The trending guys spend 6 to 12 months on a
particular system. They are looking at systems microscopically. There are procedures to
get access to this data. (N6)
3.2.1.3 Quality assurance (QA)
3.2.1.3.1 Historical quality assurance programs
One of the biggest wastes of money is maintaining the level of QA on systems that are not
risk significant. Spare parts for insignificant systems have to be QA approved, and that's
expensive and difficult. Quality Assurance does little for reliability, but it has to be there to
satisfy regulations. (C2) (U11) (U 13)
3.2.1.3.2 Graded quality assurance
BWR_#2 expects to save millions by buying less safety related equipment under the
graded QA program. Graded QA gives the utilities a less prescriptive approach to QA. It
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allows them to focus more on the important equipment and less on unimportant equipment.
(U 10) (N6)
3.2.1.3.3 Making equipment OA
There is a big problem finding "Q" equipment. NRC has forced some of the vendors out
of the market because they were being held liable for shoddy equipment. NRC is now
trying to establish how utilities can take non-safety grade equipment, and put it through its
own tests and standards, and then put it in a safety related system. The ability to take a low
cost component, test it, and then be able to use it in a safety system will save the industry a
lot of money. (U9)
3.2.1.4 Maintenance rule
3.2.1.4.1 Rationalizing maintenance
The maintenance rule is designed to focus maintenance resources in the most risk
significant areas. If it is successful, plants can eliminate all the prescriptive regulations that
have wasted time and resources. The maintenance rule is performance based regulation. It
has changed the philosophical outlook of the industry, because it focuses attention on what
is important. (U14) (U13) (U9)
The maintenance rule is mostly based on trending. If a component is safety related, then
performance goals are set for it. If the plant meets the performance goals, they can start
doing less maintenance, and they get more freedom. If the plant isn't meeting the
performance goals, it has to re-evaluate its program.
3.2.1.4.2 Capacity factor through the maintenance rule
Plants have not started looking at PRA for plant capacity yet because the PRA program was
started based on safety. But the philosophy is changing because of the maintenance rule.
The maintenance rule addresses non-safety related system reliability by considering
unplanned trips as safety threats. Consequently, it looks at the secondary system and what
is causing these trips. (U20)
3.2.1.4.3 Defining safety significance
Without drawing a line (say 10 -6 core melts per year), everything is needed. But once the
level of safety significance is defined, plants can decide whether something is really
"needed" on a rational basis. (U10)
3.2.1.4.4 Reliability centered maintenance
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) does an analysis to develop cut-sets for critical
equipment. Any new plant should adopt this method. It identifies design weaknesses, and
concentrates maintenance where it is needed. It is closely related to the maintenance rule.
(U24)
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3.2.1.5 Technical Specifications
Technical Specifications specify the allowable plant configurations and states. They
specify what components and systems are allowed to be inoperable as a function of time
and configuration. (C4)
It may be advantageous to examine the Technical Specifications of a newer plant to find
out what surveillance tests have to be done, and how to get rid of them. To go to longer
cycles, plants have to do a lot of online testing. (N2)
3.2.1.5.1 NUREG 1377
NUREG 1377 was an effort by NRC to solicit industry comments and to rationalize
Technical Specifications. For the first time, NRC decided what should and should not be
in the Technical Specifications. NUREG 1377 addressed reduced testing, aging,
degradation mechanisms and techniques for monitoring, inspection, testing, and
surveillance. (N4) (N1) (N6) (U9)
3.2.1.5.2 Standard Technical Specifications
Standard Technical Specifications (STS) were developed by NRC with assistance from the
vendors to eliminate many outdated requirements. Crystal River adopted STS and made
back the investment in their first outage. There is also a line item improvements program.
But neither are being utilized yet by industry. About 40% of LCOs and surveillance
requirements can be eliminated by revisiting Technical Specifications and revisiting
licensing bases. (N6)
The BWR owners group worked together with NRC to develop their own standard
technical specifications. They did a very good job. There are now a new set of standards.
NRC will allow utilities to compare their technical specifications to the STS and adopt the
sections they like, as long as the utility can show that its equipment can support it. They
can not pick out very specific pieces, but they can adopt sections. It gives the utilities the
chance to revisit their technical specifications and remove the unnecessary, over
burdensome requirements. BWR_#4 divided the STS into two sections: operations
maneuverability and outage enhancement. (U9)
3.2.1.5.2.1 Operations maneuverability
This includes technical specification revisions that will translate into fewer plant
perturbations. BWR_#4 has eliminated many reactor trip setpoints as a result of changes
in the technical specifications. (U9)
3.2.1.5.2.2 Outage enhancement
BWR_#4 is about to revise their technical specifications to improve their outage flexibility.
It is tough to analyze outage technical specification changes because it is not clear what
, - , " -'- : 1 · · n ~ -
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the benefit will be. Regardless, BWR_#4 is trying to identify those things that can reduce
outage scope. (U9)
3.2.1.5.3 Limiting conditions for operation (LCO) maintenance
The Technical Specifications dictate the allowed configurations for plant operation. When a
component or system becomes inoperable, the plant typically has to shut down immediately
(if the threat is serious), or the Technical Specifications give an allowed time to make the
component or system operable before the plant has to go to lower modes of operation. A
plant in this state is said to be in a "limiting condition for operation."
3.2.1.5.3.1 LCO extensions
Utilities can ask NRC for relief for one time extensions if they have or anticipate having an
allowed outage time violation (see next section). The plants can make risk arguments on
the time window and averaging the risk over the 40 year life of a plant. But arguments like
these-if made too frequently-begin to degrade safety past what was intended by
technical specifications. (U9)
3.2.1.5.3.2 Allowed outage time violations
Occasionally, plants run into a Technical Specification allowed outage time violation. For
example, if the operators test a safety system online, and it does not work, then the plant
has a specified time interval to get it running. Otherwise the plant has to go to progressively
lower modes of operation. One resolution to allowed outage time violations is extending the
allowed outage time using PRA. (V2)
3.2.1.5.3.3 Voluntary LCO maintenance
If plants need to be able to take a system out of service for a finite period of time for
inspection, calibration, maintenance and/or repair, they may have to enter an LCO to do
this. Deliberate entrance into LCO is a current practice, but NRC does not like voluntary
LCO entrance because it degrades the overall safety over that time period. (U8)
In five years, voluntary LCO entrance will probably not be a big issue. NRC will become
more receptive. (U12)
If the technical specification allowed outage times can be extended long enough,
maintenance can be done online without added redundancy. (V2)
NRC did not make evolutionary designers go to installed spare designs for safety systems.
If plants do the economic calculations, and amortize that cost over 30-50 years, redundancy
will probably pay for itself because of increased capacity factor. The staff would prefer
that option. The staff probably will not like the idea of LCO maintenance. (N2)
BWR_#4 approaches voluntary LCO conservatively. The requirements are that the
maintenance can be completed in less than half of the allowed outage time. The procedure
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must be reversible so that if it becomes apparent that the repair or maintenance cannot be
completed, they can back out of the maintenance. Extensive planning is required. (U23)
3.2.1.5.3.4 Risk basis for LCO maintenance
Voluntary entrance of LCOs should be approached on an instantaneous risk basis. There
are tools that will allow operators to input the specific plant state, and that will give them
the instantaneous risk level of the plant. This tells them if it is acceptable to take certain
equipment combinations out of service for a given period of time. Utility 1 uses this
technique. (U12)
INPO has some concerns about voluntary LCO maintenance in addition to NRCs concerns.
A few years ago, INPO was advocating doing more maintenance online, but found that in
some instances, the risk increase was unacceptable. An online PRA allows plants to do
more LCO analysis. It gives plants a full understanding of what risk status the plant is
entering by taking things out of service. PWR_#8 is using an online PRA for real-time
decisions. (N5)
BWR_#4 used their PRA to justify some of its LCO time limits. They also used their PRA
to set up system and component level outage time goals. They also have an overall plant
level risk increase goal so that doing a lot of minor LCO maintenance does not exceed the
total plant risk level goal. However, BWR_#4 does not yet use an online PRA for day to
day operations. (U23)
3.2.1.5.3.5 LCO maintenance and safety
The claim that "it's safer to do some maintenance at power" is just a rationalization to be
able to do maintenance at power. Future designs should be configured so that it is safe to
do maintenance while shutdown. That way, plants can not use this as an excuse to do
maintenance at power. At power, there is less time to react. In shutdown, there may not be
as many safety systems available, but there is a lot more time to respond to accident
conditions. (N2)
LCO maintenance is valuable and safe if all the factors are truly taken into account. But
operating experience says that plants really have to be careful, because that's when bad
things happen. A technician lifting the wrong lead or pushing the wrong button can initiate
a transient that shuts the plant down and/or challenges the safety systems. (P2)
3.2.1.5.3.6 Voluntary vs. unanticipated LCO maintenance
The difference between voluntary entrance into LCOs and forced entrance into LCOs is that
forced entrance is less frequent and is the basis for the PRA. When plants start entering
LCOs voluntarily, they destroy the statistics that were used to justify LCO maintenance.
Therefore, plants have to be able to show that the overall risks are not increased
significantly or are decreased by going to LCOs for maintenance.(U8)
The concept of LCO maintenance was never intended to be used frequently, because this
involves deliberately cutting into redundancy that people assumed was there when making
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safety judgments and in their PRA analyses. Therefore, there will be resistance to
incorporating this option into the design and technical specifications. (N2)
3.2.1.5.3.7 Operating risks
Whether LCO maintenance is a safety concern or not, it is an economic concern. The
problem with LCO maintenance is that the biggest source of unanticipated scrams is
technician error. Systems have to be designed so that technician error is unlikely to cause
problems in other systems. Plants have to be able to show that online maintenance will not
affect plant operation. (P2)(V4)
3.2.2 ASME equipment testing codes
To go to longer maintenance and testing intervals, the ASME codes must be consulted.
ASME is currently revising the maintenance and inspection codes. (N1)
3.2.3 Vendor recommendations
There has been a mind-set in the nuclear industry to follow vendor recommendations
without a questioning attitude. The question is what the risks are of extending the
periodicities of inspections and maintenance. In a lot of cases, the equipment is already
designed for 2 years, and at least longer than the vendor recommendations. What is
uncertain is by how far. (U2 1)
3.2.3 Utility Requirements Document
The Utility Requirements Document is a document that was put together by the utilities
outlining what they thought were the requirements for ordering new nuclear power plants.
(V1) (P4) (N5) (P2)
The following is a list of the Utility Requirements Document points that were considered
significant by the interviewees:
1. Focus on a safer plant that has learned the lessons of previous plants. (V1, P4)
2. Better containment (P4)
3. Lower overall costs. (V1) (P2)
4. Lower O&M costs from less maintenance and higher capacity factor. (V1)
5. Shorter constructions times due to better construction techniques. (V1)
6. More maintainable. (V1)
7. Improved online maintenance and testing. (P2)
8. Higher capacity factor (87%). (V1) (P2)
9. Lower forced outage rate (P2)
10. Lower planned outage times. (P2)
11. Capable of a two year cycle. (V1)
12. More thermal margins in systems. It's OK to lose a little thermal performance to make
the systems more reliable, and to give operators more room to stay within Technical
Specifications. (P4)
14. Simplification of the plant and safety systems. (P4)
15. Incorporate digital technology. (P4)
71
3.3 Probabilistic techniques
Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) and spin-offs such as availability analyses became popular
only after the current generation of power plants were completed or under construction.
PRA has generated many insights into reactor design that were not available to the first
generation designers. Therefore, it is not surprising that there are many who think that
PRA should be used as a design tool. The following is an outline of the comments made
in this regard.
3.3.1 Computer-based PRAs
There are computer codes that allow the plant PSA to be loaded into them to examine the
affect of system degradation on risk, but there are not any comparable codes for analyzing
availability and capacity factor. (C2)
Computer-based PRAs can be offered as an operational tool to the shift engineer's office,
the maintenance planner's office, or the operating engineer's office. (Probably not the
control room because they are already overburdened.) It can be made available to the
people making decisions on when, how and whether to enter an LCO. (U12)
Utility 2 has their PRAs on computer. They are going to an automated system where the
outage schedule will be linked to the PRA to determine the risks as a function of time.
(U13)
A code developed by NRC exists that is part of the RCM program for predicting
reliability. (C6)
3.3.2 PRA in design
3.3.2.1 Importance measures
Designers should distribute the importance more evenly among all components. That way
no single component can greatly affect reliability or safety. One goal should be the
optimization of the maintenance burden with respect to availability. For example, if there
are two components, one very important to system availability and one not very important
at all, more time should be spent maintaining the important component and less on the
unimportant one. (C7)
One major problem with current designs is that the front-line systems are typically very
reliable, but the support systems have little redundancy and are very important. This is
where adding small, cheap redundant components can buy a lot in terms of availability.
(C7)
One way to make components less significant to plant safety, operability and reliability is
through redundancy and diversity. Another way to make active components less risk
significant is to use passive and semi-passive systems for safety functions (e.g. the
AP600). (C7) (N 1)
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3.3.2.2 PRA early in design phase for decision making
Incorporating PRA into the design phase will allow for more rational design of systems. It
can be used to make design decisions. The effects of system modifications can be
immediately explored at low costs using PRA.(C2) (U 11) (N5)
Using PRA, Utility 1 has found that subtle differences can drive CDFs a factor of ten
higher. For example, a small difference in the arrangement of the electrical power buses
made BWR_#6 CDF a factor of ten better than BWR_#l's. Incorporating PRA into the
design phase would prevent poor design decisions such as this from affecting safety. (U 12)
PRA can be used to make choices in equipment purchases. PRA can be used to determine
the likelihood of a component lasting for 3,4,5 years. (C2)
3.3.2.3 Inspection intervals
There is an availability code called SOCRATES that is used to do plant reliability and
availability analyses. It determines the effects of extending the surveillance interval on
reliability by using fault tree analysis and reliability predictions based on past equipment
history. It will show on a graph if going from 30 to 120 days between tests actually
improves reliability. (C6)
PRA is also very useful for the determination of the optimal inspection intervals as a
function of plant and component age. (A3) has done work on aging and its affects on
PRA. (N1)
3.3.2.4 Licensing
Any new plant will have to have a PRA to be licensed. A PRA (even top level) should be
performed on an extended cycle design if it is to hold credibility in the industry today. It
provides clues and answers that might not otherwise be thought of. If a PRA is beyond
the scope of this research, it should be mentioned in the write-up that one should be
performed as part of any formal effort to build a plant like this. (U12)
3.3.3 Availability analysis
(U 13) used to be involved in an engineering group that came up with suggestions for
improvements in availability. The group looked at all the lost generating events, and tried
to trend some of the causes. There didn't seem to be much commonality for a lot of the
things the group trended. The group found many problems, but less solutions: turbine
blading, steam generator chemistry, valves, etc. The group didn't come up with many
things that the engineers didn't know, so the group was defunct in 1988. There needs to
be strong management who will push the ideas for a group of this type to be effective.
(U13)
A traditional probabilistic risk analysis has typical end states such as minor core melt,
major core melt, major offsite release of radiation. The end states (i.e. the plant condition
after a state transition) of a plant power availability analysis, however, become percent
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plant power after a failure or modes of operation at different plant configurations. (C2)
(U I1)
3.3.4 Common mode failures
The common mode failure fears have been turned in the wrong direction. It's an academic
exercise with a couple real world examples. The fact is, to prevent plants from doing
things that they know are safer because of concerns, which may or may be not be out
there, is wrong. The industry is trading real world problems for fear of a common mode
failure. The industry needs to become more mature on this issue. The common mode may
be out there, but the fact that it would manifest itself at the exact same time adds a whole
other element that usually is not taken into account. For example, the ATWS situation
requires two different shutdown mechanism from two different manufacturers. But it is
known that most of the problems with reliability are maintenance related. Now
technicians have just been exposed to two separate systems from two different
manufacturers. This is guaranteed to cause problems. (P2)
3.3.5 PRA for safety maintenance and LCO justification
(See section 3.2.1.5)
3.4 Design principles
The fourth broad category identified was comments concerning general design principles
that should be followed. This category includes perceived advantages and disadvantages
of diverse design philosophies. This category delineates underlying principles that should
be understood and considered by the designer and operator.
3.4.1 Fundamentals
3.4.1.1 Design margins
The industry let the wrong pressures drive it initially. In the search for better heat rates
and efficiency, engineers squeezed the fundamental design margins out of the plant. They
made the heat exchanger tubes thinner, the cladding thinner, they made the diameters
smaller. In doing so, they made them much more susceptible to failures. It would be
beneficial to put some of the design margins back into the steam generators, the
condenser, and the fuel. (U12)
3.4.1.2 Complexity
System complexity is a problem. Should reduce the number of active systems. (U16)
3.4.1.3 Advanced technology
In thinking of future plants, don't be caught up in using proven technology. Use advanced
technology in the design, because it will be proven by the time this type of reactor is built.
There are big paybacks using advanced technology. (P2)
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3.4.1.4 Maintainability
It is good to design maintainability into the plant - it's a big problem in US plants today, as
opposed to the Swedish and German plants that were well thought out in terms of trains
and equipment setup. (P3)
3.4.1.5 Systems to focus on
Focus on (1) the heat removal network for the standby equipment, (2) the feedwater
system, (3) the turbine generator, and (4) auxiliary systems. (V3).
3.4.2 Redundancy
3.4.2.1 Online maintenance
Higher redundancy can be used to facilitate online maintenance. Installed spares allow
components to be taken out of service for long enough to perform maintenance carefully
without jeopardizing safety or availability. (C4) (N1)
ABWR - the ABWR has a 3 division ECCS. It can afford to take a division down and do
surveillance and maintenance while at power. The following was the design philosophy:
N+ 1 redundancy for ECCS because the extra train can be maintained online under
LCOs or in shutdown without affecting safety.
N+2 redundancy for heat removal' function because heat removal is required
continuously, and can not be degraded online. (V3)
Swedish plants - some plants in Sweden have installed spare trains. Forsmark has 18 day
outages on an annual cycle. They can do this because they are able to do online
maintenance and online testing. They have essentially met the objective of performing
many critical activities online, but on a shorter cycle length. (U8)
German plants - the German philosophy of 4 trains was not for safety, but for online
maintenance. That was felt by the US industry to be too expensive. US plants can not
just add extra trains of equipment just to do online maintenance. It may be OK if the plant
was completely redesigned, but not with current designs. (P2)
European plants - the European approach to online maintenance is to have many more
safety trains available. If there are four 100% capacity safety trains of HPCI available,
there are fewer ramifications from taking one out for online service. (P3)
Redundancy provides flexibility to bypass equipment to permit maintenance at power.
Using extra trains and/or cross ties can improve availability. Muhleberg, a plant in
Switzerland, has two 50% turbines.(C5)
Continuously operating equipment needs to be designed with enough redundancy to be
able to take it out of service, inspect it, test it, and put it back in service. (U20)
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3.4.2.2 Cost considerations
To justify redundancy, the benefits must exceed the costs incurred by a significant margin.
The German philosophy of installed spares was considered by the US industry to be too
expensive. All costs of redundancy must be justified from an operational perspective.
However, if a plant is completely redesigned with the idea of performing all maintenance
online, redundancy may be more cost effective. (V2) (P2) (N5)
3.4.2.3 Where redundancy may not work
With pumps and valves, redundancy is only a question of money. The components that
will become problems are the large, expensive components where redundancy is not cost
justifiable - steam generators, turbine-generators, main coolant pumps, and those things
can not be maintained online. (C2) (U 1)(C4)
3.4.2.4 Effects of insufficient redundancy
The problem with existing plants (especially older ones) is they were built with the
minimum amount of redundancies required for safety. There wasn't much thought given
to adding redundancies to improve operations. Some of the newer plants have
incorporated redundancies for some components critical to operation. (U24)
BWR_#4 was designed with the minimum required redundancy. There are two trains of
ECCS. In some instances the trains can be traced back to the same sources. As a result
of the limited redundancy, outages and maintenance are extremely difficult to configure,
and are restricted. (U23)
If BWR_#4 had been designed with three trains of ECCS, it would have paid for itself.
BWR_#4 recently had a problem repairing the coolant injection system. They had a 7 day
LCO window, but had to get a 7 day extension to complete work. If the plant was
designed with three redundant trains, there would have been no rush or safety
degradation. All the breaker PMs, the battery testing, the diesel generator overhauls, and
the transformer tests could be done online if there was an additional train of ECCS
available. (U3)
3.4.2.5 Unnecessary redundancy
There are not that many places where redundancies really need to be added, if the plant
starts out with a clean slate and is designed for expeditious service of systems. Things like
not having to lift leads to do maintenance should be incorporated into the design. Then
safety and risk arguments can be made well without adding redundancies. (P2)
3.4.2.6 Complexity
It is good to have redundancies, but only when they are really necessary. Otherwise, it is
just adding to complexity. Not much redundancy is needed for standby systems. It just has
to be shown that it's OK to maintain them from a risk perspective. (U20) (U 16) (V2)
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3.4.2.7 Dependencies
Redundancy can lead to dependencies. Components performing several different tasks
(e.g. a pump that acts as both HPI and CVCS) can lead to complexities and dependencies.
There are some plants that have RHR systems that are also used for safety injection.
There was a Technical Specification that said if there is a problem with the safety
injection, the plant has to shut down. But now the plant is shutting down with no way to
cool the core. (P2)(N1)
If maintenance is going to be performed online, make sure that the systems are isolated
from each other so that maintenance on one system does not affect the operation of
another system. (V4)
3.4.3 Accessibility
3.4.3.1 Inspection
Particular design consideration must be given to components inaccessible to normal
inspection (i.e. BWR internals). Modern instrumentation with its self checking capability
helps. The key is developing non-destructive techniques for monitoring component
conditions, but it is difficult to develop such methods to work at operating temperature
and pressure. (C5)
Accessibility for inspections should be provided by design. All welds should be
inspectable. This will reduce the down time for required inspections. (N5)
3.4.3.2 Maintenance
Plants should be designed with maintenance in mind. Component accessibility is
important. Maintenance workers have to be able to get to equipment that needs to be
maintained. In some cases this just can not be done. (V2)(U14) (U16) (U24)
3.4.4 Diversity
Diversity has proven to be fallacious on its impacts on safety and an enormous
maintenance burden. For example, auxiliary feedwater (see also Section 3.1.1.3). There
is a requirement to have a turbine or diesel driven pump in addition to motor driven
pumps. That requires an enormous maintenance burden because turbine and diesel drives
are far more complicated than a motor drive, and far less reliable overall. Plants are better
off with two or three motor driven pumps, than with two motor driven pumps and one
diesel or turbine driven pump, in terms of system reliability and safety, and in terms of
maintenance load. One of the bases for diversity in auxiliary feedwater was station
blackout. But NRC has subsequently said just put in an additional diesel or a gas turbine
to cover station blackout. The alternate diesel or gas turbine does not even have to be fast
start or safety related; consequently, they will be much more reliable machines. (U12)
Starting with a clean sheet of paper, use diesel systems that are more reliable and that will
function better to backup normal AC power, and eliminate unnecessary diverse component
drivers (motive force) for safety related components. (U12)
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3.4.5 Architecture
Westinghouse, ABB-CE and GE have come up with new reactor designs, but there has
been minimal collaboration with architectural engineering companies like Stone and
Webster or Bechtel that actually design the layout. The NSSS vendors come up with
tremendously reliable systems, but the architectural company will put in systems that are at
the discretion of the site. Therefore, there are some risk and operationally significant
items - like the HVAC system -that are designed by the architect. Those systems are
necessary and very risk significant, but are designed by the architectural engineers. In
general, the architectural engineering firm designs the balance of plant. (U13)
3.4.6 Shutdown Safety
Shutdown safety should be considered in the original design of the plant. (N1) (N2)
3.4.7 Vulnerabilities to auxiliaries
Auxiliaries are those systems needed to keep the front-line equipment working. They
include electricity, air, cooling water, lube oil, and seals. Auxiliaries are typically less
reliable than the front-line systems, and limit those systems' reliability. (C4)
3.5 Economic pressures
The next category is economic pressures. The main motivation for any redesign or
modification of current plants is cost competitiveness. Economic pressures are currently
driving the industry, and they should not be forgotten in design or operation.
3.5.1 General comments
Keep all non-safety decisions based on economics. If another train is proposed, ask how
much it is going to cost, and how much will it save. If it does not save money, don't do it.
(U24)
3.5.1.1 Electricity costs
PWR_#7 1 and 2's production rate is $14/MWh-e. Their bus-bar cost is $25-$28/MWh-e.
Many plants are 4-5 times this much. Those plants aren't economical. Independent power
producers (IPPs) can install a new plant and produce power at about $30-$35/MWh-e
total cost. Unless other nuclear plants can beat this, they shouldn't be in business. Targets
for new plants have to be under $40/MWh-e. (U 14)
PWR_#10 is targeting going from $45/MWh-e to $30/MWh-e. BWR_#5 is targeting
going from $75/MWh-e to $45/MWh-e. (U15)
3.5.1.2 Regional effects
The viability of nuclear power and the value of energy varies from region to region. In the
midwest, power is cheap. But in the northeast (like New York), power is very expensive,
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and a lot more can be done to improve the economics. The cost of electricity can vary by
a factor of 10 by region. (U 14)
3.5.1.3 Breakdown of costs
Capital costs are about 50%, O&M costs are about 25%, and fuel costs are about 25%.
So 75% of the busbar costs are inversely proportional to capacity factor. (fuel costs are
the same whether you run well or not). (U 18)
Cycle costs: normal O&M is - $120M / yr.
outage costs are - $30 M above normal O&M
Fuel reload (18 mo.) - $30-50 M
For an 18 month cycle, it costs roughly $200 M. (U 18)
3.5.1.4 Power pools
Power pools would like longer cycles. They get more flexibility that way. It would be
worth it to them to let nuclear plants go offline for a little while for mid-cycle
maintenance, as long as there is flexibility and the outage is short. (U18)
3.5.1.5 Longer cycles
Some utilities didn't get savings by going to longer cycles. Utility 4 is achieving -90%
capacity factors on a 1 year cycle. A long cycle plant just can not do much better than
that. So maybe a better thing to look at is shorter cycle lengths with very short outages
and high operating reliability. (U14) (P2)
3.5.1.6 Plant size
A compact plant with a high power density and forced circulation is always more
economically attractive. (V3)
3.5.2 Capital costs
3.5.2.1 Capital requirements
It is very difficult to sell a multi-billion dollar power plant to a board of directors. Current
targets are $2B. That would double most utilities balance sheets. Plus the risk is high. So
increased capital requirements are looked upon very negatively. Adding redundancy may
look good on paper, but the capital outlay may be too huge. Economics says stay away
from capital and labor intensive ventures with high risk. Nuclear power has all three.
(U14)
3.5.2.2 Steam generators
The additional capital price for better steam generators will pay for itself. (P4)
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3.5.3 Capacity Factor
3.5.3.1 Diminishing returns of longer cycles
There are diminishing returns to capacity factor as a function of fuel cycle length. Under
the same assumptions, if you're getting 76.5% capacity at 18 months, you can get 81.7%
at 24 months, and 88.5% at 5 years. It does not make sense to go past 5 years, because the
return is very small and the difficulties are too great. (U18)
3.5.3.2 Known costs vs. perceived gains
The utilities will not look favorably on trading a known cost for a promise of a gain. Strong
evidence of the return on investment is necessary. Typical utilities discount claims of higher
capacity factors. One has to win with a 3 to 1 or a 4 to 1 ratio (i.e. it takes 3-4 soft dollars
to equal one hard dollar). To justify a modification, the value of a percent increase in
capacity factor must be calculated, and only 1/3 or 1/4 of that value should be spent to
achieve an expected gain of that percent of capacity factor. (V3) (P2)
BWR_#4 uses a three year payback horizon. If equipment modifications aren't expected to
pay for themselves in two cycles, then they can not be justified to the accounting
department. (U3)
3.5.4 Labor requirements
Online monitoring, inspection, calibration, maintenance and repair techniques can be used
for labor reduction during outages instead of cycle extension. That will pay for itself. The
real problem facing the industry today is reducing labor. PWR_#7 used to operate two
plants (total 1000 MWe) with 100 people. Now they have 800 people, which is too large
of a staff. A lot of this is security and meeting the regulatory QA/QC. Labor requirements
have to be decreased with minimum increases in capital costs. (U14)
Reducing labor requirements can be achieved through re-engineering. Re-engineering asks
"What are the inputs, what are the outputs, and what is the cheapest, most efficient way of
going from inputs to outputs." (U15)
Plants tend to try to over control everything that goes on in operations and outages. These
restrictions drive the labor requirements higher. Essentially, the industry, NRC and INPO
have created the current over staffing requirements in the industry. Every regulation adds
additional workers. Additional workers require additional QA people to check their work,
additional security to monitor them, and additional administrative people to keep track of
them. The industry has over-reacted to concerns and regulations, and they are paying for
it. This is beginning to change. (U23)
3.6 Operations and maintenance practices
This section addresses operations and maintenance considerations for longer operating
cycles. Designing to facilitate operations is an important facet that many people think was
neglected in original designs.
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3.6.1 Surveillance requirements
3.6.1.1 Surveillance interval extensions
NRC is concerned about nuclear safety unless there is verification of component
operability from periodic surveillance tests. To go to longer cycles, plants have to be able
to convince NRC that less frequent surveillances and/or overhauls are justifiable. This can
be addressed using PRA analysis, or otherwise the plants have to convince the NRC that
the online diagnostics are acceptable as proof that there are no system degradations. If
plants can not do this, all incentives to going to longer cycles are lost. (U14) (U21) (U15)
There are a lot of inspection requirements that currently require plants to come down
every 18 or 24 months. Some of those requirements have been extended, but others have
not. Some of the inspections can be done at power. It may be beneficial to look at a
newer plant and do the analysis. Maybe the plant could come down after 2 years to do
some of the minimum surveillances, which may not significantly affect capacity factor.
(V1)
Surveillance requirements are currently prescriptive. Plants can only get a total of 25%
surveillance interval extension over 3 refueling cycles. Plants currently have to shut down
because of instrumentation drift. But if digital instrumentation is used, plants can
eliminate many of these problems. (N3)
Generic Letter 91-04 addresses surveillance requirements. Generic Letter 91-04 is a
cookbook that tells each utility how to extend their refueling interval surveillances from 18
months nominal to 24 months nominal. There are four requirements:
a. Comparative review of surveillance testing. Are the tests really effective?
b. Corrective maintenance history. Have they run OK for current intervals?
c. Plant specific drift analysis. Look at the data for individual instruments.
d. If the drift is not bounded, do additional analyses. (C6)
Surveillance intervals are relatively easy to extend as long as there is good performance
data to show that there haven't been problems with the equipment in the past. (U15)
The last criterion is that the margin of safety can't be reduced by checking them less
frequently. It has to be proved that inspecting instrumentation more frequently than
necessary has a more negative impact on safety than letting it sit for longer. Or it has to
be proved that when it is tested, the calibrations never change. (C6)
EPRI put together a guideline that specifies how to do the analyses to extend surveillance
intervals. EPRI did work on about 10 plants to verify the guidance. (C6)
BWR_#4 just extended their major surveillance intervals to allow a 24 month cycle.
BWR_#4 was originally on a 12 month cycle. When they went to 18 months, it was
mostly an administrative change. However, it was more difficult to justify going to 24
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months. If the existing equipment did not show sufficient reliability, they bought new
equipment that did. Going from 18 to 24 months removed some of the margins that
previously existed in setpoint levels for water level, high flux, and high pressure scram
points. (U9) (U23)
For BWR_#4, extending the surveillance requirements is the single biggest limitation to
going to cycles longer than two years. (U1)
3.6.1.2 Decreased reliability due to over surveillance
Plants don't want to do surveillances on a weekly basis if it is going to break equipment,
but they are required to anyway. There are many surveillances done that require pulling
out drawers and plugging in leads. This is hazardous to the equipment. By doing excessive
inspections, plant equipment is being worn out. So it is often better for reliability and
durability to extend surveillances. (C6) (U10)
For example, when a drawer is pulled out to perform a surveillance, the coax cable gets
extended and pulled back in. Sometimes it gets shut in the door, and then the plant has to
buy a $10,000 cable. It happens all the time. So by extending surveillance intervals, a lot
of money on wear and tear and on technician time can actually be saved, and it will not
affect plant reliability or safety. (C6)
3.6.1.3 Staggered vs. sequential testing
Testing can be done staggered or sequentially. If testing is done sequentially, the
equipment must be made error resistant. If the technicians check something and then
check the next thing sequentially before making sure the previous one was back in service,
a plant transient or trip may result. (C6)
3.6.1.4 Monitoring vs. physical surveillances
One method of surveillance is to go out, hook up a pump to a pressure transmitter, and
take a reading. If it's within tolerance leave it alone, otherwise, fix it and then leave it
alone. This is a real, physical test. (C6)
Another method of surveillance is to monitor readings online. A computer can be used to
monitor the readings, and when one starts drifting from the others, something is wrong.
(C6)
Instead of checking all the instrumentation at once during a refueling outage, plants want
to be able to only check a half or quarter of the channels. Then at least one channel is
known to be operational, and online monitoring can be used to verify the functionality of
the rest. Weighted averages are used to determine when something is out of calibration
with respect to the others. The computer will automatically alert the operator when there
is a problem. (C6)
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3.6.2 Preventive maintenance
It is a design problem when doing a routine PM, surveillance or instrument calibration
requires energizing switchboards and lifting leads, including using jumpers. That is a
situation that is guaranteed to produce problems. If it is the desire to do this at power, it
ought to be designed in. A key lock that clearly facilitates surveillance by design is
superior. If proper consideration were given to online PMs, surveillances or calibrations,
then doing this online could be done with higher comfort. Most errors aren't safety
problems, but are operational threats. Plants lose money and credibility if they trip too
much. (P2)
BWR_#4 is just learning how to shift from a corrective maintenance strategy to a
preventive maintenance strategy. They are moving towards online preventive / corrective
maintenance. Operations is resisting. They're trying to reduce outage scope by doing
more preventive maintenance online. The risk is that there will be more plant trips due to
errors or reduced redundancy. (U9)
3.6.2.1 Extending PM periodicities
The O&M people want to shut down every 100 days to do preventive maintenance.
Major preventive maintenance is done on things like MSIVs, feedwater isolation valves,
and RCPs. Most of the industry is looking at extending the periodicities of these PMs to
much greater than 18 months. Take for example the electrical safety trains. Until recently,
PWR_#1 had been doing PMs on electrical safety related buses every 18 months, and
thought it was improving reliability. They decided to go to 3 years. PWR_#11 has already
done that. (U21)
Have to look at the maintenance history of individual components to justify going to
longer operating periods. (U26)
3.6.3 Online testing
3.6.3.1 Effects of online testing on safety
Online testing of components may increase the core damage frequency (CDF) if the test is
to be a "full functional test." For example, testing the depressurization system in the
AP600 may cause a large break loss of coolant accident (LBLOCA). (N1)
For some systems, it is far safer to do testing at power. For others, it's currently
impossible to do testing at power. (P2)
3.6.3.2 Effects of longer testing intervals
Increasing time between tests can lead to an unacceptably high failure rate if the failures
are "time in standby" related. To go to longer periods between surveillances, it has to be
shown that there is no material degradation in performance given the longer period before
surveillances. (U8) (N1)
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3.6.3.2.1 Setpoint drift
After a certain time, instrumentation has to be recalibrated, otherwise there is setpoint
drift. It is desirable to do that online. But sometimes that can't be done without
jeopardizing safety for the period of time the calibration takes, or without causing spurious
trips. (U8)
Surveillance can't be done on some systems unless the plant is in an outage. If you wait
more than 24 months for a surveillance interval on some instrumentation, the error band
has to be assumed larger, and the window of operations begins closing. If you wait too
long, the risk increases. Better analysis of equipment and how it changes with time is
needed to reduce the assumed uncertainty. (V2)
3.6.3.3 Self testing
The AP600 has built-in, on-line testing. Digital systems should be used in safety systems
for self testing rather than external checking. If self testing or diagnostic and monitoring
techniques can be used rather than surveilling equipment or tearing equipment down, the
problem can be diagnosed online. This allows plants shut down only when there is a
problem, not at prescribed intervals. But the risk of a forced outage has to be balanced
against the benefits of being able to run longer. (V2)
3.6.3.4 Other concerns
The ability to test online is a real limitation in current designs. Testing has to be an integral
part of the design. Even if maintenance can be done at power, the post-maintenance
testing probably can't be done to verify operability. Plants probably can't afford (from a
safety perspective) to design for full flow testing of the HPSI while at power with the
systems isolated. It could be hard to do.(P2)
Finally, there has to be confidence that when maintenance is done online, the probability of
a plant trip is not significantly increased. (C4)
3.6.4 Predictive techniques
3.6.4.1 Maintenance based on predictive techniques
The trend in the industry is to do maintenance based on predictive capabilities such as
pressure drops across filters, thermography, trends on leak-offs or leak-bys, capabilities of
monitoring check valve performance by acoustics. All these are much better tools to
determine when there is a tendency to have a degradation of performance in that
component and when to go in and do maintenance, instead of performing maintenance on
a specified time interval. The industry is being driven to this by economics. Why spend
$5000 overhauling a valve when it can run twice or thrice as long. Just fix it when
predictive indicators show there is a current or incipient problem rather than maintaining
them blindly at fixed intervals. (U21)
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If the consequences of failure are nuclear safety related, then the margin of safety can be
increased by performing maintenance more frequently or by lowering the threshold level
for predictive maintenance program. (U21)
3.6.4.2 Monitoring component life
Online monitoring is needed to verify that the predicted life can be achieved. Things like
thermal cycles on nozzles as the plants goes through transients are important for long
reactor life. The industry needs to know the number of cycles to failure given a crack exits
somewhere. It needs performance indicators to predict when a component will fail. (U21)
(V1)
3.6.4.3 Specific predictive techniques
3.6.4.3.1 Vibration monitoring
Vibration analysis can predict bear conditions, if something is rubbing, if something isn't
balanced correctly, if a shaft is bent, drive belt degradations, and gear degradation.
Vibration and noise nionitoring should be used for on-line indication of failures in place of
shutdown for inspection.[Ref.30] (U 16)
3.6.4.3.2 Thermography
Infra-red thermography involves scanning of temperature profiles of electrical equipment,
motors, room cooler heat exchanger tubes, uninsulated tanks, and some valves and
bearings. If thermography shows unusual temperature profiles, then this is an indication of
a degradation. (C4) [Ref.30] (U3)
3.6.4.3.3 Electrical signatures
When plants do surveillance tests today, they do them pass/fail. If technicians verify that
I&C is within tolerances, then the I&C passes the inspection. But this system tells
technicians nothing about the condition of the circuit from the transmitter through the
penetration out. For life extension (and predictive maintenance) plants want to look at the
integrity of the entire circuit. Is the penetration getting water in it? Is the transformer
starting to fail? There are studies underway to look at condition monitoring. A computer
is used to take an electronic signature of the circuit. When the signature is taken two
years later, it is possible to tell what is degrading. Technicians can tell if there is in-leakage
in a penetration. They can tell if there is a splice inside containment that has started to fail.
This is very valuable because if the plant runs for 40 years, and the utility wants to extend
plant life for another 20 years, the utility needs to have a good idea of whether the cables
are any good. (C6)
BWR_#4 recently purchased a machine that takes electrical signatures of electronic
circuitry, and trends it over time. It can be used to monitor degradation over time. They
are going to take signatures of all of the MOVs during the next outage, and then begin
trending them to predict when to replace or repair the motors, instead of waiting until the
motor fails. (U3)
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3.6.4.3.4 Lube oil testing
Lube oil analysis is used to minimize change-outs of systems with large oil reserves.
[Ref.30]
3.6.4.3.5 Hydraulic testing
Hydraulic testing measures pump flows and differential pressures to determine equipment
performance. [Ref.30]
3.6.4.3.6 Leak monitoring
Leak before break monitoring - plants have the ability to measure leakage from the
primary side from an inventory balance. There are limits for unidentified and identified
leakage from the primary system. If a crack forms in the primary, operators usually have
time to investigate before it ruptures. (U20)
3.6.4.3.7 Batteries
Trending the specific gravity and voltage of battery cells can be used to predict which
batteries will need to be replaced during the next outage. (U3)
3.6.4.3.8 Performance monitoring
BWR_#4 trends the start times on the EDGs. BWR_#4's EDGs usually start in 8.5
seconds. Recently, it took the EDG 9 seconds to start, which is still within requirements,
but higher than they expected. They investigated and found that solenoids were gumming
up due to contamination from a previous modification. This is an example of how
performance trending can be used to indicate future degradations. (U3)
3.6.5 Maintenance policy
3.6.5.1 Steaming the plant
Plants can run very reliably for a short period of time (2 to 5 years), but then the neglect
catches up with it and the plant is down for up to a year, or it runs poorly for the next
couple of cycles. It's better to take a preventive maintenance outage than to run the plant
too hard and pay for it later. Think about the oil in a car. A car can run very reliably
without preventive maintenance for a short period of time. But if it goes too long without
an oil change, it is going to destroy the engine. The same applies to nuclear power
plants.(N2)
One PWR went through a period when they "steamed" the plant. It had a great capacity
factor through neglect, and it's been hurting the reliability of the plant ever since. (U13)
One BWR started up in '69 and ran very well for about 10 years. But the necessary
preventive maintenance was neglected, and the plant paid for this in capacity factor
throughout the 1980s. (U15)
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3.6.5.2 Maintenance philosophies
BWR_#5 had a very poor operating history in the early to middle 1980s. The philosophy
was "what has to be fixed to get online?" That philosophy was changed to "what has to
be done to get online and stay there?" The results were dramatic. BWR_#5 runs very well
now. (U 15)
The service people want to shut down more to keep the plant running and out of forced
outages. The fuel people say to run longer to get better economics. (V2)
The industry is finding out that its perception of doing work during outages is not true.
The best time to maintain some of the redundant portions of the plant is during operation
because it's safer. Plants allow some components to run until failure because they don't
cause shutdown, and it's cheaper to let them fail. (U14) (U21)
3.6.5.3 24 hour maintenance
PWR_#10 does 24 hour maintenance because they had to have the staffing present
anyway to meet emergency response requirements. In addition, if the plant is running
really well, doing online maintenance keeps the control room personnel alert. The result is
good economics. (U15)
3.6.5.4 Over maintenance
PWR_#12 started out with a policy of rebuilding one of the RCPs every outage, but then
began experiencing problems. They were over maintaining them. They then went 20
years without having a problem with an RCP. (U 16)
3.6.6 Equipment performance
Running longer at steady state may in some cases be better for the equipment. When
plants come back to power from an outage, they often have failures. This is because some
of the cycling and technician-machine interactions have detrimental effects. (P4)
3.6.7 Spare parts
A significant cause of many extended outages is lack of spare parts. This can be
corrected. BWR_#4 used to go into the switchgear, take a 4160 breaker out to have it
overhauled or inspected, and send it to GE in Philadelphia to have the work done. There
would be a weeks turnaround time before it came back. They were overhauling 100
breakers every outage, which was taking out some major electrical distribution
components for a long time. Finally it was decided to purchase spares. This is much
quicker, much easier, and much safer. This is a very effective example of where a little
money in spare parts can improve outage performance. (U23)
Switzerland has a practice of having a spare circulating water pump available for change-
out during an outage. This philosophy can be applied to many more plant systems. (U19)
The cost of storing a component amounts to about 25% of the total overall cost of the
spare parts. (U3)
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3.7 Materials condition
Material degradation is a serious concern for safe and reliable operation of nuclear power
plants. It is important to minimize degradation. The following comments were made in
this area.
3.7.1 Materials
Materials are going to be a limiting factor. Inconnel 690 for the steam generator tubes is
probably the best designers can do with current materials technology. The cost of tube
material is not that great when compared to the cost of the steam generator, so they are
probably thinking that 690 is the best they can do. The rubber / elastomer diaphragms in
valves in air and water systems are also a problem. (C4)
3.7.2 Erosion/corrosion
There are many esoteric issues in material corrosion - from microbiologically induced
corrosion (MIC) to zebra muscles. There will always be a new disease for future plants.
(C4)
Any new plant should be less susceptible to erosion/corrosion by design. This is
accomplished through better material selection and chemistry control. It is also affected
by the way the piping is set up. Sharp bends should be minimized in pipes and the
transition region from 1 to 2 phase flow should be minimized. (P3)
3.7.3 Chemistry of fluids
The chemistry of primary water, feedwater, steam, closed cooling systems, and open
cooling systems should be carefully controlled. Inter granular stress corrosion cracking
(IGSCC) can probably be controlled with good chemistry control and materials selection.
(C4) (P4)
Chemistry control has progressed significantly from its initial state. This has helped
improve the condition of steam generator tubes. Chemistry is very important to continued
operation of steam generators, and other plant components and systems. (U13) (C2)
(U1)
3.8 Cycle length pressures
This category outlines concerns and experience associated with extended fuel cycles, mid-
cycle shutdowns, and refueling outages.
3.8.1 Fuel cycle length
3.8.1.1 Plant experience
Early experience with extended operating times did not show the immediate gains that
were expected because the systems were not sufficiently reliable or were not properly
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maintained. But recently, better preventive maintenance has allowed plants with extended
cycles to achieve the reliability and gains that were expected. (P4) (P2)
* PWR_#7 1 & 2 are on 12 month refueling / major maintenance cycles. They have 28
day outages breaker to breaker. They can run at 92% capacity (minus forced outages).
If they can achieve 28 day outages consistently and then run very reliably for one year,
it will be very difficult to beat that even with longer cycle plants.(U14)
* PWR_#11 runs 18 months and gets very short outage times. If other plants could
similar performance, there is little incentive to run longer. (V2)
* PWR_#3 has an average capacity factor of around 85% on a 12 month cycle. They
are currently upgrading to an 18 month cycle. (U24)
* Japanese plants have 90 day outages every year. They maintain the entire plant. A
longer cycle plant designed for online maintenance could save the Japanese a lot. But
going from 5 to 10 years only picks up 2 to 3 points in capacity. It just isn't worth it.
(V3)
The System 80+ has a two year cycle as a design criteria. (V1)
Utility 3 determined that their optimum fuel cycle length is 24 to 27 months. Going longer
cycles begins to cost too much money for fuel. (U4)
3.8.1.2 Capacity factor arguments
For a very reliable plant with short refueling outages, there isn't very much to gain in
terms of capacity factor by going to longer cycles. The AP600 is looking at 17 day
refueling outages on an 18 month schedule, which is not unrealistic. On this cycle, the
AP600 will have a maximum theoretical capacity factor of 96%. Longer cycle plants can't
really do better than that. Prairie Island is doing 21 to 23 day outages. CANDUs
originally planned to be down 10 days every 2 years. If plants can achieve this level of
performance, there is nothing to gain by going to 5 years. (P3)
The track record for US maintenance outages is about 60 days. Initiatives are to go to 40
days, and then to 30 days, which is achievable. For an 18 month cycle with a 30 day
outage, the plant's maximum hypothetical capacity factor is 94%. Running longer than
five years will not improve capacity factor significantly, but could be very costly. (V3)
The position at GE and probably the rest of the industry is that five years is awfully hard
to do and it's not economical. Two year cycles may not be economical. If a plant on a
two year cycle is out an additional week during the outage or during the cycle, all of the
expected economic gain is lost. A better strategy would be to use online monitoring,
inspection, calibration, maintenance, and repairs to shorten outage duration. (V5) (U20)
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3.8.2 Mid-cycle shutdowns
During the interviews, two opinions emerged. Both asserted that a mid-cycle surveillance
and maintenance shutdown may be necessary. However, one opinion was that a short
mid-cycle shutdown could improve reliability and could be economical. The other opinion
was that a mid-cycle shutdown would negate the expected economic gains from going to
longer cycles.
3.8.2.1 Required mid-cycle shutdowns
A lot of plants that are on two year fuel cycles have decided that it is expedient to shut
down mid-cycle for a quick maintenance outage. This is not for Technical Specification
requirements, it is just for better performance and less forced outages. This experience
suggests that it is not probable that new plants will be able to run for 5 years reliably
without shutting down. Examining why plants with two year cycles shut down will give
indications of the systems that may need to be redesigned. (C4) (U24)
PWRs will have to inspect the steam generators mid-cycle on a five year operating cycle.
(U24)
BWRs have troubles with primary stress corrosion cracking of the internals, and may need
to do these critical inspections more frequently than every five years. (U24)
On first consideration, it appears that longer cycles are more economical. But for
BWR_#4 to go to a three year cycle, it would have to shut down mid-cycle to do some
maintenance and surveillances. If the mid-cycle outage is significant (-3weeks), then the
economics of the longer cycle could shift negatively. (U 1)
3.8.2.2 Economical mid-cycle outages
A short, economical mid-cycle outage may be possible. If the major outage is kept down
to 35 days with a good, quick mid-cycle inspection, the plant could probably run at over
90% capacity.(U24) (C4)
Look at the maximum long term reliability of the plant. If that says it has to shut down
every 18 months for 3 days, it may still be OK because the whole system isn't being taken
apart. (P2)
Even if the plant has to shut down mid-cycle to do some maintenance, if the reactor head
can be left on, that eliminates all of the difficulties and radiological control problems and
safety problems associated with removing the head. (P2)
Plants can be run very economically if they can run as planned. It probably is not
expensive to shut down for a week every year or two if the plant can shut down when it
plans to. But it is important to run reliably in between. (P2)
90
3.8.2.3 Uneconomical mid-cycle outages
If the plant has to have a mid-cycle outage, and it's long, there is no benefit to going to
longer cycles. (U15)
Plants should never go to a 5 year cycle if they will have to do a mid-cycle outage. (U21)
3.8.3 Refueling outages
3.8.3.1 Outage activities
There are about 10,000 items done during an outage, lumped into a few categories: check
valve testing, pumps, and I&C calibration. Concentrating on the types of work done in
refueling outages will yield valuable insights into how to redesign plants for shorter
refueling outages and longer cycle times. (U4) (C4)
3.8.3.2 Reducing outage activities and duration
One benefit of online maintenance and inspections is that if you can do 9,000 of the 10,000
activities online that are normally done during the outage, the outage scope will be greatly
reduced. This can reduce outage labor costs, and probably shorten outage time. Doing
outage activities online will levelize the work load.(U 14) (U 15) (U21)
By going to longer cycles, the plant does not have to take off the head, transfer fuel, etc.
every 18 months. This is an economic gain. (U21)
3.8.3.2.1 Critical path activities
BWR_#4 is in the process of taking work that can be done online out of their outage. Their
critical path item is the ECCS. BWR_#4 has two 100% trains of ECCS. They can not
start maintenance on either train until the reactor cavity is flooded (~1 week into the
outage). If the plant had been designed with sufficient redundancy in the ECCS, work
could have been performed online, year round, or at least significantly earlier in the outage.
Currently, it is extremely restrictive because there is a very detailed list of systems
necessary to backup the one available train of ECCS during the outage. (U 19)
(See also Section 3.1.6.1.5)
3.8.3.2.2 Wet lift system
BWR_#4 just went to a wet lift system. With this new equipment, the cavity can be flooded
as soon as the reactor head is removed. Previously, the cavity could not be flooded until
after the dryers and separators had been removed. (U19)
3.8.3.2.3 Reactor vessel head detensioner
There are 56 holding bolts on the reactor head. They are currently detensioned in passes.
There are machines available that can do this in one pass using four to six detensioners
simultaneously. This can save 8 to 12 hours each side of the outage (a total of up to one
day). (U19)
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3.8.3.2.4 Spares for quicker maintenance
Having spare components, such as a spare reactor coolant pump motor or a spare
circulating water pump, can significantly reduce outage times. This is an economic
decision. (U19)
3.8.3.3 Longer cycles, longer outages
Refueling and major repairs during an outage usually take about 30 to 35 days for a very
good plant. Refueling is almost never critical path. These plants currently stagger
replacements and major maintenance between the outages because it is very difficult to fix
everything at once. For a five year cycle, there could be an excessive number of required
activities. For a five year cycle, the whole plant may have to be maintained during each
refueling outage. The scope of maintaining the whole plant in a single outage in huge.
(U24) (C4) (U21) (P2)
If all of the steam generator and turbine generator maintenance is done in a single outage
instead of over a couple outages, there will not be a significant overall gain in the refueling
outage time. The turbine generator will control the duration of the outage. Instead of
three 50 day outages, the plant may have one 110 day outage. (U21)
3.8.3.4 Staggered outages
For utilities with two plants, it is better to have the plant outages scheduled out of phase.
(V1)
3.8.4 Forced outages
There is concern that without periodic maintenance, there is the potential for increasing
the forced outage rate. Examining forced outage causes will yield some data on what
needs to be maintained or redesigned. (C4) (U21)
It is very expensive to shut down in mid-summer or in mid-winter. (P2)
3.9 Advanced technologies
The use of advanced technology and concepts that were not available for the first
generation of nuclear power plants can significantly increase plant reliability and flexibility.
3.9.1 Advanced reactor concepts
3.9.1.1 Simplification
One of the goals of the Advanced Reactor Corporation (ARC) was to reduce capital
investment. ARC has reduced the number of redundant and unnecessary valves, pumps,
and piping. They have coupled this with passive concepts to achieve a much simpler and
cheaper plant. The ALWRs have reduced valves by 50%. They have fewer automatic
devices like MOVs and air operated valves. These goals may be fundamentally
incompatible with longer cycles. (U14) (P3)
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3.9.1.2 Advanced reactors
The SBWR focused on simplification of maintenance and lower personnel exposure. It
was not aimed at a significantly extended fuel cycle. By taking out the recirculation pumps,
plants will save a lot of maintenance work and costs. The goal was to make a better plant
from an operational standpoint. (V4)
The ABWR was designed to meet all the safety function at minimum cost. Longer cycle
designs have a different perspective: meet safety requirements, but also allow online
maintenance. (V3)
The System 80+ FSAR is now available. It has the detailed design and Technical
Specifications. (V1)
3.9.1.3 Innovative safety
Incorporation of a depressurization system solves the small break loss of coolant accident
(SBLOCA) problem. But, it may be a source of risk for a LBLOCA. (N1)
3.9.2 Passive systems
3.9.2.1 Safety
Passive systems may not necessarily be superior from a safety perspective. Pumps can
push a lot more water through for cooling than gravity and natural circulation can. But the
passive plants will probably be safer by their greater simplicity and smaller size. There is
also concern about flow instabilities. GE has been hindered by experimental data on flow
instabilities in the SBWR. (U14) (N5)
3.9.2.2 Maintenance
ALWR designs have minimal active safety related systems in their designs. They use
passive features like gravity driven flow and passive heat sinks to eliminate active
components. These systems do not require much preventive maintenance. Fewer active
components can reduce the amount of online maintenance that would be required for longer
cycles. (P3) (C2) (U 11)
The passive plants will presumably be easier to operate and maintain. They used passivity
and simplification to eliminate complicated, problem systems. This can reduce maintenance
and capital costs. Plants can achieve shorter outages too. (N5) (P4) (U14)
3.9.2.3 Regulatory risk
Passive systems are a greater risk from a regulatory perspective, but less of a risk from a
public acceptance perspective. Adding redundancy is counter to the public's acceptance
criteria (i.e. the public will trust simple passive safety systems compared to excessively
complex systems). (U14)
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3.9.3 Digital technology
3.9.3.1 Digital circuitry
3.9.3.1.1 Capability of digital circuitry
Digital circuitry is much more accurate than analogue circuitry. Current instrumentation
calibrations drift, so that it is difficult to go up to two years between calibrations. Digital
instrumentation is much more accurate, and can go longer between calibrations. A solid
state diesel loading sequencer would allow quick, accurate self monitoring. The functional
test could then be pushed out to five years. This could take three days off the critical path.
(U3) (U23)
3.9.3.1.2 Effects of radiation on digital systems
The major limitation to digital circuitry is radiation hardening. At about 103 or 104 Rads
total integrated dose (TID), the equipment starts failing. This limits where solid state
technology can be used. (U3)
3.9.3.1.3 Fiber optic cables
Fiber optic cables could be used to decrease the number of cables in containment. The cable
trays at BWR_#4 are filled, so if they want to add another wire, they have to run another
conduit and do a safety analysis. (U3)
3.9.3.2 Digital controls
3.9.3.2.1 Performance of digital control systems
A full digital control system is an absolute necessity for any future plant. Digital systems
are better than analogue control systems because they are not susceptible to all the noise,
interference and oscillations that analogue systems are susceptible to. Many utilities are
applying digital controllers in certain systems in their plants. Monticello was one of the
first. They applied digital microcomputer technology to feedwater control many years ago.
What was shown was that the reliability was tremendous in preventing feedwater transients
which is a big cause of reactor trips and transients. (V1) (P2)
3.9.3.2.2 Regulatory position
Digital control systems are inevitable. All of the new reactor designs have digital control
systems. It was a learning process for the NRC. But it is now accepted with a little
concern until experience is gained, which will come from Sizewell B. There will be some
struggles with the first one that goes through and gets licensed, but it's only a matter of
time. (N2) (N5)
The only way to deal with the software reliability problem is to build some software and get
experience. The writers will do the best they can, but they can never prove that all the bugs
have been eliminated. (N2)
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There will have to be some key backups in case there is a software failure that wipes the
systems out. There will have to be a completely redundant backup system, but it could be a
redundant, diverse digital system (like in the CE design). NRC convinced themselves that
requiring an analogue backup was like requiring horse and buggy technology.(N2)
3.9.3.2.3 Utility position
One of the concerns with digital is what happened in Britain. The regulators accepted
digital systems, as long as there was the old analogue hardware to back it up. This is not
economical. It satisfies the regulators, but it is too expensive. (P2)
It is possible to use digital technology in non-safety areas. It is much more difficult in
safety related areas. The difficulty is connecting all the systems together and getting NRC
approval. The integrated package is not necessary, but is highly desirable. You don't get
the full benefit of the technology if you don't integrate it. (P2)
3.9.3.2.4 Experience with digital control systems
Sizewell B is the only fully digital plant in the world. There have been significant problems
with startup at Sizewell B because the systems were not available when they were
supposed to be, the operators did not have confidence, and there was no backup. (C6)
Governor controls on auxiliary feed pumps were originally mechanical at PWR_#2.
PWR_#2 ultimately went to a solid state control system because of the poor performance of
the controls. PWR_#2 completely switched their RPS to a solid state system recently
because it became uneconomical to run the old one. There were a lot of false signals
generated, and parts were difficult to obtain. (U20)
The increased reliance on digital instrumentation and control systems in operating plants is
an example of current plants utilizing advanced technology. (N1)
3.10 Safety
The final category is safety. For years, safety was the area of greatest attention and
concern. The progress made to date should not be ignored, and there is still significant
improvements that can be made in safety and safety analysis.
3.10.1 Loss of load events
Loss of load can last for a few seconds or much longer. But the plant reacts very quickly
and trips for even short loss of load events. It trips the generator output breakers and the
plant is down for a long time after that. (C2) (U11)
PWR_#9 has installed spare transformers, unit auxiliary transformers and GSU to reduce
the chance of loss of offsite power. (C2) (Ul 11)
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3.10.2 Reactor scrams
The feedwater system and turbine generator are the major sources of scrams and down
time. They are not nuclear safety systems, but they cause challenges to the reactor safety
systems. (V3)
From a risk standpoint, the probability of core damage from a single trip is very low, but
since the frequency of trips is so high, the overall CDF is significant. So if plant
availability is increased, CDF may be decreased. (U20)
3.10.3 Interfacing LOCA
You can use leak monitoring between isolation valves or redundancy to alleviate
interfacing LOCA concerns.(C2) (Ul 11)
3.10.4 Accident analysis
3.10.4.1 In favor of using thermal margins
There is a lot of margin that can be obtained just by using better analysis techniques. (V2)
3.10.4.2 Opposed to using thermal margins
Plants are designing too close to plant operating limits. Perhaps they should allow for
uncertainties or acts of God. Minor calculational and design mistakes can have great
economic impacts. If there is a localized core melt due to improper analysis, a long
shutdown and extensive decontamination are required. (U18)
3.10.4.3 Large break LOCA analysis
Best estimate LBLOCA analysis can be used to reduce uncertainties and allow for higher
peaking factors and greater operational flexibilities. Better analyses can be performed
using a statistical treatment of uncertainties. These analyses can be used to reduce the
calculated peak clad temperature during the accident. (V2)
3.10.4.4 Small break LOCA
Once the LBLOCAs have been re-analyzed, the SBLOCA limits start to become more
limiting. Going to better SBLOCA analysis techniques can generate additional thermal
margins. (V2)
3.10.4.5 Other accidents
After the SBLOCA and LBLOCA limits have been fully utilized, the plant starts running
into the deviation from nucleate boiling (DNB) limits on other accidents. Better techniques
should be used there too. (V2)
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3.11 Plant size
Small two loop plants are easier to maintain. They only have 1/2 of the steam generators
to inspect. They require a lot less maintenance. They have better accessibility to the
equipment. (U14)
The smaller plants like Ginna, Point Beach, Prairie Island, and Keewanie have had very
good performance. Ginna has 30 day outages on a yearly cycle, and they have good
capacity factors. Bigger reactors have a lot more equipment that needs to be inspected,
and maintained. The larger plants become logistically more difficult to manage. A smaller
plant like the AP600 or CANDU may be easier to operate. (N3)
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Chapter 4 - Analysis methods
The purpose of this Chapter is to outline the methods that can be used to evaluate proposed
design configurations and design modifications. This includes analysis methods for
predicting performance and reliability. It also includes cost benefit analysis methods used
to compare and evaluate designs based on cost considerations. Utilization of these methods
will assure that informed decisions can be made on rational bases.
4.1 System availability analysis techniques
This section is intended to provide an overview of the typical analysis techniques available
to the designer. These include basic probabilistic techniques, reliability block diagrams
(RBDs). fault tree / event tree methods, Markov models, and simulation models.
4.1.1. Basic PRA
The intention of this section is to give a brief overview of the concepts necessary to
perform reliability and availability analysis. For a more thorough treatment, see [Ref. 14],
[Ref. 15], and [Ref. 16].
4.1.1.1 The hazard rate (also called the instantaneous failure rate), (t)
The hazard rate is defined such that [(t) dt] is the probability that a component changes
state in the differential time element dt about t, given that it has survived to t.
Pfl(t + dt) = (t) dt (4.1)
Where Pfail(t + dt) is the probability of a state change between times (t) and(t+dt). The
hazard rate "exhibits the different life cycles of the component clearly and
distinctly." [Ref. 14, p5 5]
4.1.1.2 The failure rate, f(t)
The failure rate is defined such that [f(t) dt] is the probability that a component fails in dt
about t. The failure rate differs from the instantaneous hazard rate because the population
decreases with time.
4.1.1.3 The reliability, R(t)
The reliability is the probability that a component did not fail prior to time t.
4.1.1.4 The cumulative failure probability, F(t)
F(t) is the probability that a component has failed by time t.
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The hazard rate, failure rate, reliability and cumulative failure probability are related as
follows [Ref.14, p58]:
d [In R (t)]dt((t) (4.2)
1 - j f(t) dt
f(t) =(t) exp[ X(t) d (4.3)
-d R (t)dt
exp - (t) dt
R(t)= q (4.4)
1- f(t) dt
1- F(t)
F(t) = jo f(t) dt (4.5)
1 - R(t)
4.1.1.5 Availability, A(t)
The instantaneous availability of a system is the probability that the system is operating at
100% capacity at time t. Availability differs from reliability in that it includes the possibility
of repair and return to operation at some time after the failure. The "steady state"
availability (A) is the value of the instantaneous availability as it approaches it's asymptote:
A = limtpt life A(t) (4.6)
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4.1.1.6 Important failure rate distribution functions
4.1.1.6.1 Exponential distribution
For many components, the hazard rate is nearly constant over their useful life. This implies
that failures are purely random, and that no deterioration in component condition exists
over its useful life.[Ref. 14, p89] Under this condition, a particularly simple function is
obtained for the failure rate distribution and for the reliability. It is convenient because only
one parameter need be specified to determine reliability.
X(t) = X (4.7)
This implies that
and
(4.8)f(t) = X exp (- t)
R(t) = exp (- t) (4.9)
The form of f(t) is called the exponential distribution. We now focus on the mean time to
failure and standard deviation of this distribution. The mean time to failure (MTTF) is
defined as follows:
MTTF = ° tf(t) dt
= Jo0 tkexp(-Xt) dt
=1A (4.10)
Similarly, the standard deviation of the failure rate distribution is defined as:
o2 = E[t2 ] - (E[t])2 (4.11)
From this relation it is determined that [Ref. 14, p89]
o = 1/ (4.12)
The exponential distribution will be used to characterize equipment failures in the
subsequent models. This is a good first approximation for many components over their
useful lives. However, modeling X into the wear-out region may be a useful extension of
the availability model for future analyses, and would involve a hazard rate growing in time.
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4.1.1.6.2 The lognormal distribution
The lognormal distribution is discussed here because it will be used to model repair in one
of the models in Chapter 5. Repairs are characterized by having diffuse repair times. The
wide range of times required to fix a given component may make the exponential
distribution unsuitable for modeling repair. Further, repair may not be able to be
considered a single "random" process-because a random process may not take into
account learning or things such as sequential steps described by exponential distributions.
Thus, the lognormal (logarithmic normal) distribution may better model the data.
The theoretical justification for using the lognormal distribution to model repair is as
follows. Repairs are considered as being composed of several steps-detection, diagnosis,
preparation, execution, and testing--each of which may be described as an exponential
transition. The sum of exponential processes is a gamma distribution. The lognormal can
then used to approximate the gamma distribution, since it is easier to deal with.
It should be noted that sampling from the lognormal distribution yields the same steady
state average availability as the exponential distribution with the same mean time to repair.
However, it does affect both the standard deviation of the steady state availability and the
instantaneous availability.
See [Refs. 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18] for detailed discussions of the lognormal distribution.
4.1.2 Reliability block diagrams (RBDs)
Reliability block diagrams are a basic, logical method of simplifying block representations
of complex systems into equivalent simple systems. Although their names imply that they
apply only to reliability, they can be solved for availability also. Some simple RBD logic
structures follow.
For components in series [Ref. 15, p921
N N
Rsystem(t) = lR( = = exp |I n(:)dz (4.13)
n=l O n=l
For N fully redundant identical components in active parallel (as opposed to standby), the
reliability is given by [Ref. 15, p92]
N
1 - Rystem(t)= i[1 - R,(t)] (4.14)
n=l
Although the above equations are solved for reliability, they are equally valid for
availability, because the logic used in the derivation is the same.
Further, Equation 4.14 can be extended to r-out-of-n logic, and non-identical components.
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4.1.3 Fault tree / event tree analysis
For simple risk based calculations, fault tree / event tree analysis is often sufficient to obtain
realistic reliability values. For a complete treatment of fault trees and event trees, see [Ref.
14]. Essentially, fault trees and event trees attempt to accomplish the same objective, but
from different approaches.
4.1.3.1 Fault trees
Fault tree analyses start by defining the system boundaries. Next, an undesirable "top
event" is identified, and the question, "What can cause this top event to occur?" is asked.
In this respect, fault tree analysis works backwards from the outcome to generate the
combinations of events that cause it. [Ref. 14, p.173]
4.1.3.2 Event trees
Event tree analyses also begin by defining the system boundaries. Basic event tree
analyses then take the opposite approach of fault trees. Event tree analyses identify
precursors to undesirable events. An event tree analysis asks "What event could happen
that would affect the system adversely?," and then proceeds in a forward manner and
identifies all the possible outcomes and the consequences of those outcomes. [Ref. 14,
p.168-173]
4.1.3.3 Limitations of fault trees and event trees
Fault tree / event tree analyses are mostly static, in that they give a snapshot of system
reliability. Event trees are "semi-dynamic" in that they follow a sequence of events in time,
but they will not yield the availability as a function of time or changing variables. The
introduction of repairs into fault trees makes them cumbersome at best. The introduction of
repairs into event trees may introduce an infinite logic loop, causing the size of the event
tree to become infinite. To perform an availability analysis over long periods of time,
repairs become an important and even dominant factor. Fault / event tree analysis is
generally not flexible enough to perform a time dependent availability analysis on an
operating power plant.
4.1.4 Markov models
A Markov process is a stochastic process "whose future probabilistic behavior is uniquely
determined by its present state." [Ref. 14, p.222] Markov modeling is used to analyze
systems of components which can be described by random failures and random repair
times. As such, a Markov process is "memory-less," since "knowledge of the present
decouples the past from the future." [Ref. 14, p.222-223] Although random failures and
repairs may not be the best way to describe the system, they usually do not greatly affect
the unreliability and unavailability calculations. [Ref. 15, p.120]
The first step in a Markovian analysis is the identification of all of the possible system
states. For a large system, the number of possible states a system can occupy becomes
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unmanageably large. For this reason, reduction techniques become necessary to analyze
large systems. [Ref. 19, p.38]
From the set of system states, a set of first order differential equations are constructed to
describe the rate of transfer in and out of each state. Under the assumptions of constant
transition probabilities, this set of linear, first order differential equations can be solved by
using Laplace transform, matrix exponentiation, or time integration techniques. [Ref. 19,
p38] Note that exact, analytical solutions to Markov models are limited to very simple
systems of components.
For a simple overview of Markov processes and current research in this area, see [Ref. 19]
For a introductory mathematical treatment of Markov processes, see [Ref. 14] or [Ref. 15].
4.1.4.1 Modeling a simple component
Consider the availability of a simple pump to take water from an input and deliver it to the
output. The pump has an exponential failure rate, with instantaneous failure rate, X = 1 /
(MTWF). The pump is also described by an exponential repair rate, with instantaneous
repair rate, g = 1 / (MTTR). The initial state of the system is 100% capacity. Figure 4.1 (a)
shows this pump schematically, and Figure 4.1 (b) shows the Markov diagram for the
pump. The two possible states are 100% capacity and 0% capacity.
The Markov model for this system can be expressed as a set of coupled, first order
differential equations:
dPo(t)/dt = -Po(t) + gPl(t) (4.15)
dPl(t)/dt = -Pl(t) + )Po(t)
Where Po(t) is the probability that the pump is in state 0 at time t, and Pl(t) is the
probability that the pump is in state 1 at time t.
Noting that the time dependent Availability is just Po(t), this set of equations can be solved
for the time dependent availability, A(t), using Laplace transforms [Ref. 15, p.120-143]
A(t) = + e( + )t (4.16)
This is the time dependent availability for the hypothetical pump in this example. More
importantly, however, Equation 4.16 is the general form of the availability for any
component that undergoes exponential failures and repairs between two states.
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4.1.4.2 Limitations of Markov models
Markov models involve matrices that become extremely large for complex systems.
Therefore, simplifications and regroupings must be performed to keep the analysis within
computational capabilities. Unfortunately, with these simplifications some of the insights
into the system's behavior are lost.
Also, as mentioned, failures and repairs are treated as random processes. Markov models
cannot treat non-exponential transitions in a straight forward manner. They cannot model
time dependent transition probabilities or dependencies. This is the real limitation for
Markov models. Real systems are characterized by complex interactions, and continuous
state transitions. To model real systems using Markov models, serious simplifications may
be necessary, which can invalidate results.
Further, they cannot easily model phased mission problems. This complication is
circumvented by performing separate Markov analyses with the outputs from the (n-l)th
mission being used to define the initial state of the (n)th. However, this is somewhat
cumbersome.
Finally, all of the possible system states must be known beforehand. For these reasons,
Markov models are good as a first approximation, but have limited applications for
complicated, dynamic modeling.
(a) Input I Output
state 0 - 100%
(b) X I
state I - 0%
Figure 4.1 - Markov diagram (b) for a single pump (a)
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4.1.5 Direct simulation (monte-carlo based)
Direct monte-carlo simulation is the final and most powerful method discussed. A general
definition of a simulation follows:
"A simulation of a system is the operation of a model that is a representation of the
system. The model is amenable to manipulation that would be impossible, too expensive,
or impractical to perform on the system it portrays. The operation of the model can be
studied and from it properties concerning the behavior of the actual system can be
inferred." [Ref. 20, pl-1]
Simulation can be used to predict the effects or performance of proposed systems, system
modifications, procedural changes, an operational modification, or any physical
modification, before actual construction or implementation. This can be a cost effective
method for exploring many options before selecting the "best."
Monte-carlo simulation can be used to model systems where operations or transitions are
governed probabilistically rather than by predetermined sequences of events, although
predetermined interactions can be modeled also. Simulation is completely flexible. It can
be used to model time dependent, non-exponential transitions, dependencies, external
events, phased missions, repairs, maintenance and testing. It can be used to model almost
anything that happens in the real system.
Random number generators are used to model probabilistic transitions. Predefined and
user defined probabilistic sampling distributions are used to describe component failure
rates, repair rates, testing, or any process that is described by a statistical distribution. For
each set of random numbers, the program is run and the results are recorded. This can be
thought of as an experiment. After many such "experiments," the results will converge to
the mean values, and the availability of the system and it's individual components can be
determined.
4.1.5.1 Setting up the model
According to Russell, setting up a simulation model involves 8 steps [Ref. 20, p1 -1 3 to 1-
15]:
1. Articulate simulation goals
It is important to have clearly defined goals. This involves specifying the relationships that
will be studied and determining the information that needs to be obtained. It is the
problem statement.
2. Analyze the system to determine appropriate level of detail for the model.
This step defines the amount of detail to be incorporated into the model. It makes no
sense to precisely model electrons flowing through a coil in a pump if what is desired is
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the overall availability of a power plant. More likely, the pump will be described by a set
of failure modes and associated failure probabilities.
"The real art of model building is the ability to capture the essence of a system without
building in extraneous information into the model and yet omitting nothing of
importance." [Ref. 20, pl-14]
3. Synthesize the system (realize the model).
This is the actual construction of the model. Careful thought should be given to the
program structure and flow.
4. Collect and prepare input data
By this step, the model will be ready to run except for input data. During this step, data
should be obtained and condensed into a usable format. Representation of data in the
simulation program includes [Ref. 20, pl- 15 to 1-16]:
· Direct input of observed phenomena
· Reduction of data to an arbitrary distribution function
· Use of built-in random deviate generators to approximate the observed phenomena
analytically.
5. Verify model correctness
This is to assure that the code accurately reflects the intended model.
6. Validate model results
This assures that the code accurately reflects the real world system. Proof of the validity
of a monte-carlo simulation model is virtually impossible. In the best case, results can be
compared to the real world system to enhance our confidence that it will generate valid
results, but it can not be proved that the model absolutely represents the real system under
all circumstances, configurations and external influences.
7. Prepare for system experiments
This is the real value of simulation. Once we are confident that the model is generating
good predictions, we can begin to experiment on the system. This allows low cost
analysis of various system configurations
8. Analyze experimental results
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4.1.5.2 When does simulation become necessary?
1. When there are dependencies between different elements in the model.
· repair dependencies: there is typically a certain level of manpower to repair
failures. This can be handled by a repair supervisor routine, which simulates
realistic repair actions and dependencies.
· when the state of one component affects the state of other components
· If you consider performance as a continuous variable, simulation is a natural
way to handle this.
· If performance degradation at one point implies something about the
performance at another point.
2. When time dependence must be considered.
· time dependence of capacity factor
· aging
· transient response
· control system modeling
4.1.5.3 Advantages / disadvantages of simulation
It should be clear that monte-carlo simulation is an extremely powerful modeling technique.
However, it is not without its drawbacks. Much of the following list is taken from [Ref.
19].
4.1.5.3.1 Advantages
1. Once constructed, a model can be used to analyze proposed design or policy changes.
2. Simulation models are usually easier to apply than analytic methods.
3. Simulation does not require many of the simplifying assumptions required to make
analytical solutions tractable. Thus, modeling is completely flexible.
4. Simulation is sometimes the only method capable of generating a solution.
4.1.5.3.2 Disadvantages
1. Simulation models may become costly in terms of running time and model
construction time.
2. Simulation is sometimes used when analytic models will suffice.
4.1.5.3.3 Limitations
There are two major limitations on simulation modeling: statistical uncertainties and input
data accuracy.
The uncertainty is equal to 1 / x/N, where N is the number of trials. For large, complex
systems, the number of trials required to obtain good statistics may become prohibitively
time consuming.
The quality of input data is another major limitation. Theoretically, if the failure
distributions are known exactly, then monte-carlo simulation accuracy will be limited only
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by statistics, which can be improved with progressively larger numbers of trials.
However, the exact failure distributions are rarely known.
4.1.6 Comparison between reliability block diagrams, Markov models and
simulation for two simple cases
As the first step in validation of the monte-carlo simulation model that will be constructed
later, the results of two simplified models with the same basic program structure as the
larger model are compared to the analytical solution generated by a Markov analysis and
reliability block diagrams.
4.1.6.1 Example 1
Determining the availability of the simple system given in Figure 4.2 (a). The pump
undergoes exponential failures and repairs. The pump takes water from reservoir A, and
ejects water into reservoir B. The availability of reservoirs A and B are unity.
MTTF = 1/A = 200 hours
MTTR = 1/p. = 40 hours
4.1.6.1.1 Reliability block diagram analysis
The answer to the reliability block diagram is trivial-it is just the availability of a single
pump that undergoes exponential failures and repairs, and is given in Section 4.1.4.1.
4.1.6.1.2 Markov analysis
As was seen in discussed in Section 4.1.4.1, using Markov modeling an analytic solution
can be obtained for this simple system by constructing the set of first order differential
equations describing the pump transition probabilities, and then solving using Laplace
transforms:
A(t) = + e '¢ * ' (4.17)
1i+X +
Substituting in for pg and X, the availability equation is obtained:
A(t) = 0.8333 + 0.1667 exp[-0.03 t] (4.18)
4.1.6.1.3 Monte-carlo simulation
This problem was also constructed in the monte-carlo simulation programming language
Simscript II.5. [Ref. 21]
4.1.6.1.4 Comparison of RBD. Markov. and simulation results
The results are plotted in Figure 4.3. As seen in the graph and Table 4.1, the results of
monte-carlo simulation agree with the analytic solution obtained from Markov modeling.
Thus, for a simple component, simulation mimics analytic solutions.
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4.1.6.2 Example 2
This example is the same as the first example, except instead of one 100% capacity pumps,
the system utilizes two 100% capacity pumps in active parallel. See Figure 4.2 (b). These
pumps have the following failure and repair parameters:
MTTF= 200
MTTR = 40
4.1.6.2.1 Reliability block diagram analysis:
Using reliability block diagrams and Equation 4.14, the availability of the system is given
by:
A,v,,(t) = 2Asigle pump - (Asingle pump)2 (4.19)
Substituting in Equation 4.16 for the availability of a single pump and simplifying yields:
g2 + 2) 22 (s 2es, _ sl e '2')A(t) = 2 + 2 2 2 - S' (4.20)9 + 2Lh+ 2 ss 2(s x - s2)
where sl=-2(pg+X) and s2=-(R+X).
Substituting in for g and X, the following equation is obtained:
A(t) = 0.9722+0.9259(-0.03exp(-0.06t)+0.06exp(-0.03t)) (4.21)
4.1.6.2.2 Markov analysis
A set of coupled, first order differential equations can be constructed to represent the state
transition diagram in Figure 4.2 (b). An analytic solution can then be obtained through
Laplace transforms. [Ref. 15, p.120-143] The solution obtained through Markov analysis
is identical to Equations 4.20 and 4.21.
4.1.6.2.3 Simulation
A simulation model was constructed to model the operation of the system in Figure 4.2(a).
The results are compared to the other methods in section 4.1.6.2.5.
4.1.6.2.4 Comparison of RBD, Markov. and simulation results
Figure 4.4 compares the results of a monte-carlo run to the Markov / RBD solution to the
same problem. As can be seen in Figure 4.4 and Table 4.2, the results agree well.
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Figure 4.2 - Markov diagrams for single pump (a) and parallel pump (b) systems
Compcrison of S imulclion cad T heoreticd T ime Dependent
Avdlcbility for a single pump. MT F = 200, MT R = 40
1
0.98
0.96
aE 0.94
0.92
0,9
= 0.88
0,86
0.84
0.82
0.8
Figure 4.3
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
time, t
___
I 
110
Oorrpaisn d SimJcion amdT heoreicd TirreDqm t
Avilctilityfar Two 100% Putps in ActivePadld. MTF = 200, MTR
=40
- IVultIWIo lt u rutb) - I uy I
I . II NI ll lllllllllll rl rl rng~ rf~lIi1Elm -u - i .,10 I U - t pv .'
0 l10 200 300 4(0 503 600 700 800 900 1O0X
tinre (dcs)
Figure 4.4
a S - . - .~. ir -2 ie"NP,...-,, Ni.
Average availability ^ Average availability
Monte-carlo, 1000 cycles 0.8400 .0032
Markov Model / RBD 0.8381
Table 4.1 - Comparison of Markov and simulation average availabilities for a single
pump over 1000 days
Average Availability average availability
Monte-carlo, 1000 cycles 0.9744 .0009
Markov Model / RBD 0.9736
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Table 4.2 - Comparison of Markov and simulation average availabilities for parallel
pumps over 1000 days
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4.2 Cost benefit analysis methods
The purpose of this section is to outline two cost benefit analysis methods which can be
used as decision tools:
* deterministic cost benefit analysis
* statistical cost benefit analysis
4.2.1 Traditional cost benefit analyses
The traditional method of cost benefit analyses has been a deterministic approach. Under
this methodology, the engineer develops a "point estimate" of the expected engineering
costs and benefits associated with a specific project, and makes a decision based on these
estimates. The problem with this type of analysis is that it does not take into account the
uncertainties associated with the expected costs or benefits. This fact is not lost on
designers, and they typically impose a more conservative "rule of thumb," and do not
accept a design modification unless it pays for itself over again plus some margin (perhaps
up to a factor of 2 or 3). This is analogous to saying, "We're pretty sure the numbers are
right, but for conservatism, let's build in a margin of error." Sensitivity analyses can also
be used to assess the impacts of uncertainties; however, they are not addressed in this
thesis. [Ref. 31]
4.2.1.1 Example
Lets go through an example to illustrate this method. Consider a company that has just
purchased for $10M the rights to pump water from a reservoir to the townspeople. See
Figure 4.5. The contract lasts 10 years. The company will receive $10,000 per day for
providing this service. It receives no revenues for those days when water is not available.
The company is now considering which pumping system it should purchase to deliver
water to the town (Figure 4.6). Option 1 has an availability of 0.83 and costs $3M.
Option 2 has an availability of 0.97 and costs $5M. Table 4.3 summarizes the data.
Option 1 Option 2
Average Availability 0.83 0.97
Investment Cost $3,000,000 $5,000,000
Maintenance Cost $100,000 / yr $150,000 / yr
Time Horizon 10 years 10 years
Table 4.3 - Analysis data for hypothetical pumping systems
The real opportunity cost of investment (r) = 10%.
Capital outlay = $10M
Revenues when operating = $10,000 / day
Revenues when not operating = $0
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All we have to do now is to chose the option with the largest net benefit (NB). Note that
the net benefit is defined as the total expected benefits (B) less total expected costs (C):
NB = B - C (4.22)
Choosing the option with the largest net benefit is equivalent to performing a present
discounted value analysis for each to the two options, and choosing the most positive.
First, note that for Option 1, we expect to have the system available 83% of the time, or
303 days per year. This translates to revenues of $3.03 M per year. Option 2 is expected
to be available 97% of the time, or 354 days per year at revenues of $3.54M per year.
Let us evaluate the net benefit of each option by performing a discounted value analysis
for both the benefits and the costs.
Option 1:
10 1
B = $3.03M = $18.62M (4.23a)
m=1 (1+ r)
10 1
C, = -$10M - 3M - $O.1M = -$13.61M (4.23b)
n=I (1+ r)
NB = B - C = $5.01M (4.23c)
Option 2:
10
B, = $3.54M 1 =$21.75M (4.24a)
M=1 (1+ r) m
10
C2 = -$10M - $5M - $0.15M -$15.92 (4.24b)
n=1 + r)"
NB2 = B2- C2= $5.83M (4.24c)
Since the net benefit of Option 2 is greater than the net benefit of Option 1, Option 2 is the
better choice from a deterministic standpoint. This is the best choice given the information
available. Note, however, both options are attractive - they are both expected to make
money. Now let's look at a more sophisticated method of cost benefit analysis.
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Figure 4.5 - Pumping flow diagram.
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4.2.2 Statistical cost benefit analysis methodology
The deterministic approach to cost benefit analyses is a good first approximation.
However, a methodology that explicitly addresses statistical uncertainties is a more
powerful and informative technique. It allows the designer or operator to make decisions
based on all the information available, and will yield a probability distribution function
which describes the expected net benefit. For a complete and excellent treatment of this
methodology, see [Ref. 22]
4.2.2.1 A more realistic description of expectations - probability
distributions
Until now, expected costs and benefits were expressed as point quantities. That is, values
were expressed as point estimates. A more informative description of expectations is the
probability distribution. Under this approach, uncertainties are explicitly stated. Consider
the following example of the expected availability of the pumping system discussed in the
previous example.
Availability,A
Figure 4.7 - Availability (A) distribution for Option 1 pumping system
The distribution in Figure 4.5 shows that although there is a mean expected availability
associated with the pumping system, there is uncertainty in the exact value. The point
estimate used before assumes the mean value, LA, is the "correct" value. In fact, we do not
know exactly what the real value of the availability (A) is, but we know that A is described
by the above probability distribution. To better understand this, consider how failure data
for a system may be derived. An investigator speaks with several different individuals who
own the model of the component in question. He then asks how often the pump fails.
Each individual will probably have a slightly different answer, because pumps do not
always fail at the same time. This distribution can be constructed as follows.
1. Discretize the failure frequency into finite, manageable ranges.
2. The probability that the "true" failure rate of the component is within the failure
frequency range in question is the number of point failure rates in that frequency
band divided by the total number of failure rates reported in every frequency band.
What is obtained is a set of doublets describing the discrete probability distribution.
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Mathematically, let Al, A2, ..., An denote the discrete availabilities and let pi = p(AI), P2 =
p(A2), ..., pn = p(An) denote the probabilities associated with those availabilities being the
true availability for the particular pumps in question. Thus, the following set of doublets
are obtained:
A = <p,A>, <p2 ,A2 >,..., <pn ,An > = {<pi ,Ai > (4.25)
The same operation can be performed to obtain a probabilistic distribution describing the
costs associated with a given scenario:
C = <ql,cl>, <q2 ,c2 >,..., <qn ,cn > = {<qi ,ci >1 (4.26)
Returning to the previous distribution (A), note that what is needed is the probability
distribution of the benefit rather than the availability of the system. The distribution for
the expected benefit is derived subsequently, but first, let us review some discrete
probability mathematics.
4.2.2.2 Probabilistic mathematcis
4.2.2.2.1 Probabilistic addition
Let x, y be probabilistic distributions described by:
x = { <pi, xi>} (4.27)
y = {<qj, yj>}
If x and y are independent, then [Ref. 22]
x + y = {<pi, xi>} + {<q, yj>} = {<piqj, xi + yj>} (4.28)
4.2.2.2.2 Probabilistic multiplication
We now define z = x*y as [Ref. 22]
z = {<pi, xi> } * { <qj, yj> } = {<piqj, xi yj> (4.29)
4.2.2.3 Determining the benefit
Now, let's return to the problem at hand. We want to know the probability distribution
describing the availability associated with a particular decision. However, we want the
benefit. For this example, the benefit (Bi) associated with a given availability is just
Bi = k Ai (4.30)
Where k is a scalar factor converting availability points into benefit.
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K is the discounted value per year of availability. Since each day of availability translates
into $10,000, and there are potentially 365 days of availability per year, k is given by
10
k = $3.65M (1 (4.31)
n= (1 + rr
Now, note that multiplying a probability distribution by a scalar quantity affects only the
abscissa, not the ordinate. Defining B as the benefit distribution, we see that:
B = k A = <pl,kAl>, <P2 ,kA2 >,..., <pn ,kAn > = {<Pi ,kAi >} (4.32)
4.2.2.4 Determining the net benefit
We now have probability distributions for the cost and benefit for each option. The next
step is to obtain the net benefit probability distribution (N) for each of the options. By
definition,
N = B - C (4.33)
To illustrate this example, a probability distribution for the cost and benefit will be
assumed. First note that the benefit is expressed as a 2 by M matrix and the cost is
expressed as a 2 by N matrix, where M and N are the number of discrete ranges that the
benefit and cost probability distributions have been divided into. The result of probabilistic
distribution addition (or subtraction) of the benefit and the cost yields a 2 by (N*M) matrix.
For simplicity of this example, let M = N = 3.
From the example of Section 4.2.1.1, we know the mean expected benefit and cost
associated with option 1. Now, suppose we knew a little more about the expected benefits
and costs, and that they were given by Figures 4.8 and 4.9. Note that the mean of the
benefit and cost distributions have not changed, only the statistical uncertainties are
explicitly treated.
Next, Equation 4.33 is evaluated using the arithmetic operations of Equation 4.28 to yield
the following matrix in Table 4.4, the net benefit probability distribution [Ref. 22]:
Table 4.4 - Net benefit matrix
Net Benefit Benefit
Probability P1, B P2, B2 P3, B3
C Q1, C1 (0.063, -6.07) (0.125, -3.38) (0.063, -0.69)
O
s Q2, C2 (0.125, 2.33) (0.250, 5.02) (0.125, 7.71)
T Q3, C3 (0.063, 10.73) (0.125, 13.42) (0.063, 16.11)
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The next step is to plot the data in Table 4.4 on a cumulative probability curve, and to use
curve fitting to smooth the curve. [Ref. 2] This has been done, and is shown in Figure
4.10.
Next, note that the probability density is just the slope of the cumulative probability curve.
[Ref. 22] To obtain a discrete probability density distribution for Option 1, the range has
been split into four discrete ranges, and the slope of the cumulative probability curve has
been evaluated over these ranges. The results are given in Figure 4.11.
4.2.3 Results
There is an interesting point worth noting. The expected value of the net benefit is positive,
but there is a significant probability that the net benefit could be negative. This is a fact that
does not come out of a deterministic analysis. It could be that the pump's performance was
overestimated, and that the costs were underestimated and the net effect is that the company
loses money.
The drawback to this methodology is its complexity. Frequently, there is not enough
known about the expected cost and benefit distributions to justify assigning a probability
distribution over a point value. Further, the discrete probabilistic mechanics of the problem
are cumbersome and time consuming.[Ref. 22] However, if the probability distributions
describing the costs and the benefits are well known, and it is important to know the full
range of outcomes, this methodology is excellent. Further, the monte-carlo simulation
method of analysis lends itself to generating statistical distributions for the expected benefit.
4.3 Summary
The capabilities of several probabilistic availability analysis methods were discussed. The
results of reliability block diagram, Markov, and simulation analysis methods were then
compared to demonstrate the agreement between methods for straight forward problems. It
was also pointed out that to model complex, real world, time dependent systems with
interdependencies, monte-carlo simulation is necessary. Since one of the ultimate goals of
this line of research is to model such systems in sufficient detail to accurately predict actual
system performance, monte-carlo simulation was selected as the analysis method of choice.
To compliment the probabilistic system performance analysis methods outlined in the first
part of Chapter 4, two cost benefit analysis methods were outlined. It was seen that
deterministic cost benefit analyses are straight forward calculations. However, they are
limited in their treatment of uncertainties, and may result in decisions being made with an
incomplete appreciation of the uncertainties associated with the problem. A statistical cost
benefit analysis explicitly accounts for all uncertainties. A statistical cost benefit analysis
can be used to generate a more complete understanding of the economic risks and benefits
associated with a particular decision. However, the statistical analysis is more difficult and
cumbersome and requires a more complete understanding of the distributions describing the
expected costs and benefits.
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Cummulative probability distribution for the
net benefit of Option 1
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Chapter 5 - Analyses
In Chapter 5, a simplified monte-carlo model of a nuclear power plant is developed.
Interviewees' suggestions from Chapter 3 are utilized to identify the feedwater system as a
system worth modeling in more detail. A simplified version of this model is compared to
an analytical model to validate its structure.
The purpose of Chapter 5 is then to apply the strategies of Chapter 2 to the model to
identify directions in which performance can be enhanced. Then the model is utilized to
evaluate the efficacy of these proposed design modifications.
5.1 Plant model
5.1.1 Block model of a nuclear power plant
The first step in constructing a block power plant model is to identify major systems to be
modeled, and to define the scope of the model. The model to be constructed is based on a
standard PWR schematic. The basic systems to be included in the model are those major
systems required for power production. Safety and standby systems will not be included
in the original model, but can be incorporated later. Also not explicitly modeled are
control systems and valves. This is intended as a first pass of the major systems required
for power production.
5.1.1.1 Primary side
Modeled
1. Reactor
2. Reactor coolant pump
3. Pressurizer
4. Steam generators
Not modeled
1.CVCS
2. Safety systems
-injection systems
-emergency electrical power
-shutdown systems
3. Electrical supply
4. Instrumentation
5.1.1.2 Secondary side
Modeled
1. Turbine-Generator
2. Condenser
3. Feedwater
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Not modeled
1. Extraction steam for feedwater heating
2. Switchyard
3. Circulating water system
4. Pressure relief valves
5. Control systems
6. Instrumentation
The result is a block diagram of the power plant. In its simplest form, lumped availability
parameters are assigned to each block. If availability parameters are chosen to include
factors not explicitly included in the model, good overall plant availability predictions can
be calculated. However, this is not a very sophisticated approach, and it is desirable to
model these systems in more detail. It is clearly beyond the scope of a master's thesis to
develop a detailed, working model of a nuclear power plant, with all of its
interdependencies, complexities and tens of thousands of components. Therefore, a
compromise approach has been adopted. One of the functions of this thesis is to
demonstrate how to develop more detailed models by example. The feedwater system will
be modeled in greater detail, although still not thoroughly modeling the actual system.
This more detailed model is then utilized in conjunction with the other lumped parameter
systems to quantify the effects of system design modifications. The ability to analyze the
effects of proposed system design modifications is extremely valuable, as will be seen.
The modifications are based on the strategies of Chapter 2.
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5.2 Modeling the feedwater system
During the interviews with industry representatives, several systems were identified as
deserving design re-evaluation. Among those identified was the feedwater system. This is
a system common to all commercial US power plants, BWR and PWR. A PWR feedwater
system was chosen for analysis because PWRs comprise the majority of operating power
plants around the world, and because the feedwater system has consistently contributed to
significant capacity factor losses.
The feedwater model constructed is shown diagramatically in Figure 5.2. This particular
feedwater system is a simplified model based on the Seabrook Preliminary Safety Analysis
Report (PSAR). For a complete description of the feedwater system, see [Ref. 23]. For
convenience, a brief description is included below with the list of equipment modeled.
Components included in the feedwater system:
1. Condensate pumps. The condensate pumps are motor driven. They take water at a
pressure of 1.2 psi and 100 degrees F from the condenser and inject it into the
feedwater system at a pressure of 280 psi. [Ref. 23]
2. Steam jet air ejector condensers. The steam jet air ejector condensers condense
steam from the steam jet air ejectors, and return it to the condenser hotwells. They
also provide feedwater preheating for a small efficiency boost. [Ref. 23]
3. Steam gland condensers. The steam gland condensers are heat exchangers that
condense turbine gland seal steam while preheating the feedwater. They also
slightly boost thermal efficiency. [Ref. 23]
4. Drain coolers. The drain coolers cool low pressure heater condensate while
preheating the feedwater. The drain coolers boost thermal efficiency slightly. [Ref.
23]
5. Low pressure heaters 1 through 5. The low pressure heaters heat the low pressure
feedwater using extraction steam from the main turbine and crossover piping. The
main purpose of the low pressure feedwater train is to provide feedwater heating to
improve thermal efficiency, reduce thermal stresses on the steam generator, and
improve steam generator control [Ref. 23] [Ref. 28]. The temperature at the intake
of the feedwater pumps is 380 degrees F. [Ref. 23]
The drains from the high pressure feedwater heater are cascaded to the highest low
pressure heater. The drain from the second highest pressure heater is pumped to
the suction of the feedpumps. "Heater drains from the four lowest pressure heaters
are cascaded" and eventually dumped into the condenser. The two lowest pressure
heaters are located in the condenser neck. All heaters are single pass, U-tube
design. [Ref. 23]
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6. Feedwater pumps. The feedwater pumps boost feedwater pressure to the steam
generator operating pressure (about 1200 psi) The feedwater pumps are turbine
driven, centrifugal pumps. [Ref. 23]
7. High pressure heaters. The high pressure heaters use extraction steam to heat
the high pressure feedwater before it enters the steam generator. This improves
steam generator control, thermal stresses and efficiency. [Ref. 23] [Ref. 28]
Not modeled
1. Valves - flow control, check, bypass
2. Sensors
3. Extraction steam feeding shell side of heat exchangers
4. Reactor trips due to feedwater transients - this is something may be worth
including in future models. It could be included as a straight probability that the
transition between power states is successful or not.
5. Startup failures.
6. Plant shutdown failure rates. For model simplicity and verifiability, it was
assumed that the failure rates in shutdown conditions were the same as in
operation. The next logical extension of the model would be to include failure
rates as a function of plant state.
7. Drain pumps.
5.2.1 Failure data
It should first be noted that equipment failure data is an area where further research should
be performed. The data obtained for this report are generic and are thought to be
reasonable and consistent with available references. However, they are not as exact as
would be desirable for a detailed engineering calculation with real economic ramifications.
Therefore, the results obtained should be reasonable, but should be repeated with more
component / model specific data before any specific conclusions are made.
Failure rate and repair rate data were estimated for the components and systems to be
modeled. The data were chosen to be consistent with references, including
1. WASH 1400 data - provides general ranges for component failure and repair
rates.
2. Data provided by Northeast Utilities Operating Company's PRA group
3. Seong, Ph.D. thesis, MIT, 1987
4. NUREG-1272, NRC, AEOD, 1992 Annual Report
5. Interviews with industry representatives
The failure data used in this analysis are summarized in Table 5.1. The repair rate
distribution is listed here as lognormal; however, for simplification in the validation section
repair rates are assumed to be exponential, with the same mean time to repair.
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Component failure rate MTTF Repair rate MTTR a
distribution (days) distribution (days) (MTTR)
1. Condensate pumps exponential 1000 Lognormal 2 2
2. Steam jet air ejectors exponential 1000 Lognormal 20 20
3. Steam gland condenser exponential 1000 Lognormal 30 30
4. Drain Cooler exponential 5000 Lognormal 30 30
5. Low pressure heater exponential 5000 Lognormal 30 30
6. Feedwater pump exponential 1000 Lognormal 2 4
7. High pressure heater exponential 5000 Lognormal 30 30
8. Steam generator exponential 10000 Lognormal 60 60
9. Turbine-Generator exponential 500 Lognormal 15 15
10. Condenser exponential 5000 Lognormal 30 30
11. Reactor pump exponential 2500 Lognormal 20 20
12. Reactor exponential 5000 Lognormal 10 10
13. Pressurizer exponential 5000 Lognormal 20 20
Table 5.1 - Component reliability data
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5.2.2 Benchmarking the monte-carlo plant availability model against a
reliability block diagram analytical solution
Utilizing the reliability block diagram method, an analytical solution was obtained for the
entire model, under some simplifications. The simulation model was slightly simplified to
facilitate comparison to an analytical solution.
5.2.2.1 Assumptions
1. Exponential failure and repair transitions.
2. Availability (in the strict sense as defined below) was calculated.
3. Slightly modified success logic.
5.2.2.2 Success logic
The availability of a system at time t is the probability that the system is 100% available to
perform it's intended safety function. Therefore, the logic has been simplified to eliminate
the possibility of partial success states. Therefore, if the capacity of any series system is
less than 100%, then the plant is defined as "failed" in the respect that the availability is
zero, even if the system can still operate at a non-zero capacity less than 100%. The
capacity of the following systems were modified to allow 1-out-of-i, -out-of-2, and 2-
out-of-3 logic. The success logic is listed in Table 5.2. The success logic for all
components outside of the feedwater system is 1-out-of-i.
Table 5.2 - Success logic for analytical availability analysis
Component Success
Component Description Capacity c
1. CP x Condensate pump x 50% 2-out-of-3
2. SJAE x Steam jet air ejector x 50% 2-out-of-3
3. Gland Steam gland condenser 100% 1-out-of-1
condenser
4. DC x Drain cooler x 50% 2-out-of-3
5. H-lx Low ure heater train , component x 50% 2-out-of-3
6. H-2x Low pressure heater train 2, component x 50% 2-out-of-3
7. H-3x Low pressure heater train 3, component x 50% 2-out-of-3
8. H-4x Low pressure heater train 4, component x 50% 2-out-of-3
9. H-5x Low pressure heater train , component x 50% 2-out-of-3
10. H-6x Low pressure heater train, component x 50% 2-out-of-3
11. FW_x Feedwater pump x 100% 1-out-of-2
The hand calculation was facilitated utilizing Mathcad, and is presented in Appendix D.
The availability of each component was calculated based on the failure and repair
parameters listed in Table 5.1. Then reliability block diagram simplifications were
performed to calculate the availability. For redundant trains of a subsystem, the availability
of each train was identical. This simplifies the availability calculation for each subsystem.
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The comparison between reliability block diagram availability calculations and the monte-
carlo simulation results are listed in Figure 5.3. There is remarkable agreement between
the monte-carlo simulation model and the hand calculation.
Comparison of T ime Dependent Monte Carlo and
T heoretical Calculations for Plcant Model
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Figure 5.3
The data points on the graph are the instantaneous availability values for the monte-carlo
and the theoretical calculations. The number of "experiments" was 5000. If an average
availability is calculated (which is of greater interest for analysis purposes), the statistics
for the monte-carlo run improve considerably, and agree very well with the theoretical
average availability. This parameter is listed in Table 5.3
Mean Availability Standard Deviation of Mean
Availability
Monte-carlo 0.938 +/- 0.002
Theoretical 0.937
Table 5.3 - Average availabilities for analytic and simulation models over a 1000 day
period.
5.2.3 Towards a more realistic plant model
We now have analytical verification of the efficacy of the monte-carlo calculations of the
simplified plant model in predicting availability and reliability performance. This section is
intended to demonstrate the types of calculations and analyses that can be performed once
an effective, accurate model has been constructed.
The plant model utilized for this analysis is still significantly simplified and general relative
to the actual physical plant. Other analysis techniques such as RBDs or Markov models
= T hecreticd
{-s- Mcnte Carlo-
5000 T rids
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may be more suitable for this particular problem. However, when a serious attempt is
made to accurately model a power plant, with all the dependencies and experiential data,
other analysis techniques will fail. Therefore, the monte-carlo approach, which will
become necessary, is utilized in this present analysis.
To make the plant model more realistic, the strict definition of "availability" should be
relaxed. In fact, what will be calculated will be the average value of capacity factor as a
function of time, and a mean overall predicted capacity factor. This differs from the
previous example in that partial success states will be accounted for. In many instances,
the plant can run at reduced power while a parallel component is being repaired. Although
the plant is still producing electricity, the strict "availability" is defined as zero because the
plant is not operating at 100% capacity. The capacities of each component for this more
realistic calculation are listed in Table 5.4.
Failures were still assumed to occur according to an exponential failure rate distribution.
This is consistent with equipment behavior during the operational life of equipment. It
does not well model equipment that is aging past its intended operating period without
maintenance or repair. This should be addressed in future models.
Repair rates were assumed to follow a lognormal repair rate distribution. The lognormal
distribution was chosen because repair rates can vary significantly. There are numerous
examples of repairs taking much longer than expected in the nuclear industry. This may be
due to improper diagnosis, poor planning or an unavailability of spare parts (an emerging
issue). Whatever the case, this selection is drawn from the data and conclusions of WASH
1400.
Table 5.4 - System capacities
Component Number of conponents % Cap acity r component
1. Condensate pumps 3 50
2. Steam jet air ejectors 33
3. Steam gland condenser 1 100
4. Drain Cooler 3 33
5. Low pressure heater 3 33
6. Feedwater pump 2 50
7. High pressure heater 3 33
8. Steam generator 1 100
9. Turbine-Generator 1 100
10. Condenser 1 100
11. Reactor ump 1 100
12. Reactor 1 100
13. Pressurizer 1 100
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5.2.4 Perturbations
5.2.4.1 Cycle length perturbations
The first analysis performed will be to examine the effects of increased cycle length on
expected average operating and overall capacity factors. The base plant model described
above was run for 5000 cycles to calculate the expected operating capacity factor as a
function of time. From these time dependent data, the average operational and overall
capacity factors were calculated as a function of cycle length.
Figure 5.4 displays the results of the average operating capacity factor as a function of
cycle length. It is seen that as the plant goes to longer and longer cycle lengths, the
operating capacity factor decreases. However, it approaches a steady state asymptote
after about 600 days.
Figure 5.5 displays the results of the average overall capacity factor as a function of cycle
length for a base 60 day outage length. The curve illustrates the point made early in
Chapter 1 - going to longer cycles can significantly improve capacity factors for a given
outage length. It is not clear, however, that the outage duration is independent of cycle
length, and this should be kept in mind when viewing the cycle length results. With this in
mind, it is seen that capacity factor increases rapidly at first, but then the decreasing
operational capacity factor and the saturation effect of the reduced overall outage time
become apparent.
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5.2.4.2 Effects of redundancy
The next parameter examined was redundancy. For example, in the case of the feedwater
system, redundancy can improve the modes of operation in which repair can be performed.
In instances where sufficient redundancy does not exist, increasing redundancy can allow
repairs to be performed while the plant is at full power, rather than at reduced power levels.
Under the base configuration, the feedwater system is a secondary side system and is
isolatable. Therefore, trains can be repaired while the plant is still running, although maybe
at a reduced power level.
First, the effects of individually adding an extra train to each isolatable subsystem was
examined. This was intended to identify which individual systems had the greatest
potential for savings. Next, the effects of adding an additional, completely redundant train
of feedwater was examined. The results are summarized in Table 5.5. For calculated
increases in capacity factor less than the standard deviation of the mean operational capacity
factor, it was assumed that no conclusions could be made and that the increased capacity
factor was negligible. Systems that appeared to have the greatest potential for improved
availability were the steam jet air ejectors, the low pressure heater trains, the steam gland
condensers and the high pressure heaters. Not surprisingly, these are the components with
long mean times to repair. Although the active components tend to fail more frequently,
their repair times are also shorter, resulting in a small contribution to overall capacity factor
loss. The value of adding a completely redundant feedwater train was on the order of 5
points in overall capacity factor. For a 1000 MWe power plant selling electricity at a rate of
$30/MWh-e, this translates into roughly $13 million per year in extra revenues. If this is
sufficient to offset additional capital costs plus some margin of uncertainty, an extra
feedtrain should be implemented.
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Description # trials mean Standard Stand. increased CF increased
OCF Deviation Deviation of OCF CF_60 day
mean OCF outage
Base Case 5000 0.8870 0.0544 0.0013 0 0.8368 0
Redund. Condensate 1000 0.8871 0.0515 0.0046 -0 0.8369 -0
pumps
Redund. Steam Jet Air 1000 0.9051 0.0511 0.0048 0.0181 0.8539 0.0171
Ejectors
Redund. steam gland 1000 0.8938 0.0492 0.0019 0.0068 0.8432 0.0064
condensers
Redund. Low Press 1000 0.8974 0.0562 0.0058 0.0104 0.8466 0.0098
Heater Train 1
Redund. Low Press 1000 0.9021 0.0511 0.0035 0.0151 0.8511 0.0142
Heater Train 2
Redund. Feedpumps 1000 0.8851 0.0535 0.0035 -0 0.8350 -0
Redund. High Press 1000 0.8933 0.0516 0.0030 0.0063 0.8427 0.0059
Heater Train
Fully redundant system 1000 0.9468 0.0442 0.0020 0.0598 0.8933 0.0565
Table 5.5 - Effects of redundancy on calculated mean cycle capacity factor
5.2.4.3 Increasing component mean time to shutdown
From the strategy section, it was explained that one of the approaches to achieving higher
capacity factors is to design equipment to run longer, more reliably. This is analogous to
an increase in the mean time to failure (MTTF) or mean time before required shutdown of
equipment. An increase in the MTTF will allow plants to operate longer without
shutdowns.
This section parametrically examines the value of unilateral percentage increases in the
mean time to failure for all the components in the feedwater system only. This can also be
thought of as increasing the time between required monitoring, inspection, calibration,
maintenance, or repair. This analysis will generate expected increases in average plant
capacity factors as a function of percentage increase in MTTF. Since the dollar value of a
unit increase in capacity is known, the increase in MTTF can be translated directly into
dollar savings.
Graph 5.4 shows that a 70% increase in feedwater component reliability translates roughly
into a 2.5% increase in overall capacity factor. However, there is a saturation effect. After
about a 70% increase in the mean time to failure, the slope changes significantly. This is
due to the fact that the feedwater system is becoming very reliable, and there is not much
more that can be gained between the current state and 100% reliability.
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Increase in capacity factor vs. % increase in MTTR
- 1000 day cycle, 60 day outage
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It should be mentioned here that there is one more strategy that could be used under this
section. The approach taken was to improve the feedwater system reliability through
increasing the mean time to failure. However, there is another way to increase the overall
mean time to failure without changing any of the individual components-this is by
simplification. According to [Seong, 1987], simplifying the feedwater system by
eliminating two stages of low pressure heating, the gland seal steam condensers, and the
steam jet air ejectors can actually save money by improving reliability. Seong argues that
these components were eliminated on efficiency arguments, but reliability arguments were
not properly taken into account. Therefore, a parallel approach to improving the overall
feedwater system mean time to failure is simplification. This approach was not pursued
further because Seong has already performed the analysis.
5.2.4.4 MTTR
The final strategy examined is decreasing the mean time to repair. Achieving a decrease in
this parameter could correspond physically to an increase in maintenance staffing, an
increase in spare parts inventory, better designed plants with more repair space, better
designed equipment which facilitate repair, or an increase in equipment monitoring.
Improved equipment monitoring can decrease the mean time to repair by giving the operator
information in advance about the state of the equipment. It can inform the operator that the
component is about to fail and can inform the operator as to what part in the component is
about to fail, thus giving the operator time to prepare for the failure-order parts, train
technicians.
As Figure 5.7 shows, improving the mean time to repair is a valuable asset for improving
capacity factor. A 50% decrease in the mean time to repair for the feedwater system
components can raise overall capacity factor by 3%.
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Increase in capacity factor vs. % decrease in MTTR
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5.3 Summary
In this Chapter, a simplified model of a PWR nuclear power plant was developed, with the
feedwater system modeled in more detail. The model's internal logic was modified slightly
to generate availability data, and was compared to an analytical solution to the same
problem. The results were in agreement, which suggests that the simplified monte-carlo
model is a valid representation of the PWR model considered.
Next, the model was used to predict the effects of different strategies on plant capacity
factor. The first strategy examined added redundancy. It was determined that the
unavailability of passive heat exchangers affected capacity factor more significantly than the
active components. Therefore, added redundancy may be justified in the steam jet air
ejectors, in the turbine steam gland condensers, and in the low pressure and high pressure
heaters. The benefit of adding redundancy to the condensate and feedwater pumps were
inconclusive.
The next strategy analyzed was the value of achieving a unilateral increase of the mean time
to failure (shutdown) of the feedwater system components. It was concluded that
increasing the mean time to failure could improve capacity factor at an approximate ratio of
28% improvement in overall feedwater component reliability to 1% increase in capacity
factor. However, no significant gains are achieved after a 70% increase in feedwater
component reliability.
The final strategy analyzed was the value of achieving a unilateral decrease in the mean time
to repair of the feedwater system components. It was concluded that decreasing the mean
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time to repair could improve capacity factor at an approximate ratio of 17% decrease in
MTTR to 1% increase in capacity factor.
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Chapter 6 - Summary/conclusions
6.1 Interviews
Interviews were conducted with over 50 industry representatives to solicit their opinions
on the state of current nuclear plant designs and how plants could be designed to run for
longer cycles and with higher capacity factors. Interviewees were comprised from a wide
breadth of backgrounds, including utilities, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
consulting companies, professional organizations, the vendors, and academia.
Ten general categories of comments emerged from these interviews:
1. Technical / Hardware Concerns
2. Regulatory / Institutional Framework
3. PRA in Design
4. Design Principles
5. Economic Pressures
6. Operation and Maintenance Practices
7. Material Condition
8. Cycle Length Pressures
9. Advanced Concepts
10. Safety
11. Plant Size
Each of these were elaborated upon in detail in Chapter 3.
6.2 Strategies
Three strategies were developed as an aid to redesigning plants for longer operating cycles
and higher capacity factors. These strategies were designing to allow monitoring,
inspection, calibration, maintenance and repair (MICMR) at higher modes of operation; to
facilitate shorter times to complete MICMR; and to enhance the time between required
MICMR. These strategies were applied to the steam generators as an example of how
they can be used to help guide design goals. They were also applied to the analysis of the
PWR feedwater system, which was modeled in greater detail.
6.3 PRA methods
A review of available probabilistic analysis methods was performed, with the goal of
selecting a technique capable of realistically modeling the behavior of complex systems
with interdependencies, external influences, and time dependent behavior. Methods
surveyed were reliability block diagrams (RBDs), fault trees, event trees, Markov models,
and simulation.
Simulation was selected because of its flexibility in modeling complex, realistic systems.
However, this method is not without limitations. First, accuracy is limited by statistical
variations. This can be overcome by performing more runs, which highlights simulation's
second major limitation: long running times.
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6.4 Cost benefit methods
The motivation for this research is economic. Nuclear power plants are experiencing
competition worldwide. Plants with poor capacity factors and poor economic performance
may not be able to compete. Therefore, the redesign of plant systems must be approached
on a cost benefit basis. When considering a system modification, the benefits must exceed
the costs.
6.4.1 Deterministic analysis
Traditionally, deterministic cost benefit analyses have been the method of choice in the
industry. Point estimates are developed based on the best guesses of the benefits and costs
of implementation. From these best estimates, cost decisions are made. However, this
type of analysis does not address uncertainties in the expected benefits and expected costs.
Consequently, decisions that look good from a deterministic analysis may sometimes be in
error by not fully taking into account the risks.
6.4.2 Statistical analysis
Statistical cost benefit analysis methods can be used to specifically address uncertainties.
This method gives the decision maker a much more complete picture of the risks and
benefits associated with a decision. However, the techniques are mechanically difficult to
use, and a much more complete knowledge of the uncertainties is required. But if the
uncertainties associated with a decision are important and desired, this can be a powerful
decision making technique.
6.5 Plant model
A simplified plant model was constructed using the Simscript 11.5 simulation language.
The model incorporated simplified representations of major plant systems with a more
detailed representation of the feedwater system. The purpose of this chapter was to apply
the strategies of Chapter 2 to the simplified plant model. The simulation model was used to
analyze the effects of the strategies on capacity factor. The value of simulation was
demonstrated by analyzing plant systems before any costly design decisions are made.
6.5.1 Data
Much of the feedwater component data used are generic industry data for generic pumps
and heat exchangers. Global lumped reliability values were chosen to be consistent with
references, industry experience, and the industry interviews of Chapter 3. For a generic
analysis, this data is sufficient. However, for a plant specific analysis, data applicable to
particular component models is more accurate and is necessary. If component specific data
are not used, the uncertainty in the reliability data will be greater than the expected capacity
factor improvements. Under these conditions, no conclusions can be made.
6.5.2 Validation
The plant model's logic was simplified slightly to allow comparison with an analytical
solution derived using reliability block diagram methods. This analysis showed that the
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results obtained from simulation agreed well with the analytic solution. This should be
taken as an indication that the simulation model is valid for this configuration and for
future perturbation calculations; however, proof of validity may be impossible.
6.5.3 Conclusions
The base model developed was used to analyze several different perturbations.
6.5.3.1 Cycle length
The base design was run to determine average expected plant capacity factor as a function
of cycle length. It was seen that for short cycle lengths, the operational capacity factor
(OCF) was very high. However, the OCF approached its asymptote after about 500 days.
It was also seen that the overall capacity factor (CF) - for a given 60 day outage length -
increased rapidly as cycle length was increased, but again approached an asymptote.
6.5.3.2 Redundancy
The effects of adding redundancy were analyzed. It was seen that components with long
repair times (but with lower failure rates) tended to dominate capacity factor loss. This
indicates that designing for shorter repair times may be a more effective strategy than
designing for higher reliability. It was predicted that adding a redundant fourth train to the
feedwater system could increase capacity by about 5.5% for a 1000 day cycle with a 60
day refueling outage.
6.5.3.3 Mean time to failure
The effects of designing for increased feedwater component reliability were analyzed. It
was seen that increasing component reliability increased the feedwater system reliability at
a rate of 2% capacity per 50% increase in every feedwater component's reliability.
However, after about a 70% increase in component reliability (-2.5% capacity factor), the
capacity factor gain became much less pronounced.
6.5.3.4 Mean time to repair
The effects of designing for shorter repair times for feedwater components were analyzed.
It was seen that decreasing the mean time to repair by 50% for every feedwater
component increases capacity factor by approximately 3%. It can be concluded that there
is significant value to decreasing repair times.
6.6 Future work
This research identified many possible directions for future research that were beyond the
scope of this thesis. The following sections contain the areas where future research can be
initiated.
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6.6.1 Reliability analysis
6.6.1.1 Better component reliability and repair data
There is a need to obtain more accurate, realistic data to improve analysis results and
conclusions. For plant specific conclusions, plant equipment operating data should be
analyzed. For more general data, component vendors should be consulted to obtain
realistic component reliability data. In both cases, a firm physical understanding of the
components, their failure mechanisms, and their repair requirements should be acquired.
6.6.1.2 Improvements for availability analysis model
The model completed to date is significantly simplified relative to actual operating plants.
Several areas have been identified to improve model accuracy and treatment.
6.6.1.2.1 High priority items
* Model the plant in greater detail to better represent actual plant operation.
* Explicitly treat dependencies. This was one of the bases for adopting the monte-carlo
method.
* Model shutdown conditions. Currently, components are treated as in active operation
throughout the cycle. A better representation would be to model failure mechanisms for
components in shutdown conditions. This includes modeling demand failures and
standby failures.
6.6.1.2.2 Lower priority items
* The component "bum-in" period may need to be modeled if bum-in failures are
determined to contribute significantly to capacity loss.
* The component "wear-out" period may need to be modeled if equipment experiences
increased failure rates due to less frequent maintenance, which is expected for longer
cycles.
* The code structure is simple and adequate for current analyses. However, using
queuing can significantly improve code execution speed, which may be important for
more complex, future models.
6.6.1.3 Alternate techniques
Risk increase importance measures, availability loss importance measures, and as yet
hypothesized importance measures may be useful in the optimization of maintenance
resource allocation. They may also yield insights into better system designs.
6.6.1.4 Alternate strategy
Strategies examined to date were (1) performing critical activities at higher modes of
operation, (2) increasing component reliability, and (3) decreasing repair times. A fourth
strategy not yet examined is the effects of simplification on availability. This strategy
should be pursued in future research, if it has not already been fully addressed by previous
research.
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6.6.2 Engineering modifications / redesign
6.6.2.1 Identifying engineering limitations worth further analysis
6.6.2.1.1 Identifying poor system performance
* Contact NRC, Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD). They
do industry trending of system performance. Data may be available. (May only be
safety systems)
* Review forced outage causes for indications of design weaknesses.
* Review of operating experience for plants on a 2 year cycle. Find the limitations that
cause them to shut down.
6.6.2.1.2 Inspection and surveillance requirements
A detailed review of current inspection and surveillance criteria should be performed to
identify limitations in current designs. Surveillance interval extensions has been addressed
by EPRI and the NRC Generic Letter 91-04. Examining the Standard Technical
Specifications and the System 80+ Technical Specifications may yield additional insights.
The ASME testing codes must be checked for safety valve inspection / maintenance
requirements.
6.6.2.2 Components specific analyses
Several candidate systems for redesign were identified in Chapters 2 and 3. The following
candidates have already been analyzed to some extent, and may be worth further analysis.
6.6.2.2.1 Reactor coolant pumps
PWR_9 performed an analysis confirming that a spare reactor coolant pump motor for
quick change-out was justified on a cost savings basis. A similar analysis could be used to
benchmark the cost benefit analysis methods listed in Chapter 4.
Additional engineering analysis should be performed to determine why there exists a
disparity between the consequences of loss of reactor coolant pump seal cooling between
different pump vendors. Loss of seal cooling may result in a seal LOCA, which is
significant from a safety perspective. Therefore, more analysis may be justified.
6.6.2.2.2 Steam generators
A feasibility study of the steam generator redesign options of Section 2.4 should be
performed. This would be valuable research, because the steam generators are considered
by many to be the "weak link" in current and future PWR designs. The economic risk
associated with poor steam generator performance is enormous.
6.6.2.3 Predictive monitoring and maintenance
Predictive monitoring and maintenance techniques are extremely valuable in industry.
They will be more valuable to plants intending to operate under longer fuel cycles, because
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prescriptive shutdown periodicities may be too restrictive for these longer cycles. The
following is an initial list of monitoring techniques identified in interviews. This list should
be completed, and fully explored. These techniques may be valuable for engineering
solutions to problematic components.
* vibration monitoring
* electrical signatures
* thermography
* lube oil testing
* hydraulic testing
* leak monitoring
* battery testing
* performance monitoring
Inspection, calibration and repair techniques should also be surveyed for use in engineering
analyses.
6.6.2.4 Online monitoring and testing capabilities
Online monitoring and testing capabilities may become necessary for longer fuel cycles to
verify operability of important components. Capabilities such as online monitoring of
steam generator tube condition would be invaluable. The System 80+ FSAR should be
reviewed to determine the "state of the art" monitoring and testing capabilities.
6.6.3 Long-lived core design
Fuel cycle calculations are currently underway. Areas of interest are enrichment
requirements, fuel cycle economics, and reactivity hold-down. More subtle considerations
in the economic analysis which should also be explored are reduced refueling workforce
(even with a required mid-cycle outage), and the effects of cycle length on refueling outage
duration.
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Appendix A: Simulation program listing in
Simscript Language for base configuration
PREAMBLE
''The purpose of this program is to model a PWR nuclear
''power plant in simplified block form with a detialed description of the
''feedwater system.
''See diagram for component names and better system description.
Processes include FLOW
Resources include CONDP, SJAE, GLAND.COND, DCOOL, LPH1, LPH2, LPH3, LPH4,
LPH5, FEEDP, HPH, STEAM.GEN, TURB.GEN, COND, RCP, REACT, and PRESS
''.FT means .FAILURE.TIME; .RT means REPAIR.TIME;
''.CAP means CAPACITY; and .AV means AVAILABILITY
Every CONDP has a CONDP.FT, a CONDP.RT, a CONDP.AV, and a CONDP.CAP
Every SJAE has a SJAE.FT, a SJAE.RT, a SJAE.AV, and a SJAE.CAP
Every GLAND.COND has a GLAND.COND.FT, a GLAND.COND.RT, a GLAND.COND.AV,
and a GLAND.COND.CAP
Every DCOOL has a DCOOL.FT, a DCOOL.RT, a DCOOL.AV, and a DCOOL.CAP
Every LPH1 has a LPH1.FT, a LPH1.RT, a LPH1.AV, and a LPH1.CAP
Every LPH2 has a LPH2.FT, a LPH2.RT, a LPH2.AV, and a LPH2.CAP
Every LPH3 has a LPH3.FT, a LPH3.RT, a LPH3.AV, and a LPH3.CAP
Every LPH4 has a LPH4.FT, a LPH4.RT, a LPH4.AV, and a LPH4.CAP
Every LPH5 has a LPH5.FT, a LPH5.RT, a LPH5.AV, and a LPH5.CAP
Every FEEDP has a FEEDP.FT, a FEEDP.RT, a FEEDP.AV, and a FEEDP.CAP
Every HPH has a HPH.FT, a HPH.RT, a HPH.AV, and a HPH.CAP
Every STEAM.GEN has a STEAM.GEN.FT, a STEAM.GEN.RT, a STEAM.GEN.AV,
and a STEAM.GEN.CAP
Every TURB.GEN has a TURB.GEN.FT, a TURB.GEN.RT, a TURB.GEN.AV,
and a TURB.GEN.CAP
Every COND has a COND.FT, a COND.RT, a COND.AV, and a COND.CAP
Every RCP has a RCP.FT, a RCP.RT, a RCP.AV, and a RCP.CAP
Every REACT has a REACT.FT, a REACT.RT, a REACT.AV, and a REACT.CAP
Every PRESS has a PRESS.FT, a PRESS.RT, a PRESS.AV, and a PRESS.CAP
Define CONDP.FT, SJAE.FT, GLAND.COND.FT, DCOOL.FT, LPH1.FT, LPH2.FT,
LPH3.FT, LPH4.FT, LPH5.FT, FEEDP.FT, HPH.FT, STEAM.GEN.FT, TURB.GEN.FT,
COND.FT, RCP.FT, REACT.FT, and PRESS.FT as real variables
Define CONDP.RT, SJAE.RT, GLAND.COND.RT, DCOOL.RT, LPH1.RT, LPH2.RT,
LPH3.RT, LPH4.RT, LPH5.RT, FEEDP.RT, HPH.RT, STEAM.GEN.RT, TURB.GEN.RT,
COND.RT, RCP.RT, REACT.RT, and PRESS.RT as real variables
Define CONDP.CAP, SJAE.CAP, GLAND.COND.CAP, DCOOL.CAP, LPH1.CAP, LPH2.CAP,
LPH3.CAP, LPH4.CAP, LPH5.CAP, FEEDP.CAP, HPH.CAP, STEAM.GEN.CAP,
TURB.GEN.CAP, COND.CAP, RCP.CAP, REACT.CAP, and PRESS.CAP
as real variables
Define CONDP.AV, SJAE.AV, GLAND.COND.AV, DCOOL.AV, LPH1.AV, LPH2.AV,
LPH3.AV, LPH4.AV, LPH5.AV, FEEDP.AV, HPH.AV, STEAM.GEN.AV, TURB.GEN.AV,
COND.AV, RCP.AV, REACT.AV, and PRESS.AV as real variables
Define RESET as a text variable
Define EFPD and AVAIL as 1-dimensional, real arrays
Define NUM.CYCLES and NUM.POINTS as integer variables
Define TOTAL.EFPD, CYCLE.LENGTH and AVERAGE.EFPD as real variables
Define CONDENSATE.CAP, STEAM.JET.CAP, GLAND.CONDENSER.CAP, LPHEAT1.CAP,
LPHEAT2.CAP,FEEDPUMPS.CAP,HPHEAT.CAP, STEAM.GENERATOR.CAP,
TURBINE.GENERATOR.CAP,CONDENSER.CAP, REACTOR.PUMP.CAP, REACTOR.CAP,
PRESSURIZER.CAP, and FEEDWATER.CAP as real variables
Define CAPACITY.FACT, TIME.INCREMENT and AVAIL.AVERAGE as real variables
Tally MEAN.CAPACITY.FACT as the mean of CAPACITY.FACT
Tally SD.CAPACITY.FACT as the std.dev of CAPACITY.FACT
Tally SD.MEAN.CAPACITY.FACT as the std.dev of AVAIL.AVERAGE
Tally CONDENSATE.AV as the mean of CONDENSATE.CAP
Tally STEAM.JET.AV as the mean of STEAM.JET.CAP
Tally GLAND.CONDENSER.AV as the mean of GLAND.CONDENSER.CAP
Tally LPHEAT1.AV as the mean of LPHEAT1.CAP
Tally LPHEAT2.AV as the mean of LPHEAT2.CAP
Tally FEEDPUMPS.AV as the mean of FEEDPUMPS.CAP
Tally HPHEAT.AV as the mean of HPHEAT.CAP
Tally CONDENSER.AV as the mean of CONDENSER.CAP
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Tally REACTOR.PUMP.AV as the mean of REACTOR.PUMP.CAP
Tally PRESSURIZER.AV as the mean of PRESSURIZER.CAP
Tally TURBINE.GENERATOR.AV as the mean of TURBINE.GENERATOR.CAP
Tally REACTOR.AV as the mean of REACTOR.CAP
Tally STEAM.GENERATOR.AV as the mean of STEAM.GENERATOR.CAP
Tally FEEDWATER.AV as the mean of FEEDWATER.CAP
END
MAIN
Activate a FLOW now
Start simulation
Open 8 for output, file name = "OUTPUT"
Use 8 for output
Begin report
Print 20 lines with CYCLE.LENGTH, NUM.CYCLES, TOTAL.EFPD, AVERAGE.EFPD,
FEEDWATER.AV, CONDENSATE.AV, STEAM.JET.AV, GLAND.CONDENSER.AV, LPHEAT1.AV,
LPHEAT2.AV, FEEDPUMPS.AV, HPHEAT.AV, STEAM.GENERATOR.AV,
TURBINE.GENERATOR.AV, CONDENSER.AV, REACTOR.PUMP.AV, REACTOR.AV,
PRESSURIZER.AV thus
Length of cycle ******
Number of EFPDs in *** cycles was ****.*
Average number of EFPDs per cycle was ****
Individual system availability data
Feedwater System Availability **.****
Condensate Pump Train Availability **.****
Steam Jet Air Ejector Train Availability **.**
Turbine Gland Condenser Availability *****
Low Pressure Heater Train 1 Availability **.***
Low Pressure Heater Train 2 Availability **.****
Feedwater Pump Train Availability **.****
High Pressure Heater Train Availability ******
Steam Generator Availability **.****
Turbine Generator Availability **.****
Condensor Availability **.****
Reactor Coolant Pump Availability **.****
Reactor Availability **.****
Pressurizer Availability **.****
Skip 2 lines
For Z = 1 to NUM.CYCLES
DO
Let CAPACITY.FACT = EFPD(Z)/CYCLE.LENGTH
LOOP
Print 2 lines thus
Overall plant availability data
Print 3 lines with MEAN.CAPACITY.FACT, SD.MEAN.CAPACITY.FACT,
and SD.CAPACITY.FACT thus
Mean Plant Availability *****.*****
Standard Deviation of Mean Plant Availability **********
Standard Deviation of Plant Availability *****.*****
Print 2 lines thus
Time point A(t)
For Y = 1 to NUM.POINTS
Do
Let TIME = TIME + TIME.INCREMENT
Print 1 line with TIME and AVAIL(Y)/NUM.CYCLES thus
****** ** *******
Loop
End
END
Process FLOW
Define TIME.TO.MEASURE as a real variable
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Define POINT as an integer variable
Let NUM.CYCLES = 1000
Let CYCLE.LENGTH = 1000
Let NUM.POINTS = 100
Reserve EFPD(*) as NUM.CYCLES
Reserve AVAIL(*) as NUM.POINTS
Let TIME.INCREMENT = Int.f(CYCLE.LENGTH/NUM.POINTS)
For I = 1 to NUM.CYCLES
Do
Let RESET = "YES"
Let POINT = 1
Let time.v = 0
Let TIME.TO.MEASURE = TIME.INCREMENT
Until (time.v>=CYCLE.LENGTH)
Do
Call FEEDWATER ''Feedwater System
Call STEAM.GENERATOR ''Steam Generators
Call TURBINE.GENERATOR ''Turbine Generator
Call CONDENSER ''Condenser
Call REACTOR.PUMP ''Reactor Coolant Pump
Call REACTOR ''Reactor
Call PRESSURIZER ''Pressurizer
Wait 1 day
Let RESET = "NO"
Let CAPACITY = Min.f(FEEDWATER.CAP,STEAM.GENERATOR.CAP,
TURBINE.GENERATOR.CAP,CONDENSER.CAP,REACTOR.PUMP.CAP,
REACTOR.CAP,PRESSURIZER.CAP)
If time.v >= TIME.TO.MEASURE
Let AVAIL(POINT) = AVAIL(POINT) + CAPACITY
Let POINT = POINT+1
Let TIME.TO.MEASURE = TIME.TO.MEASURE + TIME.INCREMENT
Always
Let EFPD(I) = EFPD(I) + CAPACITY
Loop
Let TOTAL.EFPD = TOTAL.EFPD + EFPD(I)
Let AVAIL.AVERAGE = ((I-1)*AVAIL.AVERAGE + EFPD(I)/CYCLE.LENGTH)/I
Loop
Let AVERAGE.EFPD = TOTAL.EFPD / NUM.CYCLES
END
Routine FEEDWATER
Call CONDENSATE ''Feedwater System
Call GLAND.CONDENSER ''Feedwater System
Call STEAM.JET ''Feedwater System
Call LPHEAT1 ''Feedwater System
Call LPHEAT2 ''Feedwater System
Call FEEDPUMP ''Feedwater System
Call HPHEAT ''Feedwater System
Let FEEDWATER.CAP=Min. f(1,,CONDENSATE.CAP,GLAND.CONDENSER.CAP,STEAM.JET.CAP,
LPHEAT1.CAP,LPHEAT2.CAP,FEEDPUMPS.CAP,HPHEAT.CAP)
END
Routine CONDENSATE
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTFA, MTTFB, MTTFC, MTTRA, MTTRB, MTTRC, SDA, SDB, and SDC
as real variables
Let MTTFA = 1000
Let MTTFB = 1000
Let MTTFC = 1000
Let MTTRA = 2
Let MTTRB = 2
Let MTTRC = 2
Let SDA = 2
Let SDB = 2
Let SDC = 2
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Let A = 1
Let B = 2
Let C = 3
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every CONDP
Create every CONDP(3)
U.CONDP(A) = 1
U.CONDP(B) = 1
U.CONDP(C) = 1
Let CONDP.CAP(A) = .5
Let CONDP.CAP(B) = .5
Let CONDP.CAP(C) = .5
Let CONDP.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTFA,1)
Let CONDP.FT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTFB,2)
Let CONDP.FT(C) = Exponential.f(MTTFC,3)
Let CONDP.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRA,SDA,4)
Let CONDP.RT(B) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRB,SDB,5)
Let CONDP.RT(C) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRC,SDC,6)
Always
If time.v >= CONDP.FT(A)
Let CONDP.CAP(A) = 0.0
If time.v >= (CONDP.FT(A) + CONDP.RT(A))
Let CONDP.CAP(A) = 0.5
Let CONDP.FT(A) = CONDP.FT(A)+CONDP.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTFA, 1)
Let CONDP.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRA,SDA,4)
Always
Always
If time.v >= CONDP.FT(B)
Let CONDP.CAP(B) = 0.0
If time.v >= (CONDP.FT(B) + CONDP.RT(B))
Let CONDP.CAP(B) = 0.5
Let CONDP.FT(B) = CONDP.FT(B)+CONDP.RT(B)+Exponential.f(MTTFB,2)
Let CONDP.RT(B) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRB,SDB,5)
Always
Always
If time.v >= CONDP.FT(C)
Let CONDP.CAP(C) = 0.0
If time.v >= (CONDP.FT(C) + CONDP.RT(C))
Let CONDP.CAP(C) = 0.5
Let CONDP.FT(C) = CONDP.FT(C)+CONDP.RT(C)+Exponential.f(MTTFC,3)
Let CONDP.RT(C) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRC,SDC,6)
Always
Always
Let CAPACITY = CONDP.CAP(A)+CONDP.CAP(B)CONDP.CAP(C)
Let CONDENSATE.CAP = Min. f(CAPACITY, 1)
END
Routine STEAM.JET
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTFA, MTTFB, MTTFC, MTTRA, MTTRB, MTTRC, SDA, SDB, and SDC
as real variables
Let MTTFA = 1000
Let MTTFB = 1000
Let MTTFC = 1000
Let MTTRA = 20
Let MTTRB = 20
Let MTTRC = 20
Let SDA = 20
Let SDB = 20
Let SDC = 20
Let A = 1
Let B = 2
Let C = 3
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every SJAE
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Create every SJAE(3)
U.SJAE(A) = 1
U.SJAE(B) = 1
U.SJAE(C) = 1
Let SJAE.CAP(A) = 0.334
Let SJAE.CAP(B) = 0.334
Let SJAE.CAP(C) = 0.334
Let SJAE.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTFA,7)
Let SJAE.FT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTFB,8)
Let SJAE.FT(C) = Exponential.f(MTTFC,9)
Let SJAE.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRA,SDA,1)
Let SJAE.RT(B) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRB,SDB,2)
Let SJAE.RT(C) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRC,SDC,3)
Always
If time.v >= SJAE.FT(A)
Let SJAE.CAP(A) = 0.0
If time.v >= (SJAE.FT(A) + SJAE.RT(A))
Let SJAE.CAP(A) = 0.334
Let SJAE.FT(A) = SJAE.FT(A)+SJAE.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTFA,7)
Let SJAE.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRA,SDA,1)
Always
Always
If time.v >= SJAE.FT(B)
Let SJAE.CAP(B) = 0.0
If time.v >= (SJAE.FT(B) + SJAE.RT(B))
Let SJAE.CAP(B) = 0.334
Let SJAE.FT(B) = SJAE.FT(B)+SJAE.RT(B)+Exponential.f(MTTFB,8)
Let SJAE.RT(B) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRB,SDB,2)
Always
Always
If time.v >= SJAE.FT(C)
Let SJAE.CAP(C) = 0.0
If time.v >= (SJAE.FT(C) + SJAE.RT(C))
Let SJAE.CAP(C) = 0.334
Let SJAE.FT(C) = SJAE.FT(C)+SJAE.RT(C)+Exponential.f(MTTFC,9)
Let SJAE.RT(C) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRC,SDC,3)
Always
Always
Let CAPACITY = SJAE.CAP(A)+SJAE.CAP(B)+SJAE.CAP(C)
Let STEAM.JET.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
END
Routine GLAND.CONDENSER
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTF, MTTR as real variables
Let MTTF = 5000
Let MTTR = 30
Let SD = 30
Let A = 1
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every GLAND.COND
Create every GLAND.COND(1)
U.GLAND.COND(A) = 1
Let GLAND.COND.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let GLAND.COND.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTF,8)
Let GLAND.COND.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR,SD,9)
Always
If time.v >= GLAND.COND.FT(A)
Let GLAND.COND.CAP(A) = 0.0
If time.v >= (GLAND.COND.FT(A) + GLAND.COND.RT(A))
Let GLAND.COND.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let GLAND.COND.FT(A) = GLAND.COND.FT(A)+GLAND.COND.RT(A)+
Exponential. f(MTTF,8)
Let GLAND.COND.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR,SD,9)
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Always
Always
Let CAPACITY = GLAND.COND.CAP(A)
Let GLAND.CONDENSER.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
END
Routine LPHEAT1
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTF_DCA, MTTF_H1A, MTTF_H2A, MTTF_DCB, MTTFH1B, MTTF_H2B,
MTTF_DCC, MTTF_H1C, MTTF_H2C, MTTRDCA, MTTR_H1A, MTTR_H2A,
MTTR_DCB, MTTRH1B, MTTR_H2B, MTTR_DCC, MTTR_H1C, MTTR_H2C,
SD_DCA, SD_H1A, SD_H2A, SDDCB, SD_HlB, SD_H2B,SD_DCC, SDSD_H1C, and
SD_H2C as real variables
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
MTTF_DCA = 5000
MTTF_DCB = 5000
MTTF_DCC = 5000
MTTR_DCA = 30
MTTR_DCB = 30
MTTR_DCC = 30
SD_DCA = 30
SD_DCB = 30
SD_DCC = 30
MTTF_H1A = 5000
MTTF_H1B = 5000
MTTF_H1C = 5000
MTTR_H1A = 30
MTTR_H1B = 30
MTTR_H1C = 30
SD_H1A = 30
SD_H1B = 30
SD_H1C = 30
MTTF_H2A = 5000
MTTF_H2B = 5000
MTTF_H2C = 5000
MTTR_H2A = 30
MTTR_H2B = 30
MTTR_H2C = 30
SD_H2A = 30
SD_H2B = 30
SD_H2C = 30
Let A = 1
Let B = 2
Let C = 3
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every DCOOL
Create every DCOOL(3)
U.DCOOL(A) = 1
U.DCOOL(B) = 1
U.DCOOL(C) = 1
Let DCOOL.CAP(A) = 0.334
Let DCOOL.CAP(B) = 0.334
Let DCOOL.CAP(C) = 0.334
Let DCOOL.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTFDCA,4)
Let DCOOL.FT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTFDCB,5)
Let DCOOL.FT(C) = Exponential.f(MTTF_DCC,6)
Let DCOOL.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_DCA,SD_DCA,7)
Let DCOOL.RT(B) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_DCB,SD_DCB,8)
Let DCOOL.RT(C) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_DCC,SD_DCC,9)
Destroy every LPH1
Create every LPH1(3)
U.LPH1(A) = 1
U.LPH1(B) = 1
U.LPH1(C) = 1
Let LPH1.CAP(A) = 0.334
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Let LPH1.CAP(B) = 0.334
Let LPH1.CAP(C) = 0.334
Let LPH1.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTF_HlA,1)
Let LPH1.FT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTF_H1B,2)
Let LPH1.FT(C) = Exponential.f(MTTF_HlC,3)
Let LPH1.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_H1A,SDH1A,4)
Let LPH1.RT(B) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_HlB,SD_H1B,5)
Let LPH1.RT(C) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_HlC,SD_HlC,6)
Destroy every LPH2
Create every LPH2(3)
U.LPH2(A) = 1
U.LPH2(B) = 1
U.LPH2(C) = 1
Let LPH2.CAP(A) = 0.334
Let LPH2.CAP(B) = 0.334
Let LPH2.CAP(C) = 0.334
Let LPH2.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTF_H2A,7)
Let LPH2.FT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTF_H2B,8)
Let LPH2.FT(C) = Exponential.f(MTTF_H2C,9)
Let LPH2.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_H2A,SDH2A,1)
Let LPH2.RT(B) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_H2B,SD_H2B,2)
Let LPH2.RT(C) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_H2C,SDH2C,3)
Always
If time.v>=DCOOL.FT(A) or time.v>=LPH1.FT(A) or time.v>=LPH2.FT(A)
If time.v >= DCOOL.FT(A)
Let DCOOL.CAP(A) = 0
If time.v >= (DCOOL.FT(A) + DCOOL.RT(A))
Let DCOOL.CAP(A) = 0.334
Let DCOOL.FT(A) = DCOOL.FT(A)+DCOOL.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTF_DCA,4)
Let DCOOL.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_DCA,SDDCA,C7)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH1.FT(A)
Let LPH1.CAP(A) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH1.FT(A) + LPH1.RT(A))
Let LPH1.CAP(A) = 0.334
Let LPH1.FT(A) = LPHl.FT(A)+LPHl.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTFHlA,1)
Let LPH1.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_HlA,SD_HlA,4)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH2.FT(A)
Let LPH2.CAP(A) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH2.FT(A) + LPH2.RT(A))
Let LPH2.CAP(A) = 0.334
Let LPH2.FT(A) = LPH2.FT(A)+LPH2.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTF_H2A,7)
Let LPH2.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_H2A,SD_H2A,1)
Always
Always
Always
If time.v>=DCOOL.FT(B) or time.v>=LPH1.FT(B) or time.v>=LPH2.FT(B)
If time.v >= DCOOL.FT(B)
Let DCOOL.CAP(B) = 0
If time.v >= (DCOOL.FT(B) + DCOOL.RT(B))
Let DCOOL.CAP(B) = 0.334
Let DCOOL.FT(B) = DCOOL.FT(B)+DCOOL.RT(B)+Exponential.f(MTTF_DCB,4)
Let DCOOL.RT(B) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_DCB,SD_DCB,7)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH1.FT(B)
Let LPH1.CAP(B) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH1.FT(B) + LPH1.RT(B))
Let LPH1.CAP(B) = 0.334
Let LPH1.FT(B) = LPHl.FT(B)+LPH1.RT(B)+Exponential.f(MTTFH1B,1)
Let LPH1.RT(B) = Log.Normal. f (MTTR_HlB,SD_H1B,4)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH2.FT(B)
Let LPH2.CAP(B) = 0
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If time.v >= (LPH2.FT(B) + LPH2.RT(B))
Let LPH2.CAP(B) = 0.334
Let LPH2.FT(B) = LPH2.FT(B)+LPH2.RT(B)+Exponential.f(MTTF_H2B,7)
Let LPH2.RT(B) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_H2B,SD_H2B,1)
Always
Always
Always
If time.v>=DCOOL.FT(C) or time.v>=LPHl.FT(C) or time.v>=LPH2.FT(C)
If time.v >= DCOOL.FT(C)
Let DCOOL.CAP(C) = 0
If time.v >= (DCOOL.FT(C) + DCOOL.RT(C))
Let DCOOL.CAP(C) = 0.334
Let DCOOL.FT(C) = DCOOL.FT(C)+DCOOL.RT(C)+Exponential.f(MTTF_DCC,4)
Let DCOOL.RT(C) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_DCC,SD_DCC,7)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH1.FT(C)
Let LPH1.CAP(C) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH1.FT(C) + LPH1.RT(C))
Let LPH1.CAP(C) = 0.334
Let LPH1.FT(C) = LPHl.FT(C)+LPHl.RT(C)+Exponential.f(MTTFHlC,l)
Let LPH1.RT(C) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_HlC,SD_H1C,4)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH2.FT(C)
Let LPH2.CAP(C) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH2.FT(C) + LPH2.RT(C))
Let LPH2.CAP(C) = 0.334
Let LPH2.FT(C) = LPH2.FT(C)+LPH2.RT(C)+Exponential.f(MTTFH2C,7)
Let LPH2.RT(C) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_H2C,SD_H2C,1)
Always
Always
Always
Let TRAIN1.CAP = Min.f(DCOOL.CAP(A),LPHl.CAP(A),LPH2.CAP(A))
Let TRAIN2.CAP = Min.f(DCOOL.CAP(B),LPH1.CAP(B),LPH2.CAP(B))
Let TRAIN3.CAP = Min.f(DCOOL.CAP(C),LPHl.CAP(C),LPH2.CAP(C))
Let CAPACITY = TRAIN1.CAP + TRAIN2.CAP + TRAIN3.CAP
Let LPHEAT1.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,l)
END
Routine LPHEAT2
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTF_H3A, MTTF_H4A, MTTF_H5A, MTTF_H3B, MTTF_H4B, MTTF_H5B,
MTTF_H3C, MTTF_H4C, MTTF_H5C, MTTR_H3A, MTTR_H4A, MTTR H5A,
MTTR_H3B, MTTR_H4B, MTTR_H5B, MTTR_H3C, MTTR_H4C, MTTRH5C,
SDH3A, SD_H4A, SD_H5A, SD_H3B, SD_H4B, SD_H5B, SD_H3C, SD_H4C, and
SD_H5C as real variables
Let MTTF_H3A = 5000
Let MTTF_H3B = 5000
Let MTTF_H3C = 5000
Let MTTR_H3A = 30
Let MTTR_H3B = 30
Let MTTR_H3C = 30
Let SD_H3A = 30
Let SD_H3B = 30
Let SD_H3C = 30
Let MTTF_H4A = 5000
Let MTTF_H4B = 5000
Let MTTF_H4C = 5000
Let MTTR_H4A = 30
Let MTTR_H4B = 30
Let MTTR_H4C = 30
Let SD_H4A = 30
Let SD_H4B = 30
Let SD_H4C = 30
Let MTTF_H5A = 5000
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
Let
MTTFH5B
MTTF_H5C
MTTR_H5A
MTTRH5B
MTTR_H5C
SD_H5A =
SD_H5B =
SD_H5C =
= 5000
= 5000
= 30
= 30
= 30
30
30
30
Let A = 1
Let B = 2
Let C = 3
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every LPH3
Create every LPH3(3)
U.LPH3(A) = 1
U.LPH3(B) = 1
U.LPH3(C) = 1
Let LPH3.CAP(A) = 0.334
Let LPH3.CAP(B) = 0.334
Let LPH3.CAP(C) = 0.334
Let LPH3.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTF_H3A,4)
Let LPH3.FT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTF_H3B,5)
Let LPH3.FT(C) .= Exponential.f(MTTF_H3C,6)
Let LPH3.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_H3A,SD_H3A,7)
Let LPH3.RT(B) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRH3B,SD_H3B,8)
Let LPH3.RT(C) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRH3C,SD_H3C,9)
Destroy every LPH4
Create every LPH4(3)
U.LPH4(A) = 1
U.LPH4(B) = 1
U.LPH4(C) = 1
Let LPH4.CAP(A) = 0.334
Let LPH4.CAP(B) = 0.334
Let LPH4.CAP(C) = 0.334
Let LPH4.FT(A) = Exponential
Let LPH4.FT(B) = Exponential
Let LPH4.FT(C) = Exponential
Let LPH4.RT(A) = Log.Normal.
Let LPH4.RT(B) = Log.Normal.
Let LPH4.RT(C) = Log.Normal.
.f(MTTFH4A,1)
.f(MTTF_H4B,2)
.f(MTTF H4C,3)
f(MTTR_H4A,SD H4A,4)
f(MTTR_H4B,SD_H4B,5)
f(MTTR_H4C,SD H4C,6)
Destroy every LPH5
Create every LPH5(3)
U.LPH5(A) = 1
U.LPH5(B) = 1
U.LPH5(C) = 1
Let LPH5.CAP(A) = 0.334
Let LPH5.CAP(B) = 0.334
Let LPH5.CAP(C) = 0.334
Let LPH5.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTFH5A,7)
Let LPH5.FT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTFH5B,8)
Let LPH5.FT(C) = Exponential.f(MTTF_H5C,9)
Let LPH5.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRH5A,SD_H5A,1)
Let LPH5.RT(B) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRH5B,SDH5B,2)
Let LPH5.RT(C) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRH5C,SD_H5C,3)
Always
If time.v>=LPH3.FT(A) or time.v>=LPH4.FT(A) or time.v>=LPH5.FT(A)
If time.v >= LPH3.FT(A)
Let LPH3.CAP(A) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH3.FT(A) + LPH3.RT(A))
Let LPH3.CAP(A) = 0.334
Let LPH3.FT(A) = LPH3.FT(A)+LPH3.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTF H3A,4)
Let LPH3.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRH3A,SD_H3A,7)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH4.FT(A)
Let LPH4.CAP(A) = 0
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If time.v >= (LPH4.FT(A) + LPH4.RT(A))
Let LPH4.CAP(A) = 0.334
Let LPH4.FT(A) = LPH4.FT(A)+LPH4.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTFH4A,1)
Let LPH4.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_H4A,SDH4A,4)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH5.FT(A)
Let LPH5.CAP(A) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH5.FT(A) + LPH5.RT(A))
Let LPH5.CAP(A) = 0.334
Let LPH5.FT(A) = LPH5.FT(A)+LPH5.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTFH5A,7)
Let LPH5.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_H5A,SD_H5A,1)
Always
Always
Always
If time.v>=LPH3.FT(B) or time.v>=LPH4.FT(B) or time.v>=LPH5.FT(B)
If time.v >= LPH3.FT(B)
Let LPH3.CAP(B) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH3.FT(B) + LPH3.RT(B))
Let LPH3.CAP(B) = 0.334
Let LPH3.FT(B) = LPH3.FT(B)+LPH3.RT(B)+Exponential.f(MTTF_H3B,4)
Let LPH3.RT(B) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_H3B,SD_H3B,7)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH4.FT(B)
Let LPH4.CAP(B) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH4.FT(B) + LPH4.RT(B))
Let LPH4.CAP(B) = 0.334
Let LPH4.FT(B) = LPH4.FT(B)+LPH4.RT(B)+Exponential.f(MTTFH4B,1)
Let LPH4.RT(B) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_H4B,SD_H4B,4)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH5.FT(B)
Let LPH5.CAP(B) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH5.FT(B) + LPH5.RT(B))
Let LPH5.CAP(B) = 0.334
Let LPH5.FT(B) = LPH5.FT(B)+LPH5.RT(B)+Exponential.f(MTTFH5B,7)
Let LPH5.RT(B) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_H5B,SD_H5B,1)
Always
Always
Always
If time.v>=LPH3.FT(C) or time.v>=LPH4.FT(C) or time.v>=LPH5.FT(C)
If time.v >= LPH3.FT(C)
Let LPH3.CAP(C) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH3.FT(C) + LPH3.RT(C))
Let LPH3.CAP(C) = 0.334
Let LPH3.FT(C) = LPH3.FT(C)+LPH3.RT(C)+Exponential.f(MTTFH3C,4)
Let LPH3.RT(C) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_H3C,SD_H3C,7)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH4.FT(C)
Let LPH4.CAP(C) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH4.FT(C) + LPH4.RT(C))
Let LPH4.CAP(C) = 0.334
Let LPH4.FT(C) = LPH4.FT(C)+LPH4.RT(C)+Exponential.f(MTTFH4C,1)
Let LPH4.RT(C) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_H4C,SDH4C,4)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH5.FT(C)
Let LPH5.CAP(C) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH5.FT(C) + LPH5.RT(C))
Let LPH5.CAP(C) = 0.334
Let LPH5.FT(C) = LPH5.FT(C)+LPH5.RT(C)+Exponential.f(MTTFH5C,7)
Let LPH5.RT(C) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR_H5C,SDH5C,1)
Always
Always
Always
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Let TRAIN1.CAP = Min.f(LPH3.CAP(A),LPH4.CAP(A),LPH5.CAP(A))
Let TRAIN2.CAP = Min.f(LPH3.CAP(B),LPH4.CAP(B),LPH5.CAP(B))
Let TRAIN3.CAP = Min.f(LPH3.CAP(C),LPH4.CAP(C),LPH5.CAP(C))
Let CAPACITY = TRAIN1.CAP + TRAIN2.CAP + TRAIN3.CAP
Let LPHEAT2.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
END
Routine FEEDPUMP
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTFA, MTTFB, MTTRA, MTTRB, SDA, and SDB as real variables
Let MTTFA = 1000
Let MTTFB = 1000
Let MTTRA = 2
Let MTTRB = 2
Let SDA = 4
Let SDB = 4
Let A = 1
Let B = 2
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every FEEDP
Create every FEEDP(2)
U.FEEDP(A) = 1
U.FEEDP(B) = 1
Let FEEDP.CAP(A) = .5
Let FEEDP.CAP(B) = .5
Let FEEDP.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTFA,4)
Let FEEDP.FT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTFB,5)
Let FEEDP.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRA,SDA,6)
Let FEEDP.RT(B) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRB,SDB,7)
Always
If time.v >= FEEDP.FT(A)
Let FEEDP.CAP(A) = 0.0
If time.v >= (FEEDP.FT(A) + FEEDP.RT(A))
Let FEEDP.CAP(A) = 0.5
Let FEEDP.FT(A) = FEEDP.FT(A)+FEEDP.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTFA,4)
Let FEEDP.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRA,SDA,6)
Always
Always
If time.v >= FEEDP.FT(B)
Let FEEDP.CAP(B) = 0.0
If time.v >= (FEEDP.FT(B) + FEEDP.RT(B))
Let FEEDP.CAP(B) = 0.5
Let FEEDP.FT(B) = FEEDP.FT(B)+FEEDP.RT(B)+Exponential.f(MTTFB,5)
Let FEEDP.RT(B) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRB,SDB,7)
Always
Always
Let CAPACITY = FEEDP.CAP(A)+FEEDP.CAP(B)
Let FEEDPUMPS.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
END
Routine HPHEAT
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTFA, MTTFB, MTTFC, MTTRA, MTTRB, MTTRC, SDA, SDB, and SDC
as real variables
Let MTTFA = 5000
Let MTTFB = 5000
Let MTTFC = 5000
Let MTTRA = 30
Let MTTRB = 30
Let MTTRC = 30
Let SDA = 30
Let SDB = 30
Let SDC = 30
Let A = 1
Let B = 2
Let C = 3
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If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every HPH
Create every HPH(3)
U.HPH(A) = 1
U.HPH(B) = 1
U.HPH(C) = 1
Let HPH.CAP(A) = .334
Let HPH.CAP(B) = .334
Let HPH.CAP(C) = .334
Let HPH.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTFA,1)
Let HPH.FT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTFB,2)
Let HPH.FT(C) = Exponential.f(MTTFC,3)
Let HPH.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRA,SDA,4)
Let HPH.RT(B) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRB,SDB,5)
Let HPH.RT(C) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRC,SDC,6)
Always
If time.v >= HPH.FT(A)
Let HPH.CAP(A) = 0.0
If time.v >= (HPH.FT(A) + HPH.RT(A))
Let HPH.CAP(A) = 0.334
Let HPH.FT(A) = HPH.FT(A)+HPH.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTFA,1)
Let HPH.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRA,SDA,4)
Always
Always
If time.v >= HPH.FT(B)
Let HPH.CAP(B) = 0.0
If time.v >= (HPH.FT(B) + HPH.RT(B))
Let HPH.CAP(B) = 0.334
Let HPH.FT(B) = HPH.FT(B)+HPH.RT(B)+Exponential.f(MTTFB,2)
Let HPH.RT(B) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRB,SDB,5)
Always
Always
If time.v >= HPH.FT(C)
Let HPH.CAP(C) = 0.0
If time.v >= (HPH.FT(C) + HPH.RT(C))
Let HPH.CAP(C) = 0.334
Let HPH.FT(C) = HPH.FT(C)+HPH.RT(C)+Exponential.f(MTTFC,3)
Let HPH.RT(C) = Log.Normal.f(MTTRC,SDC,6)
Always
Always
Let CAPACITY = HPH.CAP(A)+HPH.CAP(B)+HPH.CAP(C)
Let HPHEAT.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
END
Routine STEAM.GENERATOR
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTF, MTTR as real variables
Let MTTF = 10000
Let MTTR = 60
Let SD = 60
Let A = 1
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every STEAM.GEN
Create every STEAM.GEN(1)
U.STEAM.GEN(A) = 1
Let STEAM.GEN.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let STEAM.GEN.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTF,4)
Let STEAM.GEN.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR,SD,5)
Always
If time.v >= STEAM.GEN.FT(A)
Let STEAM.GEN.CAP(A) = 0.0
If time.v >= (STEAM.GEN.FT(A) + STEAM.GEN.RT(A))
Let STEAM.GEN.CAP(A) = 1.0
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Let STEAM.GEN.FT(A) = STEAM.GEN.FT(A)+STEAM.GEN.RT(A)+
Exponential.f(MTTF,4)
Let STEAM.GEN.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR,SD,5)
Always
Always
Let CAPACITY = STEAM.GEN.CAP(A)
Let STEAM.GENERATOR.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
END
Routine TURBINE.GENERATOR
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTF, MTTR as real variables
Let MTTF = 500
Let MTTR = 15
Let SD = 15
Let A = 1
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every TURB.GEN
Create every TURB.GEN(1)
U.TURB.GEN(A) = 1
Let TURB.GEN.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let TURB.GEN.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTF,6)
Let TURB.GEN.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR,SD,7)
Always
.If time.v >= TURB.GEN.FT(A)
Let TURB.GEN.CAP(A) = 0.0
If time.v >= (TURB.GEN.FT(A) + TURB.GEN.RT(A))
Let TURB.GEN.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let TURB.GEN.FT(A) = TURB.GEN.FT(A)+TURB.GEN.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTF,6)
Let TURB.GEN.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR,SD,7)
Always
Always
Let CAPACITY = TURB.GEN.CAP(A)
Let TURBINE.GENERATOR.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
END
Routine CONDENSER
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTF, MTTR as real variables
Let MTTF = 5000
Let MTTR = 30
Let SD = 30
Let A = 1
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every COND
Create every COND(1)
U.COND(A) = 1
Let COND.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let COND.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTF,8)
Let COND.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR,SD,9)
Always
If time.v >= COND.FT(A)
Let COND.CAP(A) = 0.0
If time.v >= (COND.FT(A) + COND.RT(A))
Let COND.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let COND.FT(A) = COND.FT(A)+COND.RT(A)+
Exponential.f(MTTF,8)
Let COND.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR,SD,9)
Always
Always
Let CAPACITY = COND.CAP(A)
Let CONDENSER.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
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END
Routine REACTOR.PUMP
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTF, MTTR as real variables
Let MTTF = 2500
Let MTTR = 20
Let SD = 20
Let A = 1
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every RCP
Create every RCP(1)
U.RCP(A) = 1
Let RCP.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let RCP.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTF,8)
Let RCP.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR,SD,9)
Always
If time.v >= RCP.FT(A)
Let RCP.CAP(A) = 0.0
If time.v >= (RCP.FT(A) + RCP.RT(A))
Let RCP.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let RCP.FT(A) = RCP.FT(A)+RCP.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTF,8)
Let RCP.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR,SD,9)
Always
Always
Let CAPACITY = RCP.CAP(A)
Let REACTOR.PUMP.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
END
Routine REACTOR
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTF, MTTR as real variables
Let MTTF = 5000
Let MTTR = 10
Let SD = 10
Let A = 1
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every REACT
Create every REACT(1)
U.REACT(A) = 1
Let REACT.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let REACT.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTF,8)
Let REACT.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR,SD,9)
Always
If time.v >= REACT.FT(A)
Let REACT.CAP(A) = 0.0
If time.v >= (REACT.FT(A) + REACT.RT(A))
Let REACT.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let REACT.FT(A) = REACT.FT(A)+REACT.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTF,8)
Let REACT.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR,SD,9)
Always
Always
Let CAPACITY = REACT.CAP(A)
Let REACTOR.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
END
Routine PRESSURIZER
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTF, MTTR as real variables
Let MTTF = 5000
Let MTTR = 20
Let SD = 20
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Let A = 1
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every PRESS
Create every PRESS(1)
U.PRESS(A) = 1
Let PRESS.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let PRESS.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTF,8)
Let PRESS.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR,SD,9)
Always
If time.v >= PRESS.FT(A)
Let PRESS.CAP(A) = 0.0
If time.v >= (PRESS.FT(A) + PRESS.RT(A))
Let PRESS.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let PRESS.FT(A) = PRESS.FT(A)+PRESS.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTF,8)
Let PRESS.RT(A) = Log.Normal.f(MTTR,SD,9)
Always
Always
Let CAPACITY = PRESS.CAP(A)
Let PRESSURIZER.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
END
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Appendix B: Sample output file from base
simulation program.
Length of cycle 1000
Number of EFPDs in5000 cycles was 4435198.0
Average number of EFPDs per cycle was 887.0
Individual system availability data
Feedwater System Availability .9369
Condensate Pump Train Availability 1.0000
Steam Jet Air Ejector Train Availability .9811
Turbine Gland Condenser Availability .9936
Low Pressure Heater Train 1 Availability .9826
Low Pressure Heater Train 2 Availability .9828
Feedwater Pump Train Availability .9979
High Pressure Heater Train Availability .9945
Steam Generator Availability .9944
Turbine Generator Availability .9713
Condensor Availability .9940
Reactor Coolant Pump Availability .9923
Reactor Availability .9980
Pressurizer Availability .9956
Overall plant availability data
Mean Plant Availability .88704
Standard Deviation of Mean Plant Availability .00129
Standard Deviation of Plant Availability .05435
Time point A(t)
10 0.952777
20 0.922165
30 0.908696
40 0.897677
50 0.896018
60 0.897728
70 0.891356
80 0.887387
90 0.889553
100 0.894457
110 0.891894
120 0.886198
130 0.885831
140 0.887091
150 0.885704
160 0.887616
170 0.883838
180 0.888969
190 0.882943
200 0.882669
210 0.882102
220 0.884691
230 0.890227
240 0.884802
250 0.883829
260 0.88253
270 0.88539
280 0.882791
290 0.877564
300 0.884228
310 0.885797
320 0.884268
330 0.88644
340 0.885809
350 0.884174
360 0.884508
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370 0.882439
380 0.87998
390 0.883144
400 0.88471
410 0.882602
420 0.881131
430 0.878495
440 0.88157
450 0.878008
460 0.879039
470 0.878996
480 0.881235
490 0.885792
500 0.88839
510 0.888992
520 0.88613
530 0.886204
540 0.883608
550 0.883651
560 0.882949
570 0.884879
580 0.880043
590 0.884533
600 0.888994
610 0.888995
620 0.884945
630 0.886602
640 0.883206
650 0.887969
660 0.886806
670 0.887371
680 0.889563
690 0.891232
700 0.890268
710 0.891331
720 0.888202
730 0.884734
740 0.885369
750 0.888334
760 0.889609
770 0.881582
780 0.885931
790 0.884868
800 0.883472
810 0.886273
820 0.888506
830 0.883581
840 0.88298
850 0.884134
860 0.883773
870 0.880115
880 0.884536
890 0.886543
900 0.889078
910 0.887544
920 0.886103
930 0.886168
940 0.88386
950 0.881892
960 0.882069
970 0.882644
980 0.880611
990 0.881278
1000 0.881507
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Appendix C:Simulation program listing for
analytic validation
PREAMBLE
''The purpose of this program is to model the a nuclear
''power plant in simplified block form with a detialed description of the
''feedwater system. Modifications have been made to the flow subrouting
'' to calculate availability instead of capacity factor.
Processes include FLOW
Resources include CONDP, SJAE, GLAND.COND, DCOOL, LPH1, LPH2, LPH3, LPH4,
LPH5, FEEDP, HPH, STEAM.GEN, TURB.GEN, COND, RCP, REACT, and PRESS
''.FT means .FAILURE.TIME; .RT means REPAIR.TIME;
''.CAP means CAPACITY; and .AV means AVAILABILITY
Every CONDP has a CONDP.FT, a CONDP.RT, a CONDP.AV, and a CONDP.CAP
Every SJAE has a SJAE.FT, a SJAE.RT, a SJAE.AV, and a SJAE.CAP
Every GLAND.COND has a GLAND.COND.FT, a GLAND.COND.RT, a GLAND.COND.AV,
and a GLAND.COND.CAP
Every DCOOL has a DCOOL.FT, a DCOOL.RT, a DCOOL.AV, and a DCOOL.CAP
Every LPH1 has a LPH1.FT, a LPH1.RT, a LPH1.AV, and a LPH1.CAP
Every LPH2 has a LPH2.FT, a LPH2.RT, a LPH2.AV, and a LPH2.CAP
Every LPH3 has a LPH3.FT, a LPH3.RT, a LPH3.AV, and a LPH3.CAP
Every LPH4 has a LPH4.FT, a LPH4.RT, a LPH4.AV, and a LPH4.CAP
Every LPH5 has a LPH5.FT, a LPH5.RT, a LPH5.AV, and a LPH5.CAP
Every FEEDP has a FEEDP.FT, a FEEDP.RT, a FEEDP.AV, and a FEEDP.CAP
Every HPH has a HPH.FT, a HPH.RT, a HPH.AV, and a HPH.CAP
Every STEAM.GEN has a STEAM.GEN.FT, a STEAM.GEN.RT, a STEAM.GEN.AV,
and a STEAM.GEN.CAP
Every TURB.GEN has a TURB.GEN.FT, a TURB.GEN.RT, a TURB.GEN.AV,
and a TURB.GEN.CAP
Every COND has a COND.FT, a COND.RT, a COND.AV, and a COND.CAP
Every RCP has a RCP.FT, a RCP.RT, a RCP.AV, and a RCP.CAP
Every REACT has a REACT.FT, a REACT.RT, a REACT.AV, and a REACT.CAP
Every PRESS has a PRESS.FT, a PRESS.RT, a PRESS.AV, and a PRESS.CAP
Define CONDP.FT, SJAE.FT, GLAND.COND.FT, DCOOL.FT, LPH1.FT, LPH2.FT,
LPH3.FT, LPH4.FT, LPH5.FT, FEEDP.FT, HPH.FT, STEAM.GEN.FT, TURB.GEN.FT,
COND.FT, RCP.FT, REACT.FT, and PRESS.FT as real variables
Define CONDP.RT, SJAE.RT, GLAND.COND.RT, DCOOL.RT, LPH1.RT, LPH2.RT,
LPH3.RT, LPH4.RT, LPH5.RT, FEEDP.RT, HPH.RT, STEAM.GEN.RT, TURB.GEN.RT,
COND.RT, RCP.RT, REACT.RT, and PRESS.RT as real variables
Define CONDP.CAP, SJAE.CAP, GLAND.COND.CAP, DCOOL.CAP, LPH1.CAP, LPH2.CAP,
LPH3.CAP, LPH4.CAP, LPH5.CAP, FEEDP.CAP, HPH.CAP, STEAM.GEN.CAP,
TURB.GEN.CAP, COND.CAP, RCP.CAP, REACT.CAP, and PRESS.CAP
as real variables
Define CONDP.AV, SJAE.AV, GLAND.COND.AV, DCOOL.AV, LPH1.AV, LPH2.AV,
LPH3.AV, LPH4.AV, LPH5.AV, FEEDP.AV, HPH.AV, STEAM.GEN.AV, TURB.GEN.AV,
COND.AV, RCP.AV, REACT.AV, and PRESS.AV as real variables
Define RESET as a text variable
Define EFPD and AVAIL as 1-dimensional, real arrays
Define NUM.CYCLES and NUM.POINTS as integer variables
Define TOTAL.EFPD, CYCLE.LENGTH and AVERAGE.EFPD as real variables
Define CONDENSATE.CAP, STEAM.JET.CAP, GLAND.CONDENSER.CAP, LPHEAT1.CAP,
LPHEAT2.CAP,FEEDPUMPS.CAP,HPHEAT.CAP,STEAM.GENERATOR.CAP,
TURBINE.GENERATOR.CAP,CONDENSER.CAP, REACTOR.PUMP.CAP, REACTOR.CAP,
PRESSURIZER.CAP, and FEEDWATER.CAP as real variables
Define CAPACITY.FACT, TIME.INCREMENT and AVAIL.AVERAGE as real variables
Tally MEAN.CAPACITY.FACT as the mean of CAPACITY.FACT
Tally SD.CAPACITY.FACT as the std.dev of CAPACITY.FACT
Tally SD.MEAN.CAPACITY.FACT as the std.dev of AVAIL.AVERAGE
Tally CONDENSATE.AV as the mean of CONDENSATE.CAP
Tally STEAM.JET.AV as the mean of STEAM.JET.CAP
Tally GLAND.CONDENSER.AV as the mean of GLAND.CONDENSER.CAP
Tally LPHEAT1.AV as the mean of LPHEAT1.CAP
Tally LPHEAT2.AV as the mean of LPHEAT2.CAP
Tally FEEDPUMPS.AV as the mean of FEEDPUMPS.CAP
Tally HPHEAT.AV as the mean of HPHEAT.CAP
Tally CONDENSER.AV as the mean of CONDENSER.CAP
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Tally REACTOR.PUMP.AV as the mean of REACTOR.PUMP.CAP
Tally PRESSURIZER.AV as the mean of PRESSURIZER.CAP
Tally TURBINE.GENERATOR.AV as the mean of TURBINE.GENERATOR.CAP
Tally REACTOR.AV as the mean of REACTOR.CAP
Tally STEAM.GENERATOR.AV as the mean of STEAM.GENERATOR.CAP
Tally FEEDWATER.AV as the mean of FEEDWATER.CAP
END
MAIN
Activate a FLOW now
Start simulation
Open 8 for output, file name = "OUTPUT"
Use 8 for output
Begin report
Print 20 lines with CYCLE.LENGTH, NUM.CYCLES, TOTAL.EFPD, AVERAGE.EFPD,
FEEDWATER.AV, CONDENSATE.AV, STEAM.JET.AV, GLAND.CONDENSER.AV, LPHEAT1.AV,
LPHEAT2.AV, FEEDPUMPS.AV, HPHEAT.AV, STEAM.GENERATOR.AV,
TURBINE.GENERATOR.AV, CONDENSER.AV, REACTOR.PUMP.AV, REACTOR.AV,
PRESSURIZER.AV thus
Length of cycle ******
Number of EFPDs in *** cycles was ****.*
Average number of EFPDs per cycle was ****.*
Individual system availability data
Feedwater System Availability **.****
Condensate Pump Train Availability ******
Steam Jet Air Ejector Train Availability **.****
Turbine Gland Condenser Availability ******
Low Pressure Heater Train 1 Availability **.***
Low Pressure Heater Train 2 Availability **.****
Feedwater Pump Train Availability **.****
High Pressure Heater Train Availability **.****
Steam Generator Availability **.****
Turbine Generator Availability **.****
Condensor Availability **.****
Reactor Coolant Pump Availability **.****
Reactor Availability **.****
Pressurizer Availability **.****
Skip 2 lines
For Z = 1 to NUM.CYCLES
DO
Let CAPACITY.FACT = EFPD(Z)/CYCLE.LENGTH
LOOP
Print 2 lines thus
Overall plant availability data
Print 3 lines with MEAN.CAPACITY.FACT, SD.MEAN.CAPACITY.FACT,
and SD.CAPACITY.FACT thus
Mean Plant Availability *****.*****
Standard Deviation of Mean Plant Availability *****.*****
Standard Deviation of Plant Availability *****.*****
Print 2 lines thus
Time point A(t)
For Y = 1 to NUM.POINTS
Do
Let TIME = TIME + TIME.INCREMENT
Print 1 line with TIME and AVAIL(Y)/NUM.CYCLES thus
***** ** *******
Loop
End
END
Process FLOW
Define TIME.TO.MEASURE as a real variable
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Define POINT as an integer variable
Let NUM.CYCLES = 5000
Let CYCLE.LENGTH = 1000
Let NUM.POINTS = 100
Reserve EFPD(*) as NUM.CYCLES
Reserve AVAIL(*) as NUM.POINTS
Let TIME.INCREMENT = Int.f(CYCLE.LENGTH/NUM.POINTS)
For I = 1 to NUM.CYCLES
Do
Let RESET = "YES"
Let POINT = 1
Let time.v = 0
Let TIME.TO.MEASURE = TIME.INCREMENT
Until (time.v>=CYCLE.LENGTH)
Do
Call FEEDWATER ''Feedwater System
Call STEAM.GENERATOR ''Steam Generators
Call TURBINE.GENERATOR ''Turbine Generator
Call CONDENSER ''Condenser
Call REACTOR.PUMP ''Reactor Coolant Pump
Call REACTOR ''Reactor
Call PRESSURIZER ''Pressurizer
Wait 1 day
Let RESET = "NO"
Let TEMP = Min.f(FEEDWATER.CAP,STEAM.GENERATOR.CAP,
TURBINE.GENERATOR.CAP,CONDENSER.CAP,REACTOR.PUMP.CAP,
REACTOR.CAP,PRESSURIZER.CAP)
If TEMP >= 1.
Let CAPACITY = 1.
Always
If TEMP < 1.
Let CAPACITY = 0.
Always
If time.v >= TIME.TO.MEASURE
Let AVAIL(POINT) = AVAIL(POINT) + CAPACITY
Let POINT = POINT+l
Let TIME.TO.MEASURE = TIME.TO.MEASURE + TIME.INCREMENT
Always
Let EFPD(I) = EFPD(I) + CAPACITY
Loop
Let TOTAL.EFPD = TOTAL.EFPD + EFPD(I)
Let AVAIL.AVERAGE = ((I-1)*AVAIL.AVERAGE + EFPD(I)/CYCLE.LENGTH)/I
Loop
Let AVERAGE.EFPD = TOTAL.EFPD / NUM.CYCLES
END
Routine FEEDWATER
Call CONDENSATE ''Feedwater System
Call GLAND.CONDENSER ''Feedwater System
Call STEAM.JET ''Feedwater System
Call LPHEAT1 ''Feedwater System
Call LPHEAT2 ''Feedwater System
Call FEEDPUMP ''Feedwater System
Call HPHEAT ''Feedwater System
Let FEEDWATER.CAP=Min.f(1,CONDENSATE.CAP,GLAND.CONDENSER.CAP,STEAM.JET.CAP,
LPHEAT1.CAP,LPHEAT2.CAP,FEEDPUMPS.CAP,HPHEAT.CAP)
END
Routine CONDENSATE
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTFA, MTTFB, MTTFC, MTTRA, MTTRB, MTTRC as real variables
Let MTTFA = 1000
Let MTTFB = 1000
Let MTTFC = 1000
164
Let MTTRA = 2
Let MTTRB = 2
Let MTTRC = 2
Let A = 1
Let B = 2
Let C = 3
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every CONDP
Create every CONDP(3)
U.CONDP(A) = 1
U.CONDP(B) = 1
U.CONDP(C) = 1
Let CONDP.CAP(A) = .5
Let CONDP.CAP(B) = .5
Let CONDP.CAP(C) = .5
Let CONDP.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTFA,1)
Let CONDP.FT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTFB,2)
Let CONDP.FT(C) = Exponential.f(MTTFC,3)
Let CONDP.RT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTRA,4)
Let CONDP.RT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTRB,5)
Let CONDP.RT(C) = Exponential.f(MTTRC,6)
Always
If time.v >= CONDP.FT(A)
Let CONDP.CAP(A) = 0.0
If time.v >= (CONDP.FT(A) + CONDP.RT(A))
Let CONDP.CAP(A) = 0.5
Let CONDP.FT(A) = CONDP.FT(A)+CONDP.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTFA,1)
Let CONDP.RT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTRA,4)
Always
Always
If time.v >= CONDP.FT(B)
Let CONDP.CAP(B) = 0.0
If time.v >= (CONDP.FT(B) + CONDP.RT(B))
Let CONDP.CAP(B) = 0.5
Let CONDP.FT(B) = CONDP.FT(B)+CONDP.RT(B)+Exponential.f(MTTFB,2)
Let CONDP.RT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTRB,5)
Always
Always
If time.v >= CONDP.FT(C)
Let CONDP.CAP(C) = 0.0
If time.v >= (CONDP.FT(C) + COND.P.RT(C))
Let CONDP.CAP(C) = 0.5
Let CONDP.FT(C) = CONDP.FT(C)+CONDP.RT(C)+Exponential.f(MTTFC,3)
Let CONDP.RT(C) = Exponential.f(MTTRC,6)
Always
Always
Let CAPACITY = CONDP.CAP(A)+CONDP.CAP(B)+CONDP.CAP(C)
Let CONDENSATE.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
END
Routine GLAND.CONDENSER
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTF, MTTR as real variables
Let MTTF = 5000
Let MTTR = 30
Let A = 1
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every GLAND.COND
Create every GLAND.COND(1)
U.GLAND.COND(A) = 1
Let GLAND.COND.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let GLAND.COND.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTF,8)
Let GLAND.COND.RT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTR,9)
Always
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If time.v >= GLAND.COND.FT(A)
Let GLAND.COND.CAP(A) = 0.0
If time.v >= (GLAND.COND.FT(A) + GLAND.COND.RT(A))
Let GLAND.COND.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let GLAND.COND.FT(A) = GLAND.COND.FT(A)+GLAND.COND.RT(A)+
Exponential. f(MTTF,8)
Let GLAND.COND.RT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTR,9)
Always
Always
Let CAPACITY = GLAND.COND.CAP(A)
Let GLAND.CONDENSER.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
END
Routine STEAM.JET
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTFA, MTTFB, MTTFC, MTTRA, MTTRB, MTTRC as real variables
Let MTTFA = 1000
Let MTTFB = 1000
Let MTTFC = 1000
Let MTTRA = 20
Let MTTRB = 20
Let MTTRC = 20
'' Let SDA = 10
'' Let SDB = 10
'' Let SDC = 10
Let A = 1
Let B = 2
Let C = 3
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every SJAE
Create every SJAE(3)
U.SJAE(A) = 1
U.SJAE(B) = 1
U.SJAE(C) = 1
Let SJAE.CAP(A) = 0.5
Let SJAE.CAP(B) = 0.5
Let SJAE.CAP(C) = 0.5
Let SJAE.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTFA,7)
Let SJAE.FT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTFB,8)
Let SJAE.FT(C) = Exponential.f(MTTFC,9)
Let SJAE.RT(A) = exponential.f(MTTRA,1)
Let SJAE.RT(B) = exponential.f(MTTRB,2)
Let SJAE.RT(C) = exponential.f(MTTRC,3)
Always
If time.v >= SJAE.FT(A)
Let SJAE.CAP(A) = 0.0
If time.v >= (SJAE.FT(A) + SJAE.RT(A))
Let SJAE.CAP(A) = 0.5
Let SJAE.FT(A) = SJAE.FT(A)+SJAE.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTFA,7)
Let SJAE.RT(A) = exponential.f(MTTRA,1)
Always
Always
If time.v >= SJAE.FT(B)
Let SJAE.CAP(B) = 0.0
If time.v >= (SJAE.FT(B) + SJAE.RT(B))
Let SJAE.CAP(B) = 0.5
Let SJAE.FT(B) = SJAE.FT(B)+SJAE.RT(B)+Exponential.f(MTTFB,8)
Let SJAE.RT(B) = exponential.f(MTTRB,2)
Always
Always
If time.v >= SJAE.FT(C)
Let SJAE.CAP(C) = 0.0
If time.v >= (SJAE.FT(C) + SJAE.RT(C))
Let SJAE.CAP(C) = 0.5
Let SJAE.FT(C) = SJAE.FT(C)+SJAE.RT(C)+Exponential.f(MTTFC,9)
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Let SJAE.RT(C) = exponential.f(MTTRC,3)
Always
Always
Let CAPACITY = SJAE.CAP(A)+SJAE.CAP(B)+SJAE.CAP(C)
Let STEAM.JET.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
END
Routine LPHEAT1
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTFDCA, MTTF_H1A, MTTF_H2A, MTTFDCB, MTTF_H1B, MTTF_H2B,
MTTF_DCC, MTTFH1C, MTTF_H2C, MTTR_DCA, MTTR_H1A, MTTRH2A,
MTTR_DCB, MTTRH1B, MTTR_H2B, MTTRDCC, MTTR_H1C, MTTR_H2C
as real variables
Let MTTF_DCA = 5000
Let MTTF_DCB = 5000
Let MTTF_DCC = 5000
Let MTTR_DCA = 30
Let MTTR_DCB = 30
Let MTTR_DCC = 30
Let MTTF_H1A = 5000
Let MTTF_H1B = 5000
Let MTTF_H1C = 5000
Let MTTR_H1A = 30
Let MTTR_H1B = 30
Let MTTR_H1C = 30
Let MTTF_H2A = 5000
Let MTTF_H2B = 5000
Let MTTF_H2C = 5000
Let MTTR_H2A = 30
Let MTTR_H2B = 30
Let MTTR_H2C = 30
Let A = 1
Let B = 2
Let C = 3
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every DCOOL
Create every DCOOL(3)
U.DCOOL(A) = 1
U.DCOOL(B) = 1
U.DCOOL(C) = 1
Let DCOOL.CAP(A) = 0.5
Let DCOOL.CAP(B) = 0.5
Let DCOOL.CAP(C) = 0.5
Let DCOOL.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTF_DCA,4)
Let DCOOL.FT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTF_DCB,5)
Let DCOOL.FT(C) = Exponential.f(MTTF_DCC,6)
Let DCOOL.RT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTR_DCA,7)
Let DCOOL.RT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTR_DCB,8)
Let DCOOL.RT(C) = Exponential.f(MTTR_DCC,9)
Destroy every LPH1
Create every LPH1(3)
U.LPH1(A) = 1
U.LPH1(B) = 1
U.LPH1(C) = 1
Let LPH1.CAP(A) = 0.5
Let LPH1.CAP(B) = 0.5
Let LPH1.CAP(C) = 0.5
Let LPH1.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTF_HA,1)
Let LPH1.FT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTF_HlB,2)
Let LPH1.FT(C) = Exponential.f(MTTFH1C,3)
Let LPH1.RT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTR_H1A,4)
Let LPH1.RT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTR_H1B,5)
Let LPH1.RT(C) = exponential.f(MTTR_HlC,6)
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Destroy every LPH2
Create every LPH2(3)
U.LPH2(A) = 1
U.LPH2(B) = 1
U.LPH2(C) = 1
Let LPH2.CAP(A) = 0.5
Let LPH2.CAP(B) = 0.5
Let LPH2.CAP(C) = 0.5
Let LPH2.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTF_H2A,7)
Let LPH2.FT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTF_H2B,8)
Let LPH2.FT(C) = Exponential.f(MTTF_H2C,9)
Let LPH2.RT(A) = exponential.f(MTTR_H2A,1)
Let LPH2.RT(B) = exponential.f(MTTR_H2B,2)
Let LPH2.RT(C) = exponential.f(MTTR_H2C,3)
Always
If time.v>=DCOOL.FT(A) or time.v>=LPH1.FT(A) or time.v>=LPH2.FT(A)
If time.v >= DCOOL.FT(A)
Let DCOOL.CAP(A) = 0
If time.v >= (DCOOL.FT(A) + DCOOL.RT(A))
Let DCOOL.CAP(A) = 0.5
Let DCOOL.FT(A) = DCOOL.FT(A)+DCOOL.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTF_DCA,4)
Let DCOOL.RT(A) = exponential.f(MTTR_DCA,7)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH1.FT(A)
Let LPH1.CAP(A) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH1.FT(A) + LPH1.RT(A))
Let LPH1.CAP(A) = 0.5
Let LPH1.FT(A) = LPH1.FT(A)+LPH1.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTFHlA, 1)
Let LPH1.RT(A) = exponential.f(MTTR_H1A,4)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH2.FT(A)
Let LPH2.CAP(A) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH2.FT(A) + LPH2.RT(A))
Let LPH2.CAP(A) = 0.5
Let LPH2.FT(A) = LPH2.FT(A)+LPH2.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTFH2A,7)
Let LPH2.RT(A) = exponential.f(MTTR_H2A,l)
Always
Always
Always
If time.v>=DCOOL.FT(B) or time.v>=LPH1.FT(B) or time.v>=LPH2.FT(B)
If time.v >= DCOOL.FT(B)
Let DCOOL.CAP(B) = 0
If time.v >= (DCOOL.FT(B) + DCOOL.RT(B))
Let DCOOL.CAP(B) = 0.5
Let DCOOL.FT(B) = DCOOL.FT(B)+DCOOL.RT(B)+Exponential.f(MTTF_DCB,4)
Let DCOOL.RT(B) = exponential.f(MTTR_DCB,7)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH1.FT(B)
Let LPH1.CAP(B) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH1.FT(B) + LPH1.RT(B))
Let LPH1.CAP(B) = 0.5
Let LPH1.FT(B) = LPH1.FT(B)+LPH1.RT(B)+Exponential.f(MTTFHlB,l)
Let LPH1.RT(B) = exponential.f(MTTR_H1B,4)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH2.FT(B)
Let LPH2.CAP(B) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH2.FT(B) + LPH2.RT(B))
Let LPH2.CAP(B) = 0.5
Let LPH2.FT(B) = LPH2.FT(B)+LPH2.RT(B)+Exponential.f(MTTFH2B,7)
Let LPH2.RT(B) = exponential.f(MTTR_H2B,1)
Always
Always
Always
If time.v>=DCOOL.FT(C) or time.v>=LPH1.FT(C) or time.v>=LPH2.FT(C)
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If time.v >= DCOOL.FT(C)
Let DCOOL.CAP(C) = 0
If time.v >= (DCOOL.FT(C) + DCOOL.RT(C))
Let DCOOL.CAP(C) = 0.5
Let DCOOL.FT(C) = DCOOL.FT(C)+DCOOL.RT(C)+Exponential.f(MTTFDCC,4)
Let DCOOL.RT(C) = exponential.f(MTTR_DCC,7)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH1.FT(C)
Let LPH1.CAP(C) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH1.FT(C) + LPH1.RT(C))
Let LPH1.CAP(C) = 0.5
Let LPH1.FT(C) = LPHl.FT(C)+LPHl.RT(C)+Exponential.f(MTTFHlC,1)
Let LPH1.RT(C) = exponential.f(MTTR_HlC,4)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH2.FT(C)
Let LPH2.CAP(C) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH2.FT(C) + LPH2.RT(C))
Let LPH2.CAP(C) = 0.5
Let LPH2.FT(C) = LPH2.FT(C)+LPH2.RT(C)+Exponential.f(MTTFH2C,7)
Let LPH2.RT(C) = exponential.f(MTTR_H2C,1)
Always
Always
Always
Let TRAIN1.CAP = Min.f(DCOOL.CAP(A),LPHl.CAP(A),LPH2.CAP(A))
Let TRAIN2.CAP = Min.f(DCOOL.CAP(B),LPHl.CAP(B),LPH2.CAP(B))
Let TRAIN3.CAP = Min.f(DCOOL.CAP(C),LPHl.CAP(C),LPH2.CAP(C))
Let CAPACITY = TRAIN1.CAP + TRAIN2.CAP + TRAIN3.CAP
Let LPHEAT1.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
END
Routine LPHEAT2
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTFH3A, MTTF_H4A, MTTF_H5A, MTTF_H3B, MTTF_H4B, MTTF_H5B,
MTTF_H3C, MTTF_H4C, MTTFH5C, MTTR_H3A, MTTR_H4A, MTTR_H5A,
MTTR_H3B, MTTR_H4B, MTTR_H5B, MTTR_H3C, MTTR_H4C, MTTR_H5C
as real variables
Let MTTF H3A = 5000
Let MTTF _H3B = 5000
Let MTTF H3C = 5000
Let MTTR_H3A = 30
Let MTTR_H3B = 30
Let MTTR H3C = 30
''Let SD H3A = 10
''Let SD_H3B = 10
''Let SDH3C = 10
Let MTTF H4A = 5000
Let MTTF H4B = 5000
Let MTTF_H4C = 5000
Let MTTR_H4A = 30
Let MTTR_H4B = 30
Let MTTR_H4C = 30
''Let SD_H4A = 10
''Let SD _H4B = 10
''Let SDH4C = 10
Let MTTF H5A = 5000
Let MTTF H5B = 5000
Let MTTF H5C = 5000
Let MTTR H5A = 30
Let MTTR H5B = 30
Let MTTR H5C = 30
''Let SD_H5A = 10
''Let SD_H5B = 10
''Let SD_H5C = 10
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Let A = 1
Let B = 2
Let C = 3
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every LPH3
Create every LPH3(3)
U.LPH3(A) = 1
U.LPH3(B) = 1
U.LPH3(C) = 1
Let LPH3.CAP(A) = 0.5
Let LPH3.CAP(B) = 0.5
Let LPH3.CAP(C) = 0.5
Let LPH3.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTF_H3A,4)
Let LPH3.FT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTF_H3B,5)
Let LPH3.FT(C) = Exponential.f(MTTF_H3C,6)
Let LPH3.RT(A) = exponential.f(MTTR_H3A,7)
Let LPH3.RT(B) = exponential.f(MTTR_H3B,8)
Let LPH3.RT(C) = exponential.f(MTTR_H3C,9)
Destroy every LPH4
Create every LPH4(3)
U.LPH4(A) = 1
U.LPH4(B) = 1
U.LPH4(C) = 1
Let LPH4.CAP(A) = 0.5
Let LPH4.CAP(B) = 0.5
Let LPH4.CAP(C) = 0.5
Let LPH4.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTF_H4A,1)
Let LPH4.FT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTF_H4B,2)
Let LPH4.FT(C) = Exponential.f(MTTF_H4C,3)
Let LPH4.RT(A) = exponential.f(MTTR_H4A,4)
Let LPH4.RT(B) = exponential.f(MTTR_H4B,5)
Let LPH4.RT(C) = exponential.f(MTTR_H4C,6)
Destroy every LPH5
Create every LPH5(3)
U.LPH5(A) = 1
U.LPH5(B) = 1
U.LPH5(C) = 1
Let LPH5.CAP(A) = 0.5
Let LPH5.CAP(B) = 0.5
Let LPH5.CAP(C) = 0.5
Let LPH5.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTF_H5A,7)
Let LPH5.FT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTF_H5B,8)
Let LPH5.FT(C) = Exponential.f(MTTF_H5C,9)
Let LPH5.RT(A) = exponential.f(MTTR_H5A,1)
Let LPH5.RT(B) = exponential.f(MTTR_H5B,2)
Let LPH5.RT(C) = exponential.f(MTTR_H5C,3)
Always
If time.v>=LPH3.FT(A) or time.v>=LPH4.FT(A) or time.v>=LPH5.FT(A)
If time.v >= LPH3.FT(A)
Let LPH3.CAP(A) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH3.FT(A) + LPH3.RT(A))
Let LPH3.CAP(A) = 0.5
Let LPH3.FT(A) = LPH3.FT(A)+LPH3.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTFH3A,4)
Let LPH3.RT(A) = exponential.f(MTTR_H3A,7)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH4.FT(A)
Let LPH4.CAP(A) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH4.FT(A) + LPH4.RT(A))
Let LPH4.CAP(A) = 0.5
Let LPH4.FT(A) = LPH4.FT(A)+LPH4.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTF_H4A,1)
Let LPH4.RT(A) = exponential.f(MTTR_H4A,4)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH5.FT(A)
Let LPH5.CAP(A) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH5.FT(A) + LPH5.RT(A))
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Let LPH5.CAP(A) = 0.5
Let LPH5.FT(A) = LPH5.FT(A)+LPH5.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTFH5A,7)
Let LPH5.RT(A) = exponential.f(MTTR_H5A,1)
Always
Always
Always
If time.v>=LPH3.FT(B) or time.v>=LPH4.FT(B) or time.v>=LPH5.FT(B)
If time.v >= LPH3.FT(B)
Let LPH3.CAP(B) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH3.FT(B) + LPH3.RT(B))
Let LPH3.CAP(B) = 0.5
Let LPH3.FT(B) = LPH3.FT(B)+LPH3.RT(B)+Exponential.f(MTTFH3B,4)
Let LPH3.RT(B) = exponential.f(MTTR_H3B,7)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH4.FT(B)
Let LPH4.CAP(B) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH4.FT(B) + LPH4.RT(B))
Let LPH4.CAP(B) = 0.5
Let LPH4.FT(B) = LPH4.FT(B)+LPH4.RT(B)+Exponential.f(MTTF_H4B,1)
Let LPH4.RT(B) = exponential.f(MTTR_H4B,4)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH5.FT(B)
Let LPH5.CAPtB) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH5.FT(B) + LPH5.RT(B))
Let LPH5.CAP(B) = 0.5
Let LPH5.FT(B) = LPH5.FT(B)+LPH5.RT(B)+Exponential.f(MTTFH5B,7)
Let LPH5.RT(B) = exponential.f(MTTR_H5B,1)
Always
Always
Always
If time.v>=LPH3.FT(C) or time.v>=LPH4.FT(C) or time.v>=LPH5.FT(C)
If time.v >= LPH3.FT(C)
Let LPH3.CAP(C) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH3.FT(C) + LPH3.RT(C))
Let LPH3.CAP(C) = 0.5
Let LPH3.FT(C) = LPH3.FT(C)+LPH3.RT(C)+Exponential.f(MTTFH3C,4)
Let LPH3.RT(C) = exponential.f(MTTR_H3C,7)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH4.FT(C)
Let LPH4.CAP(C) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH4.FT(C) + LPH4.RT(C))
Let LPH4.CAP(C) = 0.5
Let LPH4.FT(C) = LPH4.FT(C)+LPH4.RT(C)+Exponential.f(MTTFH4C,1)
Let LPH4.RT(C) = exponential.f(MTTR_H4C,4)
Always
Always
If time.v >= LPH5.FT(C)
Let LPH5.CAP(C) = 0
If time.v >= (LPH5.FT(C) + LPH5.RT(C))
Let LPH5.CAP(C) = 0.5
Let LPH5.FT(C) = LPH5.FT(C)+LPH5.RT(C)+Exponential.f(MTTF_H5C,7)
Let LPH5.RT(C) = exponential.f(MTTR_H5C,1)
Always
Always
Always
Let TRAIN1.CAP = Min.f(LPH3.CAP(A),LPH4.CAP(A),LPH5.CAP(A))
Let TRAIN2.CAP = Min.f(LPH3.CAP(B),LP4.CAP(B),LPH5.CAP(B))
Let TRAIN3.CAP = Min.f(LPH3.CAP(C),LPH4.CAP(C),LPH5.CAP(C))
Let CAPACITY = TRAIN1.CAP + TRAIN2.CAP + TRAIN3.CAP
Let LPHEAT2.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
END
Routine FEEDPUMP
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Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTFA, MTTFB, MTTRA, MTTRB as real variables
Let MTTFA = 1000
Let MTTFB = 1000
Let MTTRA = 2
Let MTTRB = 2
Let A = 1
Let B = 2
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every FEEDP
Create every FEEDP(2)
U.FEEDP(A) = 1
U.FEEDP(B) = 1
Let FEEDP.CAP(A) =1.
Let FEEDP.CAP(B) =1.
Let FEEDP.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTFA,4)
Let FEEDP.FT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTFB,5)
Let FEEDP.RT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTRA,6)
Let FEEDP.RT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTRB,7)
Always
If time.v >= FEEDP.FT(A)
Let FEEDP.CAP(A) = 0.0
If time.v >= (FEEDP.FT(A) + FEEDP.RT(A))
Let FEEDP.CAP(A) = 1.
Let FEEDP.FT(A) = FEEDP.FT(A)+FEEDP.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTFA,4)
Let FEEDP.RT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTRA,6)
Always
Always
If time.v >= FEEDP.FT(B)
Let FEEDP.CAP(B) = 0.0
If time.v >= (FEEDP.FT(B) + FEEDP.RT(B))
Let FEEDP.CAP(B) = 1.
Let FEEDP.FT(B) = FEEDP.FT(B)+FEEDP.RT(B)+Exponential.f(MTTFB,5)
Let FEEDP.RT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTRB,7)
Always
Always
Let CAPACITY = FEEDP.CAP(A)+FEEDP.CAP(B)
Let FEEDPUMPS.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
END
Routine HPHEAT
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTFA, MTTFB, MTTFC, MTTRA, MTTRB, MTTRC as real variables
Let MTTFA = 5000
Let MTTFB = 5000
Let MTTFC = 5000
Let MTTRA = 30
Let MTTRB = 30
Let MTTRC = 30
Let A = 1
Let B = 2
Let C = 3
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every HPH
Create every HPH(3)
U.HPH(A) = 1
U.HPH(B) = 1
U.HPH(C) = 1
Let HPH.CAP(A) = .5
Let HPH.CAP(B) = .5
Let HPH.CAP(C) = .5
Let HPH.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTFA,1)
Let HPH.FT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTFB,2)
Let HPH.FT(C) = Exponential.f(MTTFC,3)
Let HPH.RT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTRA,4)
Let HPH.RT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTRB,5)
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Let HPH.RT(C) = Exponential.f(MTTRC,6)
Always
If time.v >= HPH.FT(A)
Let HPH.CAP(A) = 0.0
If time.v >= (HPH.FT(A) + HPH.RT(A))
Let HPH.CAP(A) = 0.5
Let HPH.FT(A) = HPH.FT(A)+HPH.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTFA,1)
Let HPH.RT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTRA,4)
Always
Always
If time.v >= HPH.FT(B)
Let HPH.CAP(B) = 0.0
If time.v >= (HPH.FT(B) + HPH.RT(B))
Let HPH.CAP(B) = 0.5
Let HPH.FT(B) = HPH.FT(B)+HPH.RT(B)+Exponential.f(MTTFB,2)
Let HPH.RT(B) = Exponential.f(MTTRB,5)
Always
Always
If time.v >= HPH.FT(C)
Let HPH.CAP(C) = 0.0
If time.v >= (HPH.FT(C) + HPH.RT(C))
Let HPH.CAP(C) = 0.5
Let HPH.FT(C) = HPH.FT(C)+HPH.RT(C)+Exponential.f(MTTFC,3)
Let HPH.RT(C) = Exponential.f(MTTRC,6)
Always
Always
Let CAPACITY = HPH.CAP(A)+HPH.CAP(B)+HPH.CAP(C)
Let HPHEAT.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
END
Routine STEAM.GENERATOR
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTF, MTTR as real variables
Let MTTF = 10000
Let MTTR = 60
Let A = 1
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every STEAM.GEN
Create every STEAM.GEN(1)
U.STEAM.GEN(A) = 1
Let STEAM.GEN.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let STEAM.GEN.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTF,4)
Let STEAM.GEN.RT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTR,5)
Always
If time.v >= STEAM.GEN.FT(A)
Let STEAM.GEN.CAP(A) = 0.0
If time.v >= (STEAM.GEN.FT(A) + STEAM.GEN.RT(A))
Let STEAM.GEN.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let STEAM.GEN.FT(A) = STEAM.GEN.FT(A)+STEAM.GEN.RT(A)+
Exponential.f(MTTF,4)
Let STEAM.GEN.RT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTR,5)
Always
Always
Let CAPACITY = STEAM.GEN.CAP(A)
Let STEAM.GENERATOR.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
END
Routine TURBINE.GENERATOR
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTF, MTTR as real variables
Let MTTF = 500
Let MTTR = 15
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Let A = 1
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every TURB.GEN
Create every TURB.GEN(1)
U.TURB.GEN(A) = 1
Let TURB.GEN.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let TURB.GEN.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTF,6)
Let TURB.GEN.RT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTR,7)
Always
If time.v >= TURB.GEN.FT(A)
Let TURB.GEN.CAP(A) = 0.0
If time.v >= (TURB.GEN.FT(A) + TURB.GEN.RT(A))
Let TURB.GEN.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let TURB.GEN.FT(A) = TURB.GEN.FT(A)+TURB.GEN.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTF,6)
Let TURB.GEN.RT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTR,7)
Always
Always
Let CAPACITY = TURB.GEN.CAP(A)
Let TURBINE.GENERATOR.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
END
Routine CONDENSER
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTF, MTTR as real variables
Let MTTF = 5000
Let MTTR = 30
Let A = 1
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every COND
Create every COND(1)
U.COND(A) = 1
Let COND.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let COND.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTF,8)
Let COND.RT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTR,9)
Always
If time.v >= COND.FT(A)
Let COND.CAP(A) = 0.0
If time.v >= (COND.FT(A) + COND.RT(A))
Let COND.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let COND.FT(A) = COND.FT(A)+COND.RT(A)+
Exponential. f(MTTF,8)
Let COND.RT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTR,9)
Always
Always
Let CAPACITY = COND.CAP(A)
Let CONDENSER.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
END
Routine REACTOR.PUMP
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTF, MTTR as real variables
Let MTTF = 2500
Let MTTR = 20
Let A = 1
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every RCP
Create every RCP(1)
U.RCP(A) = 1
Let RCP.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let RCP.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTF,8)
Let RCP.RT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTR,9)
Always
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If time.v >= RCP.FT(A)
Let RCP.CAP(A) = 0.0
If time.v >= (RCP.FT(A) + RCP.RT(A))
Let RCP.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let RCP.FT(A) = RCP.FT(A)+RCP.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTF,8)
Let RCP.RT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTR,9)
Always
Always
Let CAPACITY = RCP.CAP(A)
Let REACTOR.PUMP.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
END
Routine REACTOR
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTF, MTTR as real variables
Let MTTF = 5000
Let MTTR = 10
Let A = 1
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every REACT
Create every REACT(1)
U.REACT(A) = 1
Let REACT.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let REACT.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTF,8)
Let REACT.RT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTR,9)
Always
If time.v >= REACT.FT(A)
Let REACT.CAP(A) = 0.0
If time.v >= (REACT.FT(A) + REACT.RT(A))
Let REACT.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let REACT.FT(A) = REACT.FT(A)+REACT.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTF,8)
Let REACT.RT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTR,9)
Always
Always
Let CAPACITY = REACT.CAP(A)
Let REACTOR.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
END
Routine PRESSURIZER
Define CAPACITY as a real variable
Define MTTF, MTTR as real variables
Let MTTF = 5000
Let MTTR = 20
Let A = 1
If RESET = "YES"
Destroy every PRESS
Create every PRESS(1)
U.PRESS(A) = 1
Let PRESS.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let PRESS.FT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTF,8)
Let PRESS.RT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTR,9)
Always
If time.v >= PRESS.FT(A)
Let PRESS.CAP(A) = 0.0
If time.v >= (PRESS.FT(A) + PRESS.RT(A))
Let PRESS.CAP(A) = 1.0
Let PRESS.FT(A) = PRESS.FT(A)+PRESS.RT(A)+Exponential.f(MTTF,8)
Let PRESS.RT(A) = Exponential.f(MTTR,9)
Always
Always
Let CAPACITY = PRESS.CAP(A)
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Let PRESSURIZER.CAP = Min.f(CAPACITY,1)
END
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Appendix D - Mathcad listing used in analytic verification of
simulation.
1. Notation:
Availability of each system: AS i 1.. 7
Feedwater System: AS,
Steam generator: AS 2
Turbine Generator: AS 3
Condensor: AS4
Reactor Coolant Pump: AS 5
Reactor: AS 6
Pressurizer: AS 7
Availability of each block in Feedwater System: AB j j = 1.. 7
Condensate Pumps Block: AB I
Steam Jet/Air Ejectors Block: AB 2
Steam Gland Condenser Block: AB 3
Low Pressure Heaters Block 1: AB 4
Low Pressure Heaters Block 2: AB 5
Feedwater Pumps Blcok: AB 6
High Pressure Heaters Block: AB 7
Availability of each component in Feedwater System: AC k = 1 . 6
Condensate Pump: AC 
Steam Jet: AC 2
Drain Cooler: AC 3
Heater: AC 4
Feedwater Pump: AC 5
Gland Condenser: AC 6
2. Time Point to be calculated:
T := 1000
3. Calculation of Availability of Feedwater System:
A. Availability of each component:
Mean Time To Failure of each component:
Mean Time To Repair of each component:
MTTFCk: =
Condensate Pump:
Steam Jet:
Drain Cooler:
Heater:
Feedwater Pump:
Gland Condenser:
1
k MTTFCk
ACk
1000
1000
5000
5000
1000
5000
MTTFCk
MTTRCk
MTTRCk .=
2
20
30
30
2
30
Iik MTTR
MTTRSk
k Ck -(ck- ( Ck) .T
[ck Ck ck tCk
Condensate Pump:
Steam Jet:
Drain Cooler:
Heater:
Feedwater Pump:
Gland Condenser:
B. Availability of each block:
AB = 3. (AC ) 2
AB2 : 3. (AC)2
- 2. (AC1)3
- 2. (AC 2) 3
AB3 = AC
AB 4 =3 (AC 3)2 (AC 4)
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ACk
0.99800,
0.98039:
0.99403{
0.99403{
0.99800,
0.99403{
4 2. (AC3)3 (AC4)
i
I
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AB 5 -3.(AC 4)6 - 2 (AC 4)9
AB6= 2 AC5 - (AC 5)2
AB 7 3. (AC 4) 2 - 2 (AC 4)3
Condensate Pumps Block:
Steam Jet/Air Ejectors Block:
Steam Gland Condenser Block:
Low Pressure Heaters Block 1:
Low Pressure Heaters Block 2:
Feedwater Pumps Blcok:
High Pressure Heaters Block:
AB.
0.99998
0.99886'
0.99403(
0.99906'
0.99906'
0.99999(
0.99989'
C. Availability of Feedwater System:
ASI :=HAB
J
AS = 0.990922
4. Calculation of Availability of each System(Except Feedwater System):
Mean Time To Failure of each system:
Mean Time To Repair of each system:
MITFS :
n
Steam generator:
Turbine Generator:
Condensor:
Reactor Coolant Pump:
Reactor:
Pressurizer:
10000
500
5000
2500
5000
5000
MTFS
MTTRS
n
n :=2..7
MTTRS :=
n
60
15
30
20
10
20
I
I
I
s =MTTFS
n MTTFS
n
ns
AS 
n s -X s
n n
Feedwater System:
Steam generator:
Turbine Generator:
Condensor:
Reactor Coolant Pump:
Reactor:
Pressurizer:
1
n MTTRS
n
4s n -(,s n tSn) 'T
, n t n
AS.
0.99092,
0.99403(
0.97087L
0.99403(
0.99206'
0.99800L
0.99601(
5. Availability of whole plant:
Aplant I ASi
i
A plant = 0.937442
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